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ABSTRACT 
Name of Candidate Jin-Soo Park 
Title of Thesis: Marine Traffic Engineering in Korean Coastal Waters 
This study describes and discusses the marine casualties, the effectiveness of 
existing traffic services, and marine safety and Vessel Traffic Service(VTS) in Korean 
coastal waters. 
Marine traffic is comprehensively assessed in Korean waters, an analysis of 
casualties is undertaken by block scheme. Marine environmental parameters are 
identified relating to marine casualties as appropriate. Various statistical techniques are 
employed to evaluate the inter-relationships between individual causal factors, and for 
the first time effect level is instituted to quantify the relative importance of the causal 
factors in Korean waters. 
A further innovation is the examination of the adequacy of existing Korean traffic 
services by casualty and traffic analysis, and an accident danger index is introduced to 
compare accident danger over different .time periods. 
A mixed population of contributors to marine safety is sought by questionnaire. 
The design of this is both innovative and original in content in order to evaluate the 
perceived importance of the various risk factors, the marginal effectiveness of various 
options in reducing risks, and their weight with regard to YTS services and activities, 
'fhe main part of the study uses an original multiple coefficient to estimate 
casualty reduction rate and a new method· to quantify the effectiveness .of VfS. The 
Korean waters traffic study is conducted as an intermediate level and provides the data 
base for the main body of work. 
The conclusions include recommendations with respect to the stricter enforcement 
of the routeing scheme(TSS) and the adoption of further traffic observation/surveillance 
over the areas concerned. 
Finally it is noted in particular that additional Vessel 'fraffic Service and Traffic 
Separation Schemes are now required if any substantial improvement is to be achieved 
in marine traffic safety in Korean coastal waters. 
University of Plymouth 
I 9 9 4 
Ill 
LIST OF CONTENTS 
COPYRIGHT STATEMENT ............................. . 
TITLE.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 
LIST OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1v 
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vm 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xm 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv 
AUTHOR'S DECLARATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv1 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background .................................... . 
1.2 Objectives and Methodology of Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
1.2.1 Survey of existing methods of assessing risk . . . . . . . . . 3 
1.2.2 Analysis of factors affecting marine traffic safety . . . . . . 7 
1.3 Marine Traffic Engineering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
1.4 Thesis Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
2 CHAPTER 2: MARITIME ENVIRONMENT 
2.1 Meteorological Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 
2.1.1 General................................... 14 
2.1.2 Fog and visibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 
2.1.3 Wind..................................... 19 
2.1.4 Precipitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 
2.2 Maritime Topography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 
2.2.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 
2.2.2 Sea and swell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
2.2.3 Current and tide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
2.2.4 Coast and ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 
2.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 
iv 
3 CHAPTER 3: VESSEL TRAFFIC DATA 
3.1 Vessel Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 
3.2 Movement of Vessels .. , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 
3.2.1 Total movement in ports ...... , ............ , . . . . 38 
3.2.2 Monthly vessel movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 
3.2.3 Fishing vessel activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 
3.3 Sea-borne Cargo Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 
3.3.1 Total cargo traffic ................... , . . . . . . . . 43 
3.3.2 Monthly cargo traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 
3.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 
References ........ , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 
4 CHAPTER 4: SHIP CASUAL TIES 
4.1 Introduction and General Trends of Casualties . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 
4.2 Casualty Data Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 
4.2.1 Data sources ............................. , . . 51 
4.2.2 Data collection and classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 
4.2.3 Evaluation of causal factors and their relationship . . . . . . 54 
4.2.4 Coding and processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 
4.3 The Analysis of Marine Casualties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 
4.3.1 Sample attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 
4.3.2 Sample distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 
4.3.3 Breakdown of data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 
4.3.4 Type of casualties and their local and seasonal distributions 63 
4.3.5 Time of day and day of week ...... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 
4.3.6 Ship type, size and age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 
4.4 Analysis of Cause Relationships ............ . 76 
4.4.1 Possible causes of casualty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 
4.4.2 Most common causal factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 
4.4.3 Effect level of causal factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 
4.5 Consequences of Casualties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 
4.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 07 
V 
5 CHAPTER 5: EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
EXISTING TRAFFIC SERVICES 
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 
5.2 The Inchon Inbound and Outbound Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 
5.2.1 Scope of investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 
5.2.2 Traffic accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 
5.3 Traffic Separation Scheme off Kanjol-Gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 
5.3.1 Scope of investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 
5.3.2 Traffic accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 
5.4 Jinhae-Man Traffic Separation Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 
5.4.1 Scope of investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 
5.4.2 Traffic accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 
5.5 Pusan Vessel Movement Reporting Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 
5.5.1 Introduction .............................. , . . 133 
5.5.2 Scope of investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 
5.5.3 Casualties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 
5.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 
References and Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 
6 CHAPTER 6: QUESTIONNA:IRE SURVEY ON THE MARINE 
SAFETY AND VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICES IN 
KOREAN COASTAL WATERS 
6.1 Survey Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 
6.2 Data Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 
6.3 Respondents' Profiles ............... , .......... , . . . 151 
6.4 Risk Perception ........................ , . . . . . . . . . 154 
6.5 Options for Improving Marine Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 
6.6 YTS Operators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 
6.7 Effectiveness of YTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 
6.8 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176 
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178 
7 CHAPTER 7: EFFECTIVENESS OF VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICES 
7 .I Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 
7.2 Literature Survey related to YTS Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 
7.2.1 Risk assessment - Problem Area Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . 183 
VI 
7.2.2 National YTS study, Canada 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188 
7.2.3 USCG - Port needs study (VTS benefits) 1991 . . . . . . . . 190 
7.2.4 YTS Update study, Canada 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 
7.2.5 Survey on vessel traffic management systems . . . . . . . . . 195 
7.2 .6 Vessel traffic systems: Analysis of port needs . . . . . . . . . 195 
7.2. 7 Casualty analysis of selected waterways 1978 . . . . . . . . . 196 
7.2.8 Trends in navigation safety in the Dover Strait, 1978 . . . 198 
7.2.9 Safety assessment of waterway network in Tokyo Bay . . 199 
7.3 The Development of YTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 
7.4 YTS Addressable Casualty and Causal Factor ....... , . . . . . . 203 
7.5 Estimation of YTS Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 
7.6 Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209 
7.7 Summary ................. , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212 
References ................................. , , , . . . . . 214 
8 CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8 .I Summary of the main points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217 
8.2 Recommendations and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222 
ANNEX TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 
ANNEX A: CAUSAL FACTORS OF CASUALTIES . . . . . . . . . . . 226 
ANNEX B: CASUALTY CARD.......................... 229 
ANNEX C: TABLES FROM STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MARINE 
CASUAL TIES ....................... , . . . . . . 232 
ANNEX D: LIST OF TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239 
ANNEX E: CODING SCHEME FOR QUESTIONNAIRE . . . . . . . 249 
ANNEX F: QUESTIONNAIRES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252 
REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269 
VII 
LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE 2.1 Visibility Scale used at Sea ..................... 15 
TABLE 2.2 Average Foggy Days per Month in Major Ports ....... 17 
TABLE 2.3 Average Wind Speed in Major Ports ............... 20 
TABLE 2.4 Average Rainfalls in Major Ports ................. 21 
TABLE 2.5 Climatic Table .............................. 22 
TABLE 2.6 Frequency of Wave Height ...................... 25 
TABLE 2.7 Tidal Features in Major Ports .................... 28 
TABLE 3.1 Vessels Registered 1990 ....................... 33 
TABLE 3.2 Vessels Registered by Tonnage 1990 .............. 33 
TABLE 3.3 Vessels Registered by Ship's Age 1990 ............. 35 
TABLE 3.4 Korean Merchant Fleets 1972-1991 •••• 0 ••••• 0 •••• 36 
TABLE 3.5 Ship's Age of Merchant Fleet ................... 36 
TABLE 3.6 Size and Age of All Steamships and Motor-ships ...... 37 
TABLE 3.7 Total Vessel Movement ........................ 38 
TABLE 3.8 Vessel Arrivals by Tonnage Group ................ 39 
TABLE 3.9 Fishing Fleet by Tonnage Group ................. 42 
TABLE 3.10 Number of Fishing boats by Construction material and 
Age group ( 1989) ........................... , 42 
TABLE 3.11 Fishing Fleet by Type of Fishing ( 1989) ............ 43 
TABLE 3.12 Monthly Cargo Traffic (1986-1990) ....... , ....... 45 
TABLE 4.1 Casualties by Type of Vessel .................... 49 
TABLE 4.2 Number of Casualties by Type of Incident ........... 50 
TABLE 4.3 Number of Casualties by Time band ............... 50 
TABLE 4.4 Number of Casualties by Waterway type ............ 51 
TABLE 4.5 Comparison of Grouping of Causal factors .......... 53 
TABLE 4.6 Total Number of Ship-casualties vs Samples ......... 58 
TABLE 4.7 Distribution of Accidents in Korean waters .......... 61 
TABLE 4.8 Mean Casualty Frequency based on Number of registered 62 
TABLE 4.9 Mean Casualty Frequency based on Number of movements 63 
TABLE 4.10 Cross-tabulation of Waterway type by Casualty type .... 67 
TABLE 4.11 Cross-tabulation of Casualties by Ship type .......... 75 
viii 
TABLE 4.12 Weight Coefficient used in this Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 
TABLE 4.13 Possible Causes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 
TABLE 4.14 Descriptive Statistics for the Possible causes . . . . . . . . . 90 
TABLE 4. 1'5 Mean Weight Coefficient by Factor groups . . . . . . . . . . 96 
TABLE 4.16 The Relative Importance of each group of Causal Factors 96 
TABLE 4.17 The Relative Importance of the three factor groups in 
different type of Casualties (Park J S) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 
TABLE 4.18 The Relative Importance of the three factor groups m 
different type of Casualties (Tuovinen P) . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 
TABLE 4.19 The most Influential Factors in different type of Casualties 98 
TABLE 4.20 The Relative Significance of the three factor groups m 
different Sub-areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 00 
TABLE 4.21 The most Influential Factors in different Sub-areas . . . . . 101 
TABLE 4.22 Summing up the Consequences of Casualties . . . . . . . . . I 02 
TABLE 4.23 Lives lost by Casualty type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 
TABLE 4.24 Total losses by Casualty type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 03 
TABLE 4.25 Number of Hull Damage by Casualty type . . . . . . . . . . 105 
TABLE 5.1 Number of Accidents in Inchon Routeing Scheme . . . . . 119 
TABLE 5.2 Accidents in Inchon after the Routeing Scheme . . . . . . . 121 
TABLE 5.3 Size of Ships involved in Accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 
TABLE 5.4 Traffic Danger Index for Jnchon area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 
TABLE 5.5 The Accidents by Type of Vessel .............. , . 123 
TABLE 5.6 Number of Accidents off Kanjol-gap TSS . . . . . . . . . . . 125 
TABLE 5.7 Size of Ships involved in Accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 
TABLE 5.8 The Accidents by Type of Vessel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 
TABLE 5. 9 Number of Accidents in Jinhae-man TSS ....... , . . . 130 
TABLE 5.10 Size of Ships involved in Accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 
TABLE 5.11 The Accidents by Type of Vessel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 
TABLE 5.12 Number of Accidents in Pusan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 
TABLE 5.13 Main Causal Factors of Grounding Incidents . . . . . . . . . 138 
TABLE 5.14 Location of Accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 
TABLE 5.15 Size of Ships involved in Accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140 
TABLE 5.16 Traffic Danger Index for Pusan area............... 141 
TABLE 5.17 The Accidents by Type of Vessel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 
IX 
TABLE 6.1 Questionnaire responses by Shipboard Experience . . . . . 149 
TABLE 6.2 Questionnaire responses by Marine Background . . . . . . . 149 
TABLE 6.3 List of Population receiving the Questionnaire . . . . . . . . 150 
TABLE 6.4 Shipboard Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 
TABLE 6.5 Average Size of Vessel........................ 153 
TABLE 6.6 Familiar Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 
TABLE 6. 7 Ranking of Risk factors by Occupational groups . . . . . . 155 
TABLE 6.8 Ranking of Options by Occupational groups . . . . . . . . . . 159 
TABLE 6.9 Implementation/Modification to VTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162 
TABLE 6.10 VTS Level, VTS Type and Formal Authority of VTS . . . 163 
TABLE 6.11 VTS Operators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 
TABLE 6.12 Summary of Views on VTS Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . 168 
TABLE 7.1 Estimated Effect of VTS on Collision Rate . . . . . . . . . . 186 
TABLE 7.2 Estimated Effect of Shore Support on Stranding Rate . . . 187 
TABLE 7.3 VTS Effectiveness on Canadian VTS Study . . . . . . . . . . 189 
TABLE 7.4 VTS Effectiveness Percentage used in 1988 Update Study 190 
TABLE 7.5 VTS Effectiveness Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192 
TABLE 7.6 VTS Effectiveness Percentage for Collisions & Strikings 
involving participating vessels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194 
TABLE 7.7 VTS Effectiveness Percentage for Non-participating vessels 
Colliding with Participating vessels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194 
TABLE 7.8 VTS Effectiveness Percentage for all Groundings of 
participating vessels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194 
TABLE 7. 9 Estimated Reduction in Vessel Accidents by VTS Service 
Level ... 0 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 196 
TABLE 7 .I 0 Estimated Percentage of Accidents preventable by VTS . . 198 
TABLE 7.11 Summary of Collisions over 15 Years in Dover Strait .. 0 198 
TABLE 7.12 Tokyo Bay Percent Index of Historical Accidents . . . . . . 199 
TABLE 7.13 Estimated VTS Effectiveness Percentage . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207 
TABLE 7.14 Estimated VTS Effectiveness Percentage by Sub-area . . . 209 
TABLE 7.15 Sensitivity Analysis of VTS Effectiveness by Casualty type 211 
TABLE 7.16 Sensitivity Analysis of VTS Effectiveness by Sub-area . . 212 
X 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
FIGURE 1.1 Study Areas with the Sub-area Division ....... 6 
FIGURE 2.1 Foggy Days per Annum .................. 16 
FIGURE 2.2 Monthly Frequency of Sea Fog ............. 18 
FIGURE 2.3 Frequency of Sea Fog Occurrence ........... 18 
FIGURE 2.4 Average Rainfalls in Major Ports ........... , 23 
FIGURE 2.5 Predominant Current in Korea .............. 27 
FIGURE 3.1 Trends of Vessel Registered ................ 34 
FIGURE 3.2 Vessel Registered by Age group ............. 34 
FIGURE 3.3 Vessel Movement by Gross ton ............. 40 
FIGURE 3.4 Monthly Vessel Movement ................ 40 
FIGURE 3.5 Fishing Fleet by Construction Material ........ 44 
FIGURE 3.6 Total Cargo Traffic ........... , .......... 44 
FIGURE 3.7 Monthly Cargo Movement ................. 46 
FIGURE 4.1 Trends of Marine Casualties ................ 49 
FIGURE 4.2 Block Diagram ......................... 55 
FIGURE 4.3 Total Casualties by their Type .............. 65 
FIGURE 4.4 Distribution of Casualties by Waterway type .... 65 
FIGURE 4.5 Geographical Distribution of Casualties ........ 66 
FIGURE 4.6 Monthly Numbers of Casualties ............ 68 
FIGURE 4.7 Distribution of Casualties by Month .......... 70 
FIGURE 4.8 Distribution of Casualties by Watches ......... 68 
FIGURE 4.9 Distribution of Casualties by Bays of Week .... 73 
FIGURE 4.10 Distribution of Casualties by Ship Size ........ 77 
FIGURE 4.11 Distribution of Casualties by Ship's Age .... , , , 77 
FIGURE 4.12 Diagram of the Collision case .............. 83 
FIGURE 4.13 Frequency of Possible Causes ............... 89 
FIGURE 5.1 Existing Traffic Services in Korea ........... 113 
FIGURE 5.2 Trends of Vessel Movements in Jnchon ........ 116 
FIGURE 5.3 Inchon lnbound/Outbound Route ............ 117 
FIGURE 5.4 Location of Traffic Accidents (Inchon) ........ 120 
FIGURE 5.5 Traffic Separation Scheme off Kanjol-Gap ..... 127 
XI 
FIGURE 5.6 
FIGURE 5.7 
FIGURE 5.8 
FIGURE 5.9 
FIGURE 6.1 
FIGURE 6.2 
FIGURE 6.3 
FIGURE 7.1 
Traffic Separation Scheme in Jinhae-Man . . . . . . 131 
Trends of Vessel Movements in Pusan . . . . . . . . 135 
Pusan and Ifs Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 
Location of Collision Accidents (Pusan) . . . . . . . 142 
Effectiveness Indices of VTS by Occupational 
Groupings (I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170 
Effectiveness Indices of VTS by Occupational 
Groupings (2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 
Effectiveness Indices of VTS by Occupational 
Groupings (3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 
Overview of VTS Effectiveness Analysis . . . . . . 184 
XII 
ANOVA 
Av 
BIB 
BIMCO 
CCG 
CCTV 
CNIS 
COST 
CIR/G 
On V 
E 
Ed(s) 
ElL 
ETA 
et a! 
Fig 
FRP 
FY 
GCG 
GRT 
HAR 
HHW 
HMSO 
HP 
HUT 
IALA 
ibid 
IMCO 
IMO 
JAMRI 
KMPA 
ABBREVIATIONS 
Analysis of Variance 
Average 
Bridge-to-Bridge 
Baltic and International Maritime Council 
Canadian Coast Guard 
Closed Circuit Television 
Channel Navigation Information Service 
Cooperation in the field of Sciences and Technologies 
Collision/Ramming/Grounding 
Det norske Veritas 
East 
Editor(s) 
Effect Level 
Estimated Time of Arrival 
et alibi (and elsewhere) 
Figure 
Fibreglass Reinforced Plastics 
Fiscal Year 
Government Consulting Group 
Gross Register Tonnage 
Harbour Advisory Radar 
Highest High Water 
Her Majesty's Stationery Office 
Horse Power 
Helsinki University ofTechnology 
International Association of Lighthouse Authorities 
ibidem 
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization 
International Maritime Organization 
Japan Maritime Research Institute 
Korea Maritime and Port Administration 
X111 
KMU Korea Maritime University 
LPG Liquified Petroleum Gas 
m, M Metre(s) 
MAlA Marine Accident Inquiry Agency 
MA REP Ship Movement Reporting Scheme 
MIE Main Engine 
MF Medium Frequency 
MRR Movement Restriction Regulations 
MSA Maritime Safety Agency 
MSL Mean Sea Level 
MTSL Maritime Traffic Safety Law 
MN Motor Vessel 
N North 
NMI National Maritime Institute 
PAl Problem Area Identifier 
p or pp Page or Pages 
P+I Protection and Indemnity 
SAR Search and Rescue 
SPSS Statistical Package for Social Science 
SSB Single Side Band 
TR Tidal Range 
TSS Traffic Separation Scheme 
USCG United States Coast Guard 
VHF Very High Frequency 
VMRS Vessel Movement Reporting Scheme 
VTS Vessel Traffic Service 
xiv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Many people have contributed to making this thesis possible. 
Firstly, my supervisors Dr. Anthony Redfern, Prof. Roger Matte and Prof. Fred Weeks, 
without whom the research would not have been possible, for their encouragement, 
guidance and support throughout. My thanks especially to Dr. Redfem for his 
enthusiasm, invaluable comments, and support throughout as the director of study. 
I thank the British Council which supported me financially with a fellowship for this 
research, and Korea Maritime University (KMU) which allowed me to carry out research 
in the United Kingdom for three years. 
I should also like to express my thanks to the Korea Maritime University for their advice 
and assistance as collaborating establishment to this research, and the Korea Maritime 
and Port Administration for providing data not readily at hand. 
I am particularly indebted to Dr. Han-Won Shin of KMU for providing research material, 
and for distributing and collecting the questionnaire. 
Thanks also to Prof. Yong-Sub Park, Dean of Graduate School and Prof. Sang-Jib Lee, 
Dean of Maritime Science College of Korea Maritime University, without whose 
guidance, encouragement and help this work would not have been possible. 
I also give thanks to Dr. Keith Miller and Prof. David Moreby of the Institute of Marine 
Studies, and Mrs. H.P. Sanders of the Mathematics & Statistics Department for their 
guidance and consultation. 
I am deeply grateful to my colleagues Captain Bin Lin, and to Mr. Christopher Perkins 
and Dr. Myong-Ou Yoon for their help. 
I express my sincere thanks to Mr. Neil Stephens of the Canadian Coast Guard; Dr. D.S. 
Aldwinckle ofLloyd's Register of Shipping; The National Technical Information Service, 
Springfield; Captain lain Slater & Captain Peter Bush of the Thames Navigation Service 
and Mr. S.H. Song of IMO Representative from Korea who provided me with valuable 
information and papers on marine safety and Vessel Traffic Services. 
Thanks also to my parents for their support and encouragement throughout the study. 
Lastly, but not least to Basilia for her patience and sacrifice for taking care of Peter and 
Anna on her own during the years of my research. 
XV 
AUTHOR'S DECLARATION 
At no time during the registration for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy has the author 
been registered for any other University award. 
This study was financed with the aid of a fellowship (Science and Technology) from the 
British Council, and carried out in collaboration with Korea Maritime University. 
A programme of advanced study was undertaken, which included a post-graduate course 
on MSc International Shipping. 
Relevant scientific seminars and conferences were regularly attended; external institutions 
were visited for consultation purposes, and several papers to be prepared for publication. 
Seminars and Conferences attended: 
I. Sub-Committee on Standards of Training and Watchkeeping - 24th Session. 
International Maritime Organization. March 8- I 2 I 993. London 
2. Safety at Sea, Watchkeeping and Ship Routeing in Coastal Waters. 
The Nautical Institute. April 24 I 993, Plymouth 
3. The Impact of New Technology on the Marine Industries. 
Southampton Institute. September I 3- I 5 1993, Southampton 
4. Ship Emergency Response Forum. The Nautical Institute Southwest Branch. 
October 8 1993, Plymouth 
5. Marine Safety in Coastal Waters. The Nautical Institute Southwest Branch. 
January I 8 I 994, Plymouth 
External Contacts: 
1. Thames Navigation Service - Port of London Authority (visited) 
2. YTS Project & Development - Canadian Coast Guard, Ottawa 
3. The Basic Maritime Science Institute, Korea Maritime University, Pusan 
4. Korea Maritime and Port Administration, Seoul 
5. The Marine Accident Inquiry Agency, Seoul 
s;gn<d .. ~ 
Date . )J(~'i .. ~ .. l..tt9.Jf., 
XVI 
Chapter 1 
Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
Traffic density has increased recently in Korean waters due to an expansion in sea 
trade and development of coastal fisheries. The enlargement of coastal industrial belts 
and the development of coastal islands is further increasing marine traffic. 
The rapid increase of marine traffic has often resulted in marine casualties with 
attendant loss of life, damage to property, and marine pollution. Risk to shipping may 
be reduced by navigational aids, route planning and, by shore-based aids to navigation. 
Unfortunately, relatively little research has been done so far in this field in Korea. 
Although statistics relating to accidents, environment and traffic exist, and traffic 
separation schemes and vessel traffic service(VTS) systems have been introduced 1'·' 1• 
There are neither general rules to identify problem areas nor any evaluation of the 
effectiveness of existing and proposed systems. Further research has investigated 
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navigational aids in Korean waters and suggested extension of aids and improvement in 
the management of such devicesl 1•21. 
This research involves the analysis and processing of traffic statistics, a statistical 
and causal analysis of marine casualties, an evaluation of effectiveness of existing traffic 
systems, an estimation of the YTS effectiveness, and provides some guidelines for the 
formulation of solutions to the problems identified in Korean waters. 
1.2 OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH 
This study assesses the level of safety achieved in Korean waters, discusses the 
effectiveness of existing traffic measures, and estimates the effectiveness of proposed 
V"J:S systems. In order to establish the basic needs of a YTS system, it is necessary to 
examine the existing level of safety through casualty and traffic analysis. 
This thesis examines marine traffic and focuses on an analysis of casualties 
leading to recommendations for a vessel traffic servtce m Korean waters with 
improvements m navigational practices identifying the nature and needs. Further 
emphasis is placed on the development of an unique model to quantify YTS 
effectiveness. 
As a secondary objective the adequacy of the existing traffic measures (Traffic ·· 
Separation Scheme & Vessel Movement Reporting System) in Korean waters are 
assessed with recommendations, as appropriate, for improvements in navigation safety. 
The risk to shipping in a particular area may be expressed in terms of the 
probability of a casualty and the consequences of such a casualty. This leads to an initial 
requirement for estimating the expected frequencies of casualties in the water. The 
estimation of casualty rates presents a number of problems. 
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A first necessary step is to divide Korean Waters into several sea-areas. The sea-
areas have to be such that local conditions (such as environmental conditions and traffic 
density) within each would be sufficiently uniform. Accordingly the Korean coastal 
waters are divided into ten sub-areas taking into account the jurisdiction of each district 
port authority and marine police. Figure 1.1 illustrates the study areas with the sub-area 
division. 
Within a relatively small area, such as one of the selected sea-areas, casualties to 
ships are quite rare events, so that to obtain a statistically significant number of recorded 
casualties on which to base the predictions for a particular sea area, many years of data 
would be required. 'However, over a long period, many factors which affect the 
occurrence of casualties may change. Traffic patterns may change, navigation aids may 
improve, mixes of ship type and nationalities may vary and even hydrographic features 
may alter due to dredging, reclamation or to natural sea"bed movement. Consequently, 
long-term historical records are unlikely to be representative of present or future risk, and 
short-term records generally contain too few casualties to give reliable guidance as to 
future trends[I·JJ. 
In order to meet the problem of estimating risk in the absence of reliable 
experience, a number of techniques[I-'~J·[I·IIJ have been devised for deducing a measure of 
risk from observation of marine traffic interactions in a given sea-area. 
1.2.1 SURVEY OF EXISTING METHODS OF ASSESSING RISK 
Risk assessment methods used in earlier research include: 
(a) HUT (Helsinki University of Technology) reportll-'~J!l·SJ. A detailed data base of 
ship casualties has been collected for the Baltic Sea for 1979-81. The analysis of this 
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data base leads to an estimation of the consequences and costs of casualties in the area 
and these can be used to indicate both problem areas and the potential benefits of 
measures to reduce casualty rates. 
(b) CCG (Canadian Coast Guard) report11 ' 6111 ·'1. This report describes the methods 
used for ranking vessel traffic management sites for marine risk by means of traffic 
forecasts, a navigational risk index, and estimation of the impact of marine casualties. 
The risk index was determined by using a panel of experts to rate a number of factors 
which affected the safety of navigation in the areas of interest and then to weight the 
factors according to their importance. The weighted ratings were then added to obtain 
an overall index for each area. 
(c) COST 301. PAl (Problem Area Identifier) is based on simple mathematical 
techniques for estimating the frequency of encounters and the mean casualty rate in an 
area, modified by the assessment of navigational risk made by a panel of experienced 
navigators. The PAl comprises the two components of annual expected collision rate and 
expected stranding rate, and these are kept as separate entities. This is necessary if 
recommendations concerning shore-based aids are to be formulatedl 1•81. This method 
relates directly to the cost-benefit analysis11·91_ 
(d) WENNINK C.J. 11 ' 101. In this paper, the risk analysis methods for the evaluation 
of collision and grounding risks have been reviewed with emphasis on a causal' approach 
(fundamental) method in preference to the frequently used statistical (historical) method 
based on records of previous port accidents. 
Wennink suggests a Causal Approach Method (Risk prediction on the basis of 
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contributory elements) instead of statistical method. Since such contributory elements 
directly relate to the size of a transiting vessel and its navigational and environmental 
constraints, the transit risk related to such a vessel can be measured against these 
contributory or ··causal risk parameters··. Eventually, this established relationship between 
causal conditions and ship-related risk levels can, in turn, be used for port safety 
prediction purposes in generaL 
(e) SHIP DOMAIN STUDY. The ship domain concept has been developed in recent 
years by the JapaneseP· 11111 •121 • In the United Kingdom Goodwin[I-IJJ and Coldwell 11 •141 
have been involved in further work with the general aim of increasing the safety and 
efficiency of marine traffic. 
Toyoda and Fujii11 •11J, in 1971, gave a brief history of how the domain developed 
as far back as 1966. They defined the effective domain as "a two-dimensional area 
surrounding a ship which other ship must avoid." Later in the same year(l971) Fujii and 
Tanaka11 -121 gave a much more detailed description of the effective domain. 
The further primary domain study is that made by GoodwinP·IJJ m 1975. 
Goodwin's main concern was an attempt to establish the water areas required by any one 
ship for safe navigation, and this led to the concept of the ship domain. Goodwin 
defined the ship domain as "the effective area a ship which a navigator would like to 
keep free with respect to other ships and stationary objects." 
The study of ship domains carried out by Coldwell11 •141 in 1982 was an effort to 
develop a ship domain for use in a relatively narrow channels. '}:he ship domain for use 
in restricted waters was established and dimensions were given to a limited extent for 
independent variables such as vessel type and length. Certain dimensions for a ship 
domain with navigation marks were also established. 
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1.2.2 ANALYSIS OF FACTORS AFFECTING MARINE TRAFFIC SAFETY 
A comprehensive literature survey has been carried out to determine the factors 
which influence marine traffic safety. A good background of the factors that may lead 
to a casualty is given by MOON & HIGGINSr 1- 151, KARLSEN & KRISTIANSENr 1-161, 
QUINN & SCOTTr 1-171 and KEMPr 1-181, identifying the statistics that should be collected. 
Other studies on ship casualties also gave detailed analysis and classifications of similar 
factors. [1-19][1-20][1-21 1 
For the purpose of this study, the factors undermentioned are reviewed in detail: 
(I) Technological factors 
e Ship factors (type, length, beam, age, speed, flag, etc) 
• Waterway (type, channel width & depth, etc) 
e Traffic condition (density, flow, etc) 
(2) Environmental factors 
e Weather (visibility, wave, wind, etc) 
e Current & Tide 
e Social situations (rules & regulations, commercial pressure, etc) 
(3) Human factors 
e Manning and watch system (health, organization, training, watchkeeping, 
etc.) 
e Ship control tasks (appreciation of information, manoeuvring, etc.) 
A statistical analysis is undertaken of a casualty data base for the years 1986-
1990. Additional information on the causal factors of the casualties has been compiled 
by block scheme. The effect level of YTS addressable risk is quantified. 
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1.3 MARINE TRAFFIC ENGINEERING 
Definitions of marine traffic engineering include: 
(a) Part of engineering which, for any transport system, deals with the form and lay-
out of the track and its controls and with the operation of traffic, so as to provide 
safe, convenient and economic means for the movement of vehicles, people and 
goods! 1-221. 
(b) The study of marine traffic and the application of the results of such studies to 
improvements in navigation facilities and traffic regulationsll·23 1. 
A very wide range of studies has been published to date, especially m the 
publications of the Navigation Institutes. These studies have investigated, broadly 
speaking, the following aspects of the maritime traffic phenomena: traffic features, 
casualties and economies. All these aspects are inter-related but the classification made 
serves as an outline[l-241. 
(a) Traffic features. The basic traffic features of a given sea area are the nationality 
and the number of ships, their sizes, speeds, types, tracks and cargo. There have been 
many traffic observation projects to obtain the distributions of these fundamental 
variables. The first systematic traffic survey was carried out by Y amaguchi et a! in 1963 
in Japan, where the marine traffic had become heavily congested. Nowadays more than 
30 surveys a year are being carried out with the cooperation of the Maritime Safety .. 
Agency in Japan alone 11-251 • In Europe the Dover Strait is under continuous surveillance. 
In the Baltic Sea the Polish traffic measurements in the southern Baltic, which started in 
1979, are worth mentioning 11 -261 • There are currently two supplementary methods of 
observation of the traffic in use: visually and by radar. 
(b) Casualties. Maritime casualties may be divided into two discrete groups 
according to their elementary causes: traffic accidents and technical accidents. 
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Collisions, groundings and rammmgs are traffic accidents; fires and explosions, 
founderings, capsizings, floodings and weather damages are the latter ·type. The 
explanation of such grouping is evident: the remedies against traffic accidents can be 
found in the development of the traffic situations and environment, but the technical 
accidents are addressed by the technical development of ships11 '271 • Marine traffic 
engineering has mainly concentrated on accidents of the traffic type. The complex nature 
ofmarine accidents and the difficulties in conducting direct experiments explain why the 
collection and analysis of various accident data files or databases has been the 
predominant methods of safety study. The best known worldwide casualty statistics are 
contained in the data bank of Lloyd · s Register of Shipping. One of the difficulties of the 
statistical method of study has been the lack of a uniform international code of 
investigation and recordingP·281 • Another problem is the quality of the .information 
collected. The statistical analysis shows only information of a general nature and detailed 
conclusions are generally not possible. The usefulness of the statistics lies in their 
diagnostic ability: they show what and where the main problems are. 
(c) Economic aspects. Proper assessment of the costs and benefits of each proposed 
new traffic or safety measure is beneficial to society as a whole. In practice these are 
difficult to estimate. Total losses resulting from marine accidents should take into 
account both direct and indirect costs. The former (repair, lost cargo, lay-days ... ) is in 
theory possible to estimate, but the latter (price of human life lost, damaged environment, 
... ) are difficult to express in monetary terms. On the benefits side, a U.S. Coast Guard 
study 11•291 came to the conclusion that, except in rare cases, no quantitative assessment 
is possible of the extent to which any specific safety action is effective in reducing the 
risks of marine accidents, 
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1.4 THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis comprises eight chapters. 
Chapter 2 discusses some meteorological and topographical factors which are 
considered to impinge on marine casualties. These factors include fog & visibility, wind, 
precipitation, sea & swell, current & tide and coast & ports. 
Chapter 3 details the nature of marine traffic including vessel statistics, vessel 
movements and cargo traffic. 
Chapter 4 summarizes the general trend of marine casualties in Korean waters, 
and describes the casualty data base, from which the causes and consequences of the 
casualties are derived. Various statistical tools are used to evaluate the inter-relationships 
between individual causal factors including marine environmental and marine traffic 
parameters identified in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. Emphasis is given to determining the 
causal relationships connected with ship casualties, and for the first time the 
quantification of the effect level of causal factors is made for Korean waters. 
Chapter 5, contains the first evaluation of the effectiveness of existing traffic 
services in Korean waters, and recommends possible measures to improve navigation 
safety. An accident danger index is used to compare the level of safety in various time 
periods. 
Chapter 6 analyzes a questionnaire derived to evaluate marine safety and Vessel 
Traffic Services in Korean coastal waters. Various factors increasing marine risk are 
discussed, a number of options for improving safety are examined, and the median 
addressing YTS assistance is considered. Multiple range test is proposed as a means of 
testing differences between occupational groupings. 
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Chapter 7 describes the effectiveness of proposed Vessel Traffic Services. A wide 
range of literature related to the effectiveness is reviewed, a novel method of estimating 
VTS effectiveness(benefits) is proposed and sensitivity analysis is discussed. The unique 
approach quantifying the VTS effectiveness is the combination of the casualty rate 
reduction factors with the effect level of causal factors. The development of casualty rate 
reduction factors is based on the questionnaire survey in Chapter 6, and the development 
of effect level of causal factors is based on the casualty analysis in Chapter 4. This new 
approach produces a more valid index of VTS effectiveness by the another filtering 
process. 
Chapter 8 summarizes the findings, surnmartes and recommendations of the 
research. Annexes of causal factors. statistical tables of casualty analysis, list of traffic 
accidents and questionnaire survey are included at the end of the thesis. 
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MARITIME ENVIRONMENT 
2.1 METEOROLOGICAL FEATURES 
2.1.1 GENERAL 
Korea is a middle latitude peninsular country affected by both maritime and 
continental air masses. Many frontal systems pass through the region, and the weather 
generally changes from west to east. The most influential air masses are the Siberian air 
mass and the North Pacific Ocean air mass. That is why Korea has the following notable 
features; 
(a) a wide range of temperature between the hottest and coldest periods of the 
year 
(b) rain falls that are concentrated during summer season 
(c) sea and swell directions and heights are determined almost entirely by the 
circulation of the north-east monsoon in winter and the south-west monsoon in 
summer. 
A discussion and survey on some meteorological factors, which may have an 
important influence on marine casualties, is given in this chapter. 
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2.1.2 FOG AND VISIBILITY 
Fog is formed by water droplets held in suspension at or near the surface so as 
to reduce an observer's visibility to less than 1,000 metres (1,100 yards). When dust, 
smoke, or sand particles obscure vision in the surface layers, the reduction in visibility 
is known as haze. 
Visibility IS defined as the greatest distance at which an object of specified 
characteristics can be seen and identified with the unaided eye in any particular 
circumstances, or, in the case of night observations, could be seen and identified if the 
general illumination were raised to the normal daylight levei.I2·ll 
Table 2.1 Visibility scale used at sea 
Range Recorded in Steps 
Km N. Mile Km N. Mile 
< 0.05 < 0.03 2.0 - 4.0 1.1- 2.2 
0.05 - 0.2 0.03- 0.1 4.0- 10.0 2.2 - 5.4 
0.2 - 0.5 0.1 - 0.3 10.0 - 20.0 5.4 - 11.0 
0.5 - 1.0 0,3 - 0,5 20.0 - 50.0 11.0 - 27.0 
1.0 - 2.0 0.5 - 1.1 ~ 50.0 ~ 27.0 
Source: BURGESS CR. Meteorology for seafarers p.35 
Visibility is assessed by viewing the horizon through 360 degrees and recording 
the shortest distance. Land observing stations use objects at known distances in daytime 
and a visibility meter at night, thus making it possible to provide accurate visibility 
ranges. At sea, however, the limited availability of objects often makes the estimation 
of visibility difficult and a coarser scale is usedY·21 
Visibility is an important factor in relation to collisions, contacts and strandings. 
Collisions will occur more frequently in areas where there is a high incidence of low 
visibilityY·31 Mottel2·41 stated that fog still remains the ship-master's greatest enemy, and 
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the fog hazard becomes extreme in closed waters. Bearing in mind the importance of 
visibility as a factor for navigation safety, it is suggested that detailed investigation 
should be carried out separately for each area. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the average number of foggy days per annum, showing the 
frequency is 40-50 days over coastal waters in west and south-west areas, and more than 
20 days in east and south-east waters. 
Sea fog is rare during the months from August to March the frequency being less 
than three percent. Most of the fog at sea occurs in the months of April to July during 
the SW monsoon period; fog being most frequent in Julyl2•5ll2•61. It can be seen from 
Figure 2.2 that 69 percent of sea fog is formed during the four months from Apri l to 
July, 24 percent occurring during July. 
Table 2.2 Average foggy days per month in major ports (visibility ::::; 1 Km) 
Port Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Av. 
lnchon 2.0 2.0 3.4 4.6 5.3 7.1 9.0 2.5 1.3 2.8 1.6 2.4 3.7 
Kunsan 1.8 1.9 2.5 4.0 3.4 4.4 4.0 2.1 3.7 5.2 3.1 1.9 3.2 
Mokpo 0.7 1.2 1.2 1.7 1.7 2.9 4.7 1.3 1.8 1.6 1.5 0.9 1.8 
Yosu 0.4 0.5 1.4 2.4 3.5 3.6 7.9 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.6 1.4 2.0 
Cheju 0.1 0.3 1.0 2.0 3.5 6.1 3.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 1.4 
Soguipo 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.4 3.5 5.3 4.9 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 
Chungmu 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.9 2.1 3.3 5.3 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.8 1.2 
Pusan 0.3 0.5 1.0 2.5 3.7 6.5 5.6 02 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.5 1.8 
Ulsan 0.1 0.0 0.6 1.4 1.4 3.9 2.0 0.4 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.9 
Pohang 0.0 0.1 0.7 1.0 0.8 2.3 2.1 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.7 0.0 0.8 
Ulnungdo 0.0 1.3 2.2 6.2 7.2 10.5 12.9 6.8 3.6 0.8 0.5 0.6 4.4 
Gangnung 0.2 0.3 0.1 1.4 1.9 2.2 3.2 1.6 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.0 1.0 
I Average I 0.5 I 0.7 I 1.2 I 2.5 I 3.2 I 4.8 1 5.4 I 1.4 I 1.1 I 1.1 I 0.8 I 0.7 I I 
Source: A Comprehensive developing plan of navigational aids (1987). KMU, Pusan 
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Fig 2.2 Monthly frequency of sea fog {1980-1984) 
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Fig 2.3 Frequency of sea fog occurrence (1980-1984) 
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Source: The Ministry of Science and Technology (1986), Seoul 
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As can be seen in Figure 2.3, sea fog commonly occurred between 0500-0800 
hours and dispersed between 0700-1100 hours. Average duration time of sea fog is 4.5 
hours, the longest being 5.6 hours in January and the shortest 3.3 hours in October. 
Table 2.2 indicates the average foggy days per month in the major port areas of 
Korea. The "Ulnung-do" area suffers most from fog with Inchon!Kunsan following next 
in terms of severity. 
Dust and sand storms are experienced at times. In the western part of the region, 
dust haze being carried along by strong winds from the dust deserts of Mongolia can be 
fairly extensive in late winter and spring. In the worst cases visibility is reduced to a few 
yards by the thick haze, which also causes irritation to eyes, throat and chest12·71 • Most 
of the sea areas has good visibility in winter. Exceptions occur during precipitation. 
2.1.3 WIND 
Wind force is a factor which may have an important influence on casualty rates, 
particularly in the case of strandings, The wind speed at which the navigation of a ship 
is a significantly affected clearly depends on the size, shape and speed of the vessel. 
Detailed data on the effect of wind force on different vessels are relatively scarce12·81 • 
The winter monsoon starts in September and continues through February to 
March; winds are north, or at times north"west, with average force five in January and 
gales on about five to ten percent of occasions in December and January, and one to five 
percent in the other winter months. The winds in summer are east and south during 
June, and between south-east and south-west during July and August, with average force 
three to fourY·91 
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Table 2.3 Average wind speed in major ports (metre/second) 
Port Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Ocl Nov Dec Av. 
lnchon 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.2 3.6 3.0 2.8 2.8 2.8 3.0 3.8 4.0 3.9 
Kunsan 4.0 4.6 4.7 4.5 4.1 3.8 3.6 3.8 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.9 4.1 
Mokpo 4.9 5.0 4.9 4.3 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.6 4.3 4.4 4.2 
Yosu 4.8 4.9 4.6 4.0 3.1 3.0 2.8 3.4 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.0 
Cheju 5.3 5.0 4.2 3.9 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.7 4.3 4.9 4.2 
Pus an 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.3 3.8 3.7 3.8 4.1 3.7 3.5 3.9 4.0 4.4 
Ulsan 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.4 22 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.0 1.8 2.1 2.5 2.7 
Pohang 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.3 3.1 2.0 2.9 3.1 3.2 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.5 
Ulnungdo 4.5 4.4 4.4 5.4 5.3 3.9 3.9 4.1 3.8 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 
Gangnung 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.9 2.6 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.8 2.5 3.0 3.3 2.6 
Average 4.2 4.2 4.0 3.9 3.5 3.1 3.0 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.7 3.9 
Source: A Comprehensive developing plan of navigational aids (1 987). KMU. Pusan 
Table 2.3 indicates the monthly average wind force in major port areas, in which 
Pusan has the strongest recorded wind speed. West and south-western areas have 
stronger winds than the east. Generally, wind directions are constant during the summer 
months of June to September. North-west is the most dominant direction on western 
coasts but the wind direction tends to vary on the eastern side of the peninsula. 
2.1.4 PRECIPITATION 
The main effect of precipitation in the form of rain or snow is a decrease in 
visibility. It is also possible that heavy rain, with large drop sizes, may interfere with the 
operation of radar preventing the detection of target ships. The effect of precipitation on 
radar performance depends on the radio wavelength used. 
Annual rainfall varies from 800 to I ,200 mm, but at Cheju-do(Soguipo Hang) 
exceeds I ,500 mm (Table 2.4). The number of wet days is an indication that the higher 
amounts of rainfall in summer are due to the greater intensity rather than the duration, 
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especially over the south-east region. Very large amounts in a short period have been 
recorded in this area; 250 mm fell in eight hours during one August and falls of 200 mm 
in one day are rather common along the Korean coast. Large seasonal and annual 
deviations from the normal occur in all parts of the area. The July total at Pusan has 
varied from between 60 mm to 650 mm. P·IOJ Rainfall in general, becomes more frequent 
and widespread in south than north, and more frequent in west than east. As can be seen 
in Figure 2.4, the amount of rainfalls are concentrated during summer months over the 
coasts. 
Table 2.4 Average rainfalls in major ports (mm) 
Port Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Ocl .Nov. Dec Av. 
Inchon 14 12 38 79 74 92 222 180 109 51 45 29 79 
Kunsan 18 31 46 91 75 148 228 220 106 47 57 37 92 
Mokpo 21 54 50 105 83 192 170 153 162 58 48 24 93 
Yosu 13 40 66 136 139 252 240 261 259 60 47 25 128 
Cheju 46 79 76 97 72 214 188 258 198 107 83 48 122 
Soguipo 34 87 128 175 191 315 263 247 183 80 85 42 153 
Chungmu 17 45 96 156 139 225 215 209 131 77 59 24 116 
Pusan 22 42 80 153 134 243 218 219 212 80 62 26 124 
U1san 21 42 62 128 75 187 162 226 213 72 49 17 105 
Pohang 27 38 60 92 53 145 133 203 175 62 52 16 88 
Ulnungdo 140 102 76 89 63 103 112 124 180 107 114 121 Ill 
Gongnung 41 39 64 99 71 119 165 309 184 114 71 44 110 
Average 35 51 70 117 97 186 193 217 176 76 64 38 
Source: A Comprehensive developing plan of navigational aids (1987). KMU. Pusan 
Snow occurs on one or two days per month as far south as Pusan from December 
to March and snowfall becomes more frequent and widespread further north. Days with 
snowfall are included for some stations in the climatic table. Visibility is seriously 
reduced with moderate snowfall in strong winds and when drifting of fallen snow occurs 
with high winds. These conditions may cause problems in northern parts of the areaY·IIJ 
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Table 2.5 Climatic table 
Ports Temperature (0 C) Number of days · 
Highest Lowest Average Rain Snow Fog Gale ... Thunder 
Inchon 32.8 -16.2 12.3 11 9 25 58 5 23 
Kunsan 34.0 -13.9 13.5 128 24 72 24 14 
Mokpo 35.7 - 11.1 14.7 117 26 39 33 11 
Yosu 33 .9 -9.9 14.8 107 12 24 9 8 
M as an 37.1 -10.0 15.3 101 5 11 0 12 
Pus an 34.3 -10.4 15.5 103 5 19 5 7 
Ulsan 36.5 -11 .8 14.9 96 3 10 0 12 
Pohang 35 .7 - 11.1 15.0 105 6 3 I 12 
Samcheog 33 .8 -13.5 13.2 113 10 6 0 10 
Sokcho 33 .2 -13.8 12.4 141 14 20 10 17 
Cheju 37.0 -4.5 16.4 130 15 7 23 12 
Soguipo 34.7 -4.2 17.1 126 6 18 2 5 
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1991, KMPA, Seoul 
2.2 MARITIME TOPOGRAPHY 
2.2.1 GENERAL 
Korea lies approximately between the parallels of 33° north and 43° north, and 
the meridians of 124 ° east and 131° east. The major part of Korea consists of a 
peninsula extending nearly 350 miles south from the east seaboard of the Asian continent 
to from the east side of Yellow Sea; it is separated from Japan by the Korea Strait. A 
mountainous ridge extends the length of the peninsula sloping towards the heavily 
indented west coast wruch js jntersected by the principal rivers; the east coast has only 
narrow coastal plain separating it from the spinal ridge; there are few harbours on that 
side and the rivers are small. 
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The west coast of Korea is fringed by a multitude of islands which provide 
sheltered harbours and anchorages, but their value is somewhat impaired by the large rise 
and fall of tide and hence the strength of tidal streamsY- 121 
2.2.2 SEA AND SWELL 
Waves can, under certain circumstances, constrain the way in which ships 
navigate and this might have an influence on both stranding and collision rates. 
The relationships are complex and, unfortunately, little is known concerning any 
correlation between wave characteristics and casualty rates, because it is not only wave 
height but also wave length which needs to be considered. Further a given sea state will 
have a quite different effect on different classes of ships. 
Another consideration is that observed sea state may include a swell component 
which is unrelated to local wind.12·131 
Sea and swell directions and heights are determined predominantly by the 
circulation of the north-east monsoon in winter and the south-west monsoon in summer 
in Korean waters. North-east to south-east wave/swells are diffused to the east coast in 
Korea as the coast faces the open sea. A period of strong north winds causes moderate 
to heavy swell from between north and north-east over the southern part of the Japan Sea 
in winter. Persistent heavy swells occur in the Korean Strait when the summer monsoon 
is well established. Sea disturbance through the Strait is also complicated by the north-
moving Kuro Shio(Japan) Current. Heavy swell is infrequent, but may develop over the 
east and south-east sector when vigorous depressions cross the central area. The south 
coast, however, is sheltered by coastline and is therefore not much affected by the north-
west and north-east wind. 
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Table 2.6 Frequency of wave height 
Season Height Mid-west (%) Mid-south (%) Mid-east (%) 
Winter :<: 1.5m 35 30 35 
>2.4m 10 10 11 
>3 .6m 4 4 4 
Spring 2::l.5m 5 5 5 
>2.4m 2 2 2 
Summer :<: l.5m 10 12 10 
>2.4m 5 4 4 
>3.6m 2 2 2 
Autumn :<: l.5m 20 20 20 
>2.4m 15 15 15 
>3.6m 5 5 7 
Source: A Comprehensive developing plan of navigational aids(J987), KMU, Pusan 
In some coastal areas heavy swell is encountered on the rare occasions of strong 
to gale force southern winds, and when typhoons occur. There are about two typhoons 
yearly, on average, and these give confused seas with mountainous waves and heavy 
swell. 
As can be seen in Table 2.6, wave/swell is predominant by the continuous north-
east monsoon in winter months, and the frequency of sea and swell reaching a height of 
3.6 metre or more is four to seven percent in autumn and winter, and less in spring and 
summer. 
2.2.3 CURRENT AND TIDE 
It is believed that currents or tidal streams have an important influence on 
strandings, collisions and contacts between ships and fixed objects, but little influence 
on the incidence of collisions between ships. 12-141 
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(a) Currents. Although the area in general, is subject to monsoon winds it is only near 
the west coast of Korea that the currents reverse their direction in accordance with the 
prevailing monsoon. 
Seasonal changes are evident as illustrated in Figure 2.5. In this figure, arrows 
·indicate the predominant direction and average rate but there is some variability in 
current, so that sets different from those indicated on the figures may be experienced at 
times and, exceptionally, the current may flow in the opposite direction. 
Kuro Shio Current (Japan Current or 'fsushima Current): A warm current of Pacific 
origin flows north-east towards Kyushu and Tsushima. To the south of Cheju-do it 
subdivides with the weaker stream flowing ·to the Y:ellow Sea and the stronger flow 
turning north-east to pass either side of Tsushima into the Japan Sea. During the summer 
months, the flow through the Korea Strait is at a maidmum, with average rates of one 
knot. Water passing on the north and north-west sides of Tsushima bifurcates at the 
north-east end of the Korea Strait, one part of the flow moves north along the east coast 
of Korea to become the East Korean Current. During the. winter months this current 
sometimes reverses its flow as the Liman Current extends south and also because the 
flow through the Korea Strait is at a minimum at that time of yearY- 151 
Liman Current: The Liman Current has its origin in the neighbourhood of Proliv 
Nevelskogo, at the north end of the Gulf of Tartary. It is a cold current which sets south 
along the Siberian coast eventually branching east into the Japan Sea. The extent to 
which this current penetrates south is dependent on season, For much of the year it is 
limited to about 40° north. In winter, however, it continues on, to pass down the east 
coast of Korea, before branching east. 
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Currents within the central part of the Japan Sea are somewhat variable as the 
result of branching from both the Tsushima and Liman Currents. Southerly sets are most 
likely in the winter and northerly sets in the summer, but constancy cannot be relied 
uponY-151 
(b) Tides and Tidal Streams. The rising tide sets north from the Pacific Ocean into 
Yellow Sea, and thence north-west into Bo Hai, by following the west coast of Korea 
and south coast of Liaodong Bando. 
In general the streams have a maximum rate of one to three knots, except where 
local topography causes an increase. The range of tide varies from three metres to eight 
metres in west coast, about six metres at the port of Kunsan and eight metres at the port 
of Inchon. Also the approach to Inchon is a particularly interesting area where streams 
of five knots or more are found between the islands in the vicinity. 
Table 2. 7 Tidal features in major ports 
Port Water Level (Cm) Tidal Speed (rills) 
H.H.W. M.S.L. Av. T.R. Flood Ebb 
Inch on 927.0 463.5 527.4 3.30 2.10 
Kunsan 682.0 341 .0 419.2 1.90 1.70 
Mokpo 467.6 233.8 269.0 5.10 8.00 
Yosu 361.6 180.8 202.4 0.60 0.60 
M as an 2 14.8 107.4 129.8 0.50 0.50 
Pus an 128.2 64.1 78.8 0.60 0.80 
Ulsan 60.8 30.4 32.6 0.75 1.18 
Pohang 24.6 12.3 6.2 0.00 0.00 
Samcheog 35.0 17.5 11.6 0.35 0.23 
Cheju 283.4 141.7 142.6 1.40 1.60 
Soguipo 303.2 151.6 151.4 0.50 0.70 
Source: Statistical Yearbook (1991), KMPA, Seoul 
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Table 2. 7 presents the tidal characteristics in major ports in Korea. Mong the 
south coast of Korea, among the islands offshore and in the north half of the Korea Strait 
the flood stream sets west at one to two knots, increasing to five knots among the 
islands. In general, the rates diminish east; offPusan Hang the flood stream sets south-
west at one knot. Along the east coast of Korea the flood stream sets southward but 
diminishes rapidly in strength as one goes north and becomes negligible northward of 
Ulsan Man. The tidal streams are generally negligible along the south-east and east 
coasts of Korea. The range of tide is only 0.3 metre in the east and 1.2 metre in the 
south-east, but south-west area has 3 metres tidal range. It should be noted that the set 
due to the tidal streams is additional to that caused by the current; in general, the tidal 
streams are more important close inshore and the currents offshore, but this is not always 
so. 
2.2.4 C0AST AND PORTS 
The length of South Korea's coastline is 5,560 Km in peninsula and 7,229 Km 
in islands, which is 12,789 Km in totaJY·' 61 
Most ports on the west and south coasts have relatively difficult navigational 
approaches with a large number of offshore islands. 
Another feature of the ports in the west coast is the tidal range of approximately 
three to eight metres, which results in a large area of mud banks being exposed when the 
tide is out. 
The depth of water off the west coast is less than 20 metres outto approximately 
20 miles from the shore line and approximately 12 miles from the shore line on the south 
coast. There are no islands off the east coast, where deeper water exists. 
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2.3 SUMMA:RY 
(I) Most (69%) of fog at sea occurs in the months of April to July during the south-
west monsoon period; fog being most frequent in July. 
(2) Pusan experiences the strongest wind and the west and south"western areas have 
stronger winds than the east. 
(3) Rainfall is more frequent in the west than the east, being heaviest during the 
summer months. 
( 4) Tidal ranges vary from three metres to eight metres on the west coast and tidal 
streams have a maximum rate of one to three knots. 
(5) Most ports on the west and south coasts of Korea have relatively difficult 
navigational approaches with many offshore islands. 
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VESSEL TRAFFIC DATA 
In general, vessel tonnage and cargo volume are measures used to describe marine 
traffic, but the following factors are particularly fundamentalP-IJ 
11 vessel tonnage and nature (size, type, age, etc.) 
11 number of ships and· their tonnage entering & leaving ports 
Therefore a discussion and survey on vessel tonnage, movement of ships and cargo 
traffic is given in this chapter. 
3.1 VESSEL STATISTICS 
(I) Vessels registered: Table 3.1 shows the number of ships of Korean register and their 
tonnage, and Figure 3. 1 shows a growth trend. The register of vessels other than fishing 
vessels has grown slowly but continuously with an average rate of 2 percent per annum 
in numbers and 4.3 percent in terms of tonnage. 
(2) Vessels registered by tonnage group: Table 3.2 shows the number of ships and their 
gross tonnage by tonnage group. The number of ships less than 100 gross tons accounts 
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for 78 percent of all registrations, but only one percent in terms of total tonnage. 
Table 3.1 Vessels registered -December 1990 (grt: 1,000 tons) 
Passenger Cargo ship Tanker Tugs Others Total 
Year No grt No grt No grt No grt No grt No grt 
1981 163 29 1256 3477 491 1379 640 36 1365 38 3915 4959 
1982 156 33 1211 4388 491 1143 653 38 1489 47 4000 5650 
1983 162 45 1236 4922 508 1072 684 42 1565 58 4155 6139 
1984 160 45 1248 5174 522 1146 677 44 1647 93 4254 6501 
1985 156 45 1163 5414 517 1065 682 39 1656 100 4174 6662 
1986 156 55 1075 5312 521 1144 699 41 1785 104 4236 6655 
1987 166 55 1039 5281 518 1031 745 44 1868 104 4336 6514 
1988 160 54 1045 5850 527 1189 795 49 2022 98 4549 7239 
1989 151 56 1049 6369 529 733 805 50 2076 99 4610 7306 
1990 152 57 1049 6308 532 596 838 53 2140 101 4711 7115 
Source: Statistical yearbook (1 991). KMPA, Seoul 
Table 3.2 Vessels registered by Tonnage- December 1990 (grt: 1,000 tons) 
Group Passenger Cargo ship Tanker Tugs Others Total 
No. grt No. grt No. grt No. grt No. grt No. grt 
-99 78 5 485 12 338 9 705 23 2074 30 3680 80 
100- 60 11 137 37 83 20 130 24 55 11 465 104 
499 
500- 3 2 75 59 54 43 2 I 2 I 136 106 
999 
1000- 2 2 67 112 25 36 0 0 3 5 97 155 
1999 
2000- 7 21 105 379 19 60 I 5 3 11 135 475 
4999 
5000- 2 16 14 98 5 45 0 0 I 8 22 166 
9999 
10000- 0 0 76 1136 4 62 0 0 I 10 81 1208 
19999 
20000- 0 0 60 1873 2 87 0 0 I 25 63 1984 
49999 
50000- 0 0 30 2603 2 234 0 0 0 0 32 2837 
I Total I 152 1 57 I 1049 6308 532 596 838 53 I 2140 1 101 11 4711 I 7115 I 
Source: Statistical yearbook (1991), KMPA 
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Fig 3.1 Trends of vessels registered 
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Fig 3.2 Vessels registered by Age group (No. of ships) 
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(3) Vessels registered by ship's age: Table 3.3 and Figure 3.2 show that 235 ships (5%) 
are over 30 years old vessel and 932 ships (20%) are new vessels (less than 5 years old). 
They, however, account for 0.4 percent and 33 percent respectively in terms of tonnage. 
Table 3.3 Vessels registered by Ship's age - December 1990 
Tonnage 0-5 5 • 10 . 10. 15 15 . 20 20.25 25 . 30 over 30 
• ..... Total·· .•. 
.. 
I .- ·•· . . . 
·years' :: 
·•· year5 · 
group years : years years ·years . years .. ·. . . •· 
. 99 782 647 954 483 441 177 196 3680 
15112 11909 20392 10800 11499 5012 4943 79667 
100- 54 54 125 99 79 26 28 465 
499 11052 14000 28924 19383 17252 7390 5628 103629 
500- 22 19 20 24 24 18 9 136 
999 18779 14482 15000 19045 17774 14758 6104 105942 
1000- 16 17 23 16 9 15 I 97 
1999 26423 27383 36838 22648 14344 25533 1981 155150 
2000- 21 17 28 42 21 6 0 135 
4999 83616 58789 104060 142853 68770 17113 0 475201 
5000- I 3 2 9 7 0 0 22 
9999 5645 25888 19537 62490 52787 0 0 166347 
10000- 0 9 38 27 5 I I 81 
19999 0 138388 557426 406990 79552 12771 12644 1207771 
20000- 21 22 7 10 2 I 0 63 
49999 711039 650463 208073 344935 44762 24558 0 1983830 
50000- 15 4 I 7 5 0 0 32 
1469573 362405 64863 622232 318012 0 0 2837085 
Total 932 792 1198 717 593 244 235 4711 
2341239 1303707 1055113 1651376 624752 107135 31300 7114622 
Source: Statistical yearbook (1991), KMPA 
(4) Vessel statistics of world fleet: Table 3.4 shows that Korean shipping industry grew 
rapidly until the early of 1980s (1981 ), about 16 percent per annum in number of ships 
and about 35 percent in tonnage, while the growth of world merchant fleets was 3 
percent and 6 percent respectively. Thereafter, however, the growth rate decreases to 3 
percent per annum in number of ships and 5 percent in tonnage, while the world rates 
were 0.8 percent and 0.4 percent respectively in the same period. 
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Table 3.4 Korean Merchant fleets 1972-1991 
Korea World 
No. GRT No. GRT 
1972 446 1,057,408 57,391 268,340,145 
1973 617 1,103,925 59,606 289,926,686 
1974 650 1,225,679 61,194 311,322,626 
1975 828 1,623,532 63,724 342,162,363 
1976 936 1,796,106 65,887 3 71,999,926 
1977 1,042 2,494,724 67,945 393,678,369 
1978 1,148 2,975,389 69,020 406,001,979 
1979 1,287 3,952,946 71,129 413,021,426 
1980 1,426 4,334,114 73,832 419,910,651 
1981 1,634 5,141,505 73,864 420,834,813 
1982 1,652 5,529,398 75,161 424,741,682 
1983 1,733 6,386,002 76,106 422,590,317 
1984 1,799 6,771,402 76,068 418,682,442 
1985 1,847 7,168,940 76,395 416,268,534 
1986 1,837 7,183,617 75,266 404,910,267 
1987 1,899 7,214,070 75,240 403,498,122 
1988 1,930 7,333,704 75,680 403,406,079 
1989 1,974 7,832,453 76,100 410,480,693 
1990 2,110 7,783,075 78,336 423,627,198 
1991 2,136 7,820,532 80,Q30 436,026,858 
Source: (1) Statistical yearbook 
(2) Lloyd's register of shipping 
Table 3.5 Ship's age of merchant fleet (number of ships) 
Total over 20 years less than 5 years 
Korean fleet 2,422 811 (33.5%) 374 (15.4%) 
World fleet 80,030 28,748 (35.9%) 8,718 (10.9%) 
Source: (1) Statistical yearbook 
(2) Lloyd's register of shipping 
Comparing ship's age overall the Korean fleet is younger than world average, but 
811 ships out of 2,422 ships are over 20 years old (Table 3.5 & 3.6). 
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Ta b l e 3.6 S i ze and age of all steamships and moto rshi p s 
0 - 4 years 5 - 9 years 10 - 14 years 
Tonnage Group No . GRT No. GRT No. GRT 
100- 499 4,666 1, 277.266 5,296 1,360,136 7,588 1 ,787,036 
500- 999 799 574 , 336 1,159 874,889 1,447 1,107,649 
1,000- 1,999 514 797,456 1,129 1,706,649 1,048 1,538,208 
2,000- 3,999 686 1,981,266 1,032 3,104,031 1,217 3,671,308 
4,000- 5,999 392 1,890,218 609 2,968,875 545 2,703,197 
6,000- 6 , 999 113 723,940 145 944. 943 178 1 , 148 , 255 
7,000- 7 , 999 107 814.406 117 878,803 126 947,926 
8,000- 9,999 108 972,121 237 2,135,286 460 4,228,651 
10 , 000- 19 , 999 378 5,598,581 1,071 15,856 , 237 1,568 22,136,833 
20,000- 4 9. 999 631 20,936,035 1,382 41,259,108 835 25,824,593 
50,000 &. above 324 27,251,452 232 18,126,326 280 24,572,500 
T 0 TAL 8. 718 62,817,077 12,049 89,215 , 283 15,292 89,666,156 
Source: Statistical yearbook, KMPA 
Lloyd~s register of shipping 
15 - 19 years 20 - 24 years 
No. GRT No . GRT 
6,874 1, 715,716 6,267 1,495,631 
1,500 1,149,530 1,228 924,211 
1,107 1 , 634,420 1,059 1,557,808 
1,151 3,439 , 148 1,154 3,270,281 
596 2,949,544 431 2,132,482 
196 1, 922,907 109 696 , 449 
116 861,275 80 598,244 
459 4,234,146 479 4,380,304 
1,364 19,937 , 278 825 11,305,720 
706 22,253,781 293 9,12 1 ,481 
694 65,670,157 98 7,004,631 
14,863 125,767,90 2 12 ,023 42,487 , 242 
25 - 29 years 30 years &. over T 0 t a 1 
No. GRT No. GRT No. GRT 
4,051 980,243 6,992 1 , 753 , 951 41,734 10,369,979 
727 544,650 1,240 886 , 794 8,100 6,062,059 
620 909,633 592 827 , 411 6 , 069 8, 971,585 
582 1,686,809 409 1,223,828 6,231 18,376,671 
185 896,829 142 684,463 2 , 900 14,225,608 
46 297 , 188 41 265,715 928 5,999,397 
34 254,545 122 925,424 702 5,280,62 3 
149 1 ,354,831 130 1 , 170,487 2,022 18,475,82 6 
270 3 , 655,298 228 3,143,991 5 ,704 81,633, 938 
1 08 3,046,983 54 1, 374,777 4 , 009 123,816,758 
2 113 ,299 1 76 , 049 1,631 142,814,414 
6, 774 13,740,308 9,951 12,332,890 80,030 436,026 , 858 
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3.2 MOVEMENT OF VESSELS 
3.2.1 TOTAL MOVEMENT IN PORTS 
Table 3. 7 and Figure 3.3 show that total vessel movements in Korean ports are 
increasing continuously by 4.6 percent per annum in number of ships and 13.5 percent 
per annum in terms of gross tonnage. 
Table 3. 7 Total vessel movement (arrival+departure) 
(GRT: I ,000 tons) 
Grand total Oceangoing Coastal 
Year Korean Foreign 
No. GRT No. GRT No. GRT No. GRT 
1981 193036 305344 27649 78541 12473 163113 152914 63690 
1982 200242 344639 26940 99116 12734 176837 160568 68686 
1983 206499 390267 26094 99821 13487 208556 166918 81890 
1984 211679 415923 25631 104876 14054 225065 171994 85982 
1985 217043 453857 25008 115990 15411 243056 176624 94811 
1986 246626 508039 25444 120268 18602 285679 202580 102092 
1987 245669 587949 25249 131952 21784 346738 198636 109259 
1988 265526 632696 24873 138460 24385 368557 216268 125679 
1989 273325 667007 25009 143430 28248 383475 219968 140102 
1990 281355 716329 24006 164387 30923 393040 226426 158902 
Source: Statistical yearbook (1991), KMPA 
Table 3.8 shows the number of vessels and their gross ton entering ports by 
tonnage group. In terms of ship numbers, the 500-2,999 ton category has the highest 
incidence (9,693 ships), while the 20,000 and above category has the highest gross 
tonnage, being 173,617,648 tons for the ocean-going ships. In the case of coastal ships, 
however, the less than I 00 ton category has the highest incidence of 50,781 ships, 
followed by the I 00-499 ton category with 32,236 ships. 
38 
Chapter 3 
Ships of less than 3,000 grt amount to 85.4 percent of total traffic, however the 
percentage should be much greater taking into account fishing vessels' movements. Thus 
it can be said that coastal and small ocean-going ships are the main components of the 
coastal traffic in Korean waters. 
Table 3.8 Vessel arrivals by tonnage group (1990) 
Tonnage Total Oceangoing Coastal 
group 
No. GRT No. GRT No. GRT . 
- 99 51621 2489530 840 34558 50781 2454972 
100- 499 35572 12078107 3336 1256223 32236 10821884 
500- 2999 32110 41327396 9693 14344234 22417 26983162 
3000- 4999 8371 34268416 3418 14076591 4953 20191825 
5000- 6999 1896 12836407 1452 10193752 444 2642655 
7000- 9999 1900 18119913 1514 13967816 386 4152097 
10000-19999 4180 60797055 3507 51513563 673 9283492 
20000- 4075 176204380 4007 173617648 68 2586732 
Total 139725 358121204 I 27767 1 279004385 11 111958 I 79116819 I 
Source: Statistical yearbook (1991) 
3.2.2 MONTHLY VESSEL MOVEMENT 
Figure 3.4 indicates the seasonal variations in traffic for the period of five years 
(1986-90). In general there is less traffic in January(-10.4%) and February(-19.2%), 
more traffic in May(+6.5%), September(+3.2%), October(+6.5%), November(+5.8%) and 
December (+5.5%) with peak values in May and October. Oceangoing ships show less 
fluctuation than coastal vessels, peak value on December(+9.6%) and the lowest value 
on January(-11.7%). Coastal vessels, however, show peak values in May(+6.9%) and 
October(+6.8%) and the minimum value in February(-21%). 
These can probably be explained by the financial year system (January l -
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Fig 3.3 Vessel movement by gross ton 
Gross Ton(thousand) 
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Fig 3.4 Monthly vessel movement 
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December 31 ), more export/import cargo rush into the last month of December but less 
cargo in January. Also there are less days in February and the long New Year(lunar) 
holiday (approximately one week long in most industries) in February. 
3.2.3 FISHING VESSEL ACTIVITY 
Since a considerable volume of marine traffic consists of fishing vessels in Korean 
waters, it is necessary to consider fishing vessel activity. COST 301 noted that:!3·21 
As fishing vessels constitute more than half the traffic at certain times in some 
areas it was considered important that it should be taken into account both for its 
own sake and for the hazards created by fishing operations. 
However, it is difficult to obtain data on fishing vessel traffic since fishing 
activities depend significantly on the location of fishing grounds. Possible ways to 
develop quantitative data or a general applicable model on fishing vessel movements are 
as follows. 13·21 
• Estimation of fishing vessel flows near port areas (departures and arrivals) 
may be possible by analysis of landed catches, and composition of vessel fleets. 
• The provision of keeping log books for data collection of catches on fishing 
vessels could probably, at least in the future, open one way to estimate the 
number of fishing vessel movements at sea based on average data of catch per 
fishing effort. 
However, such research will need an extensive local data collection combined 
with seasonal traffic counts for calibration process, and the log books are not yet fully 
adopted for operational purposes in Korea. This section describes general statistics of 
the Korean fishing fleet. 
(I) Fishing fleet by tonnage group: Table 3.9 shows that total number of fishing vessels 
has been increased slightly; average rate of 2. 7 percent per annum for the period of 1980-
89. The number of ships under 5 gross tons account for 87 percent of the total fishing 
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fleet and 100 ton and over category account for 1.4 percent only. 
Table 3.9 Fishing fleet by tonnage group 
5-100 . 
. 
Year Total under 1-5 5-10 1-20 2-30 3-50. 1-200 over 
I ton ton ton ton ton ton ··ton . ton 200 . 
1980 77574 23314 42839 3507 3040 817 1220 1805 450 582 
1981 80500 24743 44421 3491 2944 871 1166 1832 448 584 
1982 86515 25092 50150 3610 2772 863 1084 1852 488 604 
1983 88594 26139 51006 3672 2727 929 1044 1921 552 604 
1984 90463 26666 52036 3804 2663 992 1056 2061 565 620 
1985 90970 27603 52001 3599 2470 987 1025 2088 569 628 
1986 93037 28525 52823 3745 2489 1029 1107 2085 587 648 
1987 94153 29242 52916 3929 2492 1045 1150 2083 607 691 
1988 99024 33252 53354 4230 2499 1080 1210 2046 613 740 
1989 98455 33440 52816 4314 2329 1026 1186 1953 618 773 
Source: Statistical yearbook of fisheries (1984)(1990) 
(2) Fishing fleet by the type of construction material and age group: 
Table 3.10 Number of fishing boats by the type of construction material and age group 
Total under 6-10 years 
I 
11-15 16-20 over 21 
5 years years years years .. 
Total 98455 28899 24654 29641 10674 4587 
Wooden 
Non-power 19757 3838 6377 5922 2817 805 
Power boat 69347 19591 16912 22636 7434 2774 
. 
Sub-total 89106 23429 23289 28558 . 10251 .. 3579 
Steel 
. 
·•· .·· 
• Power boat 4006 938 699 988 381 1000. 
. 
F.R.P. 
Non-power 402 303 93 4 2 0 
Power boat 4941 4229 573 91 40 8 
.. 
Sub-total 5343 4532 666 95 42 . 8 
. . 
Source: Statistical yearbook of fisheries (l.Y~ 0) 
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As can be seen in Table 3.10 and Figure 3.5, wooden boats account for 90 percent 
of the total number of fishing vessels, steel ships account for four percent only and non-
power boats account for 20 percent of total fleet. 
(3) Fishing fleet by type of fishing: Table 3.11 shows the number of fishing vessels and 
their tonnage by the type of fishing. Coastal and off-shore fisheries which have direct 
influence to coastal traffic involve the greatest number of vessels(58%) and 
tonnage(46%). 
Table 3.11 Fishing fleet by type of fishing (1989) 
Type of Total Power vessel Non-power vessel 
fishing 
No. GRT No. GRT No. GRT 
Distant water 799 434,429 799 434,429 - -
fisheries 
Coastal/off- 56,966 447,366 48,272 434,585 8,694 12,781 
shore fisheries 
Culture 37,418 45,587 27,611 37,080 9,807 8,507 
fisheries 
Inland water 2,955 2,507 1,303 1,609 1,652 898 
fisheries 
Others 317 33,342 309 33,334 8 8 
Total 98,455 963,231 78,294 941,037 20,161 22,194 
Source: Statistical yearbook of fisheries (1990) 
3.3 SEA-BORNE CARGO TRAFFIC 
3.3.1 TOTAL CARGO TRAFFIC 
Cargo movement is an important measure of the volume of marine traffic. This 
section describes the cargo movements in ports in Korea. 
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Fig 3.6 Total cargo traffic 
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Figure 3.6 show that total cargo traffic has been increasing continuously. For the 
period 1981 -90 the average annual rate of increase has been 12 percent, while during the 
same period coastal traffic has experienced an annual increase of nearly 19 percent. 
3.3.2 MONTHLY CARGO TRAFFIC 
The monthly cargo movements for 5 years are summarised on Table 3.12. The 
figures indicate the mean monthly level of cargo traffic during five years( 1986-90). The 
peak value of cargo traffic was in December and the lowest value in February. 
Table 3.12 Monthly cargo traffic (1986-1990) (unit: thousands ton) 
I Month I Foreign trade I Coastal trade I Total I 
January 14,808 3,646 18,454 
------------- -------------- -------------- --------------
February 14,365 3,417 17,782 
------------- -------------- -------------- --------------
March 15,917 3,993 19,190 
------------- -------------- -------------- --------------
April 15,574 4,005 19,579 
------------- -------------- -------------- --------------
May 16,322 4,015 20,337 
------------- -------------- -------------- --------------
June 15,374 3,905 19,279 
------------- -------------- -------------- --------------
July 16,164 3,866 20,030 
------------- -------------- -------------- --------------
August 16,335 3,957 20,292 
------------- -------------- -------------- --------------
September 16,206 3,866 20,072 
------------- --------------
-------------- --------------
October 15,788 4,456 20,244 
------------- -------------- -------------- --------------
November 16,288 4,361 20,649 
------------- -------------- -------------- --------------
December 17,658 4,767 22,425 
Average 15,909 4,021 
!·•••·••••••····· 
19,921 
s ource: Statistical yearbook (1 87) - (1991), KMPA 
Fig 3.7 shows graphically monthly cargo traffic figure for the same period. It 
indicate no significant seasonal variations, although there is less cargo traffic in January 
and February and peak value on December. This may be explained by the same reason 
in section 3 .2.2. 
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3.4 SUMMARY 
(1) The register of Korean ships other than fishing vessels has grown slowly but 
continuously; average rate of 2 percent in numbers and 4.3 percent per annum in 
terms of tonnage. 
(2) Total vessel movements m Korean ports are increasing significantly by 4.6 
percent in number of ships and 13.5 percent per annum in terms of tonnage. 
Coastal and small size of ocean-going ships are the main components of the 
coastal traffic in Korean waters. 
(3) Total number of fishing vessels has been increased slightly and the number of 
ships under five gross ton accounts for 87 percent of total fishing fleet. Coastal 
and off-shore fisheries which have direct influence on coastal traffic has the 
highest number of ships. 
(4) Total cargo traffic has been increased continuously with an average annual rate 
of 12 percent for the period 1981-89, while coastal traffic has experienced annual 
increase of nearly 19 percent. 
(5) There are no significant seasonal variations of cargo traffic. 
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SHIP CASUALTIES 
4.1 INTRODBCTION AND GENERAL TRENDS OF CASUALTIES 
A systematic investigation of marine accidents in Korean waters began in the 
Marine Accidents Inquiry Agencies under the Marine Accidents lnquir,y Act from 1971. 
The purpose of the Act is to clarify the causes of marine accidents through an inquiry 
of the Agencies, and to contribute thereby to the prevention of further occurrence of 
marine accidents. 14-IJ 
This chapter is a comprehensive examination of cause relationships of casualty 
data for the years 1986-1990. As part of the approach a statistical analysis of casualty 
has been carried out, but further consideration has been given to find out more about the 
cause relationships associated with ship casualties. The main emphasis of this chapter 
is placed on the quantification of effect level of causal factors related to the casualties, 
and also the identification of main contributory factors in different type of casualties and 
in different sub-areas. 
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The casualty ratio excluding fishing vessels shows decreasing trends as can be 
seen from Figure 4.1. The number of ships, however, involved in casualties are 
increasing whereas they are decreasing in many other countries (see pages 198-99). 
Fig 4.1 Trends of marine casualties (1982-1990) 
Casual t y ratto (~) 
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Table 4.1 shows that fishing vessels account for approximately 62 percent and 
cargo ships account for about 17 percent of the total casualties, whi le tankers account for 
five percent and passenger/ferries for about three percent. 
Table 4.1 Number of ships involved in casualties by the type of vessel 
Type 1986 1987 1988 . 1989 1990 . Total .•.• Ratio 
Passenger 23 28 11 16 20 98 3.3 
Cargo 98 118 81 103 11 3 512 17.4 
Tanker 24 30 29 23 46 152 5.2 
Fishing 296 378 357 405 397 1,833 62.2 
Tugs 16 31 24 17 31 119 4.0 
Others 56 72 41 22 42 233 7.9 
Total 512 657 543 586 649 2,947 100% 
Source: Written Veraicts(l990 . Seou 
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Table 4.2 summarizes the number of casualties by types of incident. It is 
recognized that collision, stranding/grounding and foundering accidents account for 
approximately 50 percent of total casualties, and machinery damage accounts for 28 
percent of casualties. 
Table 4.2 Number of casualties by Type of incident 
Type 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Total Ratio 
Collision 99 133 93 108 132 565 23.6 
Stranding 71 92 56 51 56 326 13.6 
Foundering 56 70 57 61 47 291 12.2 
Machinery damage 96 125 141 !59 160 681 28.4 
Flooding 31 43 26 34 28 162 6.8 
Fire 23 21 26 37 39 146 6.1 
Death and injuries 17 11 12 11 13 64 2.7 
Others 36 38 27 18 40 159 6.6 
Total 429 533 438 479 515 2,394 100% 
Source: Written Verdicts (1990). Seoul 
Table 4.3 Number of casualties by Time band 
Time band 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Total Ratio 
0000-0400 81 85 74 91 81 412 17.2 
0400-0800 68 102 83 75 96 424 17.7 
0800-1200 61 96 74 79 93 403 16.8 
1200-1600 67 82 72 86 83 390 16.3 
1600-2000 81 84 73 87 93 418 17.5 
2000-2400 63 71 57 60 66 317 13.2 
Unknown 8 13 5 I 3 30 1.3 
Total 429 533 438 479 515 2,394 100% 
Source: Written Verdicts (1990). Seoul 
Table 4.3 presents the number of casualties by time band. Under chi-squared 
goodness of fit test the observed number of casualties in different time band is 
significantly different from a uniform distribution of casualties every time band, at the 
five percent level with five degrees of freedom; but the number of casualties occurring 
during first five time bands were found to be not significantly different to a uniform 
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distribution, again at five percent level but for four degrees of freedom. It seems 
reasonable to conclude that the occurrence of casualties is significantly less during 2000-
2400 hours time band. 
Table 4.4 shows the number of casualties by waterway type. Approximately three 
quarters of all casualties occur in territorial water (with 12 miles off the coast) where 
shore-based navigational aids may be available. 23.5 percent of casualties were occurred 
in open sea and international waters. 
Table 4.4 Number of casualties by Waterway type 
Year Confined waters Territorial seas Open sea Total 
1986 179 164 86 429 
1987 294 128 Ill 533 
1988 122 170 146 438 
1989 98 211 170 479 
1990 216 248 51 515 
Total 909 921 564 2,394 
Ratio 38.0% 38.5% 23.5% 100% 
Note: (I) Confined waters include port/harbour, approaches and narrow channels 
(2) Territorial seas: within 12 miles off coast 
Source: Author - modified from Written Verdicts (1990) 
4.2 CASUALTY DATA BASE 
4.2.1 DATA SOURCES 
Generally casualty information is available from the following sources: 
o Port/Government authorities 
o Search and Rescue (SAR) Centre 
o Underwriters & P+I Clubs 
o Ship owners 
o Classification societies 
o Cargo operators 
The primary source of data in this study is the Written Verdicts produced by the 
Central Marine Accident Inquiry Agency. Secondary sources are: 
51 
Chapter 4 
• Statistical Yearbook of shipping casualties by Marine Police, Korea 
• Lloyd · s Register of Shipping Statistical Tables 
• Lloyd's Register of Shipping: Lloyd's Register of Ships 
• Lloyd · s Maritime Directory 
• Fairplay's Commercial Shipping Fleets 
• Fairplay World Shipping Directory 
The Written Verdicts are published annually by the Central Agency and contain 
details of the casualties that have been examined during the year. The Verdicts give 
general information about casualties such as: 
• ship's particulars 
• the development of casualty 
• the causes of casualty 
• the decisions 
Maritime casualties can be divided into two discrete groups according to their 
elementary causes: traffic accidents and technical accidents as described in section 1.3. 
For the purpose of this study the focus is concentrated on the accidents that could be 
influenced by shore-based navigational aids. Casualty data of collisions, strandings, 
groundings, rammings and founderings are analyzed for the areas concern over a five 
year period ( 1986-90). 
'fhe circumstances of each casualty are examined to determine the extent of the 
causal factors in each case. 
4.2.2 DATA COLLECTION AND CLASSIFICATION 
A good background of the variables that may lead to a casualty is given by Moon 
& Higgins,14·21 and many other studies of ship casualties have classified the variables in 
a similar way.14·3JI4'4JI4•5114 -6JI4•7114•8114•91 This analysis deals with 36 variables of computerised 
data on casualties which include: 
(a) general information: casualty type, year/month/date/time of day and day of week 
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(b) ship's elements: tonnage, type, length, beam, age, speed, draft, flag, etc. 
(c) meteorological conditions: wind, sea, visibility, current, weather, etc. 
(d) human elements: manning & watch system, etc. 
(e) waterway configurations: waterway type, channel width and depth, etc. 
(f) consequences of casualty: number of live lost or injuries, total loss, oil outflow, 
delays and damage to hull, cargo, machinery. 
So far there are very few research results available related to cause relationships 
of casualties. Quinn & Scottl4•101, DnVl4-11 1 and Tuovinenl4-121 undertook the research to 
find out the inter-relationships between the causal factors. 
The analysis of cause relationships in this study is based on the registering of 
causal factors derived from an examination of the Written verdicts and earlier researches. 
The factors vary between cases and about 80 different causal factors are identified. 
Therefore it is clear that these factors should be arranged into larger groupings in order 
to identify the main tendencies indicated by the casualty data. This study uses 12 sub-
groups based on 82 causal factors, and these sub-groups cover three main groups. 
Annex-A illustrates how the mixed population of contributory factors is classified into 
various groupings with the code number. 
The comparison of categorization of causal factors in different studies are made 
in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5 Comparison of grouping of causal factors 
PARK J S DnV QUINN TUOVINEN 
Main Group 3 groups 6 areas 4 dimensions 3 groups 
Sub-group 12 sub-groups 21 groups 4 sub-groups 
Factors 82 factors 200 factors 27 factors 60 factors 
Source: Author- compiled from Annex-A and References [4-10} [4-11} [4-12} 
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4.2.3 EVALUATION OF CAUSAL FACTORS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP 
Earlier studies indicated clearly that information obtained from conventional 
statistics cannot provide guidance on detailed casualty analysis. Much more is needed 
if casualty statistics are to play a proficient and vigorous role in encouraging safety. 
Specific difficulties originate from making the causal relationships clear. 
Symbolic modelling of functional block diagram and fault trees has proved to be 
an efficient aid in safety analysis 14•131 , and fault tree analysis and block diagrams have 
proved to be useful tools for the evaluation of relationships between different causes of 
ship casualtiesl4·' 41. These methods are used to indicate the relationships between 
individual physical factors. They are also used to determine the effects that may be 
generated by a change in any of the factors or in their inter-relationships. In addition 
these models permit easy understanding and recognition of the factors leading to 
individual casualty14 •151 • 
The block scheme that is presented in Fig 4.2 is used in this study to survey the 
cause relationships. The block scheme was used by Tuovinen( 1983) to evaluate the 
causes of 471 ship casualties in the Baltic Sea. The grouping of causal factors, however, 
is not detailed and the list of causal factors does not cover the all possible causes 
identified in this study. Especially the human element contributory factors are very 
limited. Consequently the block scheme is enhanced to meet the requirements of this 
study. The purpose is to trace the sequence of events relevant to the casualty by 
connecting the appropriate blocks with lines. The block scheme is completed by the 
researcher on the basis of available information. 
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Figure 4.2 
Sr. No.: CAUSAL FACTORS OF CASUALTY Jinsoo PARK 
============== Ship's Name: 
Date of Casually: 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 
= = = = = = = = = == 
EXTERNAL CONDIJIONS 
Institute of Marine Studies 
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!Daylighq JDarknes~ jrwilighq !Fog! I Rain) !snow! !storm! !Heavy Ship Motion! J Poor Radar efliciency by Rain/Sea/Snow! 
Heavy surrounding 
Traflic 
WORKING ENVIRONMENTS 
Other ship passing Other ship on 
too close distance Collision Co. 
Improper Rules Deficiency on charted/ Other ship manoeuvring Other ship no-reaction to 
(Road, Class .... ) rinted information a ainst rule the critical situation 
TECHNICAL FAULT 
and DEFICIENCIES 
-------
r·[ BREAKDOWN }--
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Pr_opeller I 
~ 
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.!J I!_ M~ N_ F~ ~T .Q R_~ 
------- --
IMPROPER SYSTEM 
INTERFACE 
WATCHKEEPING 
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of order 
lrmproper reporting!Take-over I Not use every available equipment/aids in the sitUation 
I Engineer! I watch olficerllcaptainiiPitotiiHelmsmaniiLookoutl!captain on watch I 
Excessive speed under 
the circumstance 
Misobservation of 
Nav. aids 
CONTROL TASKS 
Not fix position 
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Misobservation of 
other ship 
Negligence in 
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It is often assumed that an accident is caused by one definite factor, and if this 
factor could have been eliminated the undesired event would not have occurred. 
Although this position might be defensible in some rare cases, it oversimplifies the 
problem. In general a casualty is the result of several causes, or more correctly a chain 
of events. Using the block scheme described above the systematic tracing of the relevant 
sequence of events is possible. This combination of elements is then used for 
classification of individual factors in each casualty. 
4.2.4 CODING AND PR0CESSING 
The large amount of information collected can be managed, described and 
analyzed most effectively on a computer. The casualty information is coded and a data 
file created. These data are then analyzed using the "Statistical Package for Social 
Science (SPSS)" 14• 161 which has been found to be very suitable for this purpose, The data 
sheet of Annex-8, "Casualty card", has been used to input data into computer. The card 
corresponds to each variable described in section 4.2.2. 
4.3 THE ANALYSIS OF MARINE CASUAL TIES 
4.3.1 SAMPLE ATTRIBUTES 
The population of this study consists of all the collision, grounding, ramming and 
foundering accidents which have taken place in Korean waters during the period of 1986-
1990. The primary source, the written verdicts, of data base in this study contains some 
of the cases that have been examined during each year, but not all the cases are 
published. Therefore it has not been possible to collect relevant information on the entire 
population, and the collected data base is a part of the population. The primary source 
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of data base consists of: 
Part I: 
Part 11: 
accident inquiry reports and suit cases - taken as sample in this study, 
list of accidents - population. 
lihe part Il gives only the ship's name, type of casualty, year/month/date/time of accident 
and the location. The additional information including ship type, tonnage, flag, waterway 
type were acquired by secondary sources. 
In order to use the sample in making inferences about the population, the sample 
should be representative. This feature is guaranteed only in a probability or random 
sample. In United Kingdom the term random sample means "a sample drawn so that 
every member of the population had a non-zero chance of selection" whereas in U.S.A. 
this is termed a "probability sample" .14•171 
The sample comprises 381 ship-casualties, and Table 4.6 details the data obtained 
including the number of ship-casualties by the casualty type, by sub-area and the annual 
number of ships in casualties. 
The fit was tested by means of "goodness of fit test" with a five percent 
significance level. In this case the null hypothesis H 0 would be that the sample used in 
this study are in approximately the same proportions as in the population from which 
they were taken. Under the test, the sample by casualty type is significantly different to 
that assuming same proportions as in the population. The discrepancies are mainly 
because the number of collisions in the sample is over-representative while the number 
of founderings is under-representative. There also are significant difference between the 
sample and population by year. The differences are because the number of sample in 
1987 is under-representative but the number in 1988 is over-representative. 
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Table 4.6 Total number of ship-casualties versus samples 
Sub-area Total number Sample 
East (Sub-area I & 2) 116 54 
South-east (Sub-area 3 & 4) 225 81 
South (Sub-area 5 & 6) 222 89 
South-west (Sub-area 7 & 8) 301 91 
West (Sub-area 9 & I 0) 169 66 
Total 1.033 381 
Type of casualty Total number Sample Year Total number Sample 
Collision 578 242 1986 194 64 
Grounding 249 81 1987 252 74 
Ramming 48 ?' _o 1988 186 92 
Foundering 158 35 1989 176 67 
Total 1,033 381 1990 225 84 
Total 1,033 381 
Source: Author 
Under a Chi-squared goodness of fit test. however, the sample by sub-area is not 
significantly different to the population at the five percent level with four degrees of 
freedom. though the number of accidents in south-west coast is under-representative 
whereas the number of accidents in east coast is over-representative. The conclusion 
therefore is that the sample used in this study does seem to include, in approximately the 
same proportions as in the population by sub-area. but does not seem to include the same 
proportions by casualty type and in terms of year. 
However. the discrepancies between the sample and total population are beyond 
our control, because the sample has been determined by those responsible for producing 
the "Written verdicts" from which the data come. Furthermore the discrepancies are not 
of major significance because what this study is concerned with is establishing causality 
of marine accidents. 
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4.3.2 SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION 
The use of the observed past frequency of marine casualties in prediction ofthe 
future frequency necessitates the development of a statistical model which fits the past 
data. Assuming that the model will continue to apply in the future the proper prediction 
can be made with some degree of confidence. For marine casualties, which are isolated 
events occurring in a continuum of time, it might reasonably be expected that the model 
most likely to describe their frequency of occurrence would be the Poisson distribution 
or a distribution derived from it.l4·' 81 Tuovinenl4•191 found the Poisson distribution is an 
adequate model for this purpose. 
The basic condition for such a distribution is that events should be random in 
nature. In the context of marine casualties this means that the expected accident rate 
should be constant for every day in the year or every hour in the day depending on the 
chosen time base. Clearly this is unlikely in view of changes in identified variables such 
as: weather and traffic density. These variables can be allowed for by means of a 
modification known as the negative binomial distribution, sometimes referred to as the 
Pascal distribution after the French mathematician Blaise Pascal(1623-1662). 
The negative binomial distribution has two parameters w and p where p+q=l, 
affording greater flexibility. If the average number of accidents per day is E(x) and the 
variance is V(x), then the mean of distribution is wqlp and the variance is wq/p2• The 
probability of having x accidents in a day is given by the formulal4•201 
O~(ao 
Grimes14·' 81 said that the negative binomial model produces a closer fit to the 
observed distribution than the Poisson and the "goodness of the fit" was confirmed by 
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means of a x2 test. Cockcroft.14-211 has supported this point in his study 'Statistics of ship 
collisions'_ Goodwin and Kemp14-221 also pointed out that; 
If one considers the frequency distribution of the number of sea collisions per 
month over a recent 20-year period it may be shown that the Poisson distribution 
does not provide a good model because factors affecting collisions such as 
visibility do not remain constant from month to month. In fact the best model is 
given by the negative binomial distribution when the probability of success, or 
mean level of success, is not constant from trial to triaL The negative binomial 
distribution has been found to apply to the distribution of road accidents and air 
accidents together with marine casualties. 
Table 4.7 shows the observed distribution of casualties in this study during the 
period of 1986-90 with the expected distributions produced by both Poisson and negative 
<binomial models. In each case the number of days totals 1826 which includes the one 
leap year day. Clearly the negative binomial model presents a closer fit to the observed 
distribution than the Poisson. The fit was tested by means of x2 test with five percent 
significance leveL If we let 0; be the frequency in the ith cell of the observed 
distribution and E; of the expected distribution, then the test statistic is given by 
In this case, the null hypothesis H0 would be that the sample distribution fits to 
negative binomial modeL Under the null hypothesis our test value of x2 is 3.935 and the 
X\5% value is 9.488. So the null hypothesis is accepted. The conclusion therefore is that 
negative binomial distribution is an adequate model to be used' in investigating marine 
accident frequencies. 
The Poisson model fails mainly through its inability to fit at the upper end of the 
distribution, i.e. those few days when a large number of accidents occur. These could 
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be the days when weather or traffic conditions are adverse to marine safety, and they are 
the days which the Poisson model can not allow for because of its basic requirement for 
constant expectation. l4- 181 
The bottom row of Table 4.7 presents the negative binomial probabilities 
corresponding to the above distribution. Accordingly there is a 71 percent chance on any 
day that there will be no accident of collision, grounding, ramming & foundering 
anywhere in Korean waters. And there is a 22 percent chance that there will be one 
accident, a six percent chance of two accidents, 1.4 percent chance of three accidents and 
so on. 
Table 4.7 Distribution of accidents in Korean waters 
Number of 0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
accidents per 
day 
Observed 
frequency (days) 1284 416 94 22 8 I 0 I 
Poisson 
frequency (days) 1234 484 95 12 I 0 0 0 
(Probability) .676 .265 .052 .0067 .0007 .0001 .0000 .0000 
Neg. binomial 
frequency (days) 1293 396 104 26 6 I 0 0 
(probability) .7083 .2166 .0567 .014 .0034 .0008 .0002 .0000 
Source: Author 
4.3.3 BREAKDOWN OF DATA 
Casualty frequency for Korean ships for the period of 1986-90 is based on the 
mean number of registered ships and the number of casualties per annum. This is 
consistent with the technique adopted by the Det norske Veritas'(DnV) studyl4.231. It is 
evident from the Table 4.8 that, in common with the DnV study, the casualty frequency 
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for ships below 100 ton gross is surprisingly low. This is probably due to inadequate 
reporting of casualties and longer port stay for this group. Smaller vessels operating in 
shallow waters out of shipping lanes may beach & recover easily and not be reported. 
This table also shows that the casualty rate is relatively constant but high for the tonnage 
group ranging between 500 and 4,999 ton gross. The casualty rate for ships above 5,000 
ton gross shows a less frequency, lying at an average of 14.6 percent. This reduction can 
be prescribed to the fact that the latter mentioned group trades in foreign waters & open 
sea and is thus less exposed to the more difficult coastal waters. However the casualty 
frequency of Korean ships for above 500 tons is as much as 2.5 times of Norwegian 
figure even though the frequency for below 500 grt is nearly same as the frequency of 
Norwegian vessels. 
Table 4.8 Mean casualty frequency based on number of registered (1986 - 1990) 
Tonnage group Number of registered Number of casualties Casualty frequency 
(gross ton) vessels (B) per annum (A) (A/B) 
up to 19 2,310 12 0.5% 
20- 99 1,370 31 2.3% 
100- 499 465 46 9.9% 
500- 999 136 31 22.8% 
I ,000 - 4,999 232 43 18.5% 
5,000 & over 198 29 14.6% 
Total 4,711 192 4.1% 
Source: Author - modified from Written Verdicts 
However the casualty frequency based on vessel traffic is more analytic index 
than the frequency based on the number of registered vessels. The only available traffic 
data in Korean waters is the statistics of vessel movements. Table 4.9 shows the 
frequency based on the mean number of movement in ports and the mean number of 
casualties for the same period (1986-90). This table demonstrates different facts to the 
figure based on the mean number of registered vessel. The bigger size vessels have more 
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casualty frequency than smaller ships. 
Table 4.9 Mean casualty frequency based on number of movements (1986 - 1990) 
Tonnage group Number of movements Number of casualties Ca5ualty frequency per 
(gross ton) in ports (B) per annum (A) 
. 
1,000. movements (A/B) 
up to 100 99,020 43 0.43 
100 - 499 65,845 46 0.70 
500 - 4,999 74,977 74 0.99 
5,000 & over 21,517 29 1.35 
Total 261,359 192 0.73 
Source: Author - modified from Written Verdicts & Statistical yearbook 
4.3.4 TYPE OF CASUAL TIES AND THEIR LOCAL AND SEASONAL 
DISTRIBUTIONS 
The following definitions are used for defining a casualty of this study in this 
chapter. Same definitions are used in Lloyd's casualty information system14-24l_ 
(I) Collision striking or being struck by another vessel, regardless of whether underway, 
anchored or moored. This category does not include striking under water 
wrecks. Three different types of collision (meeting, crossing and 
overtaking) are distinguished as practicable. 
(2) Stranding includes ships reported touching sea bottom, grounding, bumping over bars 
and entanglement on under water wrecks. 
(3) Ramming striking or being struck by an external substances not being another ship 
or the sea bottom. This category includes striking dock, lock, buoy, 
breakwater, platforms/drilling rigs and fixed shore nets. 
( 4) Foundering includes ships which have sunk as a result of heavy weather, springing 
of leaks, list, breaking in two, etc., but not as a consequence of collision, 
stranding or ramming. 
The following criteria are used for defining a waterway type in this study: 
(1) Port/Harbour is a place in the port/harbour limit. 
(2) Port approaches: there is no internationally recognized criteria defined. 
Port approaches, however, in this study is within approximately five miles 
from the port entrance. 
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(3) Coastal waters means territorial seas ( 12 miles off the coast). 
( 4) Sound/Passage is a place in the channel, passage, fairway and traffic lahe. 
The incidence of the different types of casualty is shown in Figure 4.3. Collision 
accounts for 63.4 percent, stranding for 21.3 percent, ramming for 6.1 percent and 
foundering for 9:2 percent of all casualties. The 100 tons and above category of ship has 
more meeting collisions but less foundering casualties than all casualties. 
145 fishing vessels (38%) are involved in casualties, especially 63 percent of 
foundering and 41 percent of grounding accidents are fishing vessels. Meantime 44 
percent of ramming incidents are cargo ships. (see Table 1, Annex-C) 
Table 4.10 and Figure 4.4 shows how casualties are distributed according to the 
type of waterway where the casualty took place. 60.9 percent of ramming casualties 
occur in ports & harbour, 41.7 percent of collisions and 42 percent of strandings occur 
in coastal waters. From Fig 4.4, it is apparent that fishing boat casualties are most 
frequent in coastal waters and open sea, while merchant ship casualties tend to occur in 
ports/harbour and coastal waters, Passenger ship casualties are more often(38.5%) in port 
& harbours, (see also Table 11, Annex-C) 
Fig 4.5 shows the geographical distribution of casualties in one degree squares. 
The highest number of casualties occur in the Pusan/Ulsan area, and the south coastal 
area has a higher number of accidents than the east & west coasts of Korea. Another 
identified danger area is the port of Inchon and its approaches. Clearly the principal port 
areas(e.g. Pusan, Inchon) have a higher portion of ramming accidents while more 
groundings are experienced in the areas (e.g. Cheju, Mokpo) where fishery bases exist. 
(see Table 7, Annex-C) 
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Fig 4.4 Distribution of casualties by Waterway type 
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Table 4.10 Cross-tabulation of waterway type by casualty type 
Type of casualty Row 
Total 
Collision Stranding Ramming Foundering 
Port and 42 25 14 4 85 
Harbour 49.4% 29.4% 16.5% 4.7% 100.0% 
17.4% 30.9% 60.9% 11.4% 22.3% 
Port 26 9 3 3 41 
approaches 63.4% 22.0% 7.3% 7.3% 100.0% 
10.7% 11.1% 13.0% 8.6% 10.8% 
Sound and 42 13 I 56 
passage 75.0% 23.2% 1.8% 100.0% 
17.4% 16.0% 4.3% 14.7% 
Coastal 101 34 5 16 156 
waters 64.7% 21.8% 3.2% 10.3% 100.0% 
41.7% 42.0% 21.7% 45.7% 40.9% 
Open sea 31 12 43 
72.1% 27.9% 100.0% 
12.8% 34.3% 11.3% 
Column 242 81 23 35 381 
Total 63.5% 21.3% 6.0% 9.2% 100.0% 
Source: Author 
Fig 4.6 shows the total number of casualties per month and clearly indicates the 
seasonal variations. Generally more accidents happen in June, July & December. This 
may well be linked to existence of fog during June & July and with periods of high wind 
during winter, as described in Chapter 2. Fishing boats have more casualties during 
December & January, while larger vessels (I 00 grt & above) have more casualties during 
June & July (see also Table 6, I 0 & 13 in Annex-C). The inference is that larger vessels 
are more adversely affected by low visibility, and smaller ships by wind and sea state. 
Table 18 and 19 in Annex-C support this inference; 36 ships (26.3%) below 100 tons are 
involved in casualties under wind force six and over whilst 41 ships (17.6%) above I 00 
tons are involved. However 91 ships (53%) above 100 tons are involved in casualties 
under reduced visibility (less than 0.5 mile) while 36 ships (38%) below lOO tons are 
involved. 
67 
Chapter 4 
Fig 4.6 Monthly numbers of casualties 
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The monthly distribution of collisions shows a seasonal effect which is statistically 
significant under a Chi-squared goodness of fit test at the five percent level with ll 
degrees of freedom. High numbers occur in the summer, with peak values in June & 
July and values slightly above in May, August & December. There are significantly less 
collisions in the periods of January to March and September to November inclusive (see 
Fig 4. 7 a). It therefore seems reasonable to say that the occurrence of collision accidents 
does not occur uniformly over the month. This result is explained by the correlation 
between the low visibility on a certain month as described in Chapter 2, and also 
supported by the statistical analysis of the relationship between visibility and month. 
Table 14 in Annex-C shows that very high number of ships (64 ships out of 127) are 
involved in casualties during June and July under reduced visibility(less than 0.5 mile). 
By comparison, Glansdorpi4-25J reported that the monthly distribution of collisions have 
a slight trend towards peak values in the winter period for the European waters covered 
by COST 301. 
The monthly distribution of groundings shows that higher numbers occur in July, 
November & December, and high numbers of foundering accidents occur in December. 
Although peaks appear at Fig 4.7 (b), (c) and (d), due to the relatively small number of 
accidents in the sample size, they are not significant. 
4.3.5 TIME OF DAY AND DAY OF WEEK 
Traditionally three watch system (4 on/8oft) is employed on bridge manning; first 
mate 0400-0800 and 1600-2000 hours; second mate 1200-1600 and 0000-0400 hours; 
third mate 0800-1200 and 2000-2400 hours. Different watch systems, however, may be 
adopted on smaller ships or coastal vessels. lihe master is on watch in some cases and 
two watch systems (6 on/6 oft) are also operated. 
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lihe minimum manning standards of ship-officers on Korean ships is mandated 
in Korea Ship-Officers Act. The ships registered in Korea should be manned by the 
following number of officers14-261 : 
(a) ocean-going ships (500 ton & above): a master and three deck officers duly 
certificated 
(b) ocean-going ships (200 - 500 tons): a master and two deck officers 
(c) ocean-going ships (less than 200 tons): a master and a deck officer 
(d) coastal vessels: a master and a deck officer 
(e) coastal ships(less than 1600 tons) but navigating inland water area: a master 
General casualty data, including machinery as well as collision and stranding 
incidents, indicated at Table 4.3 in section 4.1 that time of day had little significance. 
Figure 4.8, however, shows that 46.7 percent of casualties occur between 0000 hours and 
0800 hours in this sample, another high spot is between 1600 and 2000 hours whilst 
fewer casualties happen between 2000 and 2400 hours (see also Table 3 in Annex-C). 
This may be due to twilight and sea fog occurring between 0500 and 0800 hours usually. 
Also there may be more movement of ships for coming alongside and leaving the berths 
in port area to meet the work shift (day shift: 0800-1700 hours), thus more ships enter 
port before 0800 hours and leave after 1700 hours. 
No exact information on the daily distribution of arrivals and departures from 
ports is available, but the peak period of rarnrnings is coincident with the traffic peaks 
at ports. l'his is the type of waterway where most rammings take place, as seen in Table 
4.1 0. Comparative more rarnmings occur between 0400 and 0800 hours than during 
other watches. 
More grounding accidents were reported in 0800-1200 and 2000-2400 hours 
watch period, third officer's watch typically, whereas fewer groundings occurred in 0400-
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0800 and 1600-2000 hours periods comparing to total accident. This may well be linked 
to the experience and qualifications of the watchkeeper. 
The daily distribution of casualties by day of week is presented in Fig 4.9. It 
clearly indicates daily differences. Peak values are on Thursday and lowest values on 
Monday (see also Table 5 in Annex~C). The daily distribution of collisions shows a peak 
value on Thursday and the lowest value on Monday (graph a). Under a Chi-squared 
goodness of fit test, the weekly distribution of collision is significantly different to that 
assuming no weekly variation at the five percent level with 6 degrees of freedom, but the 
distribution of groundings is not significantly different. 'l!herefore it is reasonable to say 
that the collision accidents in Korean waters do not occur uniformly over the week. 
The daily distribution of rammings shows a high value on Thursday (graph c) and 
more founderings were reported on Wednesday and Thursday (graph d). However, it is 
not possible to assume that the weekly distributions of ramming and foundering accidents 
are significant because the numbers involved are small. 
Several studies show similar phenomena, for example, Glansdorp '4' 251 reported a 
similar trend that peak value occurs on Thursday and the lowest value on Tuesday based 
on 446 collisions in COST 301 area, and Bowdidge'4' 271 also reported a similar trend, 
based on 190 collisions in the Dover Strait area during the 17-year period 1960 to 1976 
inclusive without further explanation. So far, however, it has not proved possible to 
identify any valid explanation for these variations. No evidence has been found from the 
earlier studies that there would be a correlation between the number of casualties at a 
certain day. This study attempted to trace the causes further back to the various related 
factors such as visibility, wind force and sea state. 
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Fig 4.9 Distribution of casualties by days of week 
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The further analysis revealed that much higher number of ships were involved in 
casualties on Thursday under reduced visibility(less than 0.5 mile), stronger wind(wind 
force 6 and over) and higher seas(sea state 5 and over). But only seven ships were 
involved in casualties on Monday under reduced visibility, less than 0.5 mile. 
(I) 33 ships(26%) out of 127 were involved in casualties under low visibility 
(2) 22 ships(29%) among 77 were involved under stronger wind 
(3) 19 ships(28%) among 67 were involved under higher seas 
The inference therefore is that the adverse environmental factors are the main 
cause for these variations rather than the diurnal changes of.the physiological. capabilities 
of navigators which are not possible to identify. (see Table 15, 16 & 17 in Annex-C) 
4.3.6 SHIP TYPE, SIZE AND AGE 
Table 4.11 shows the division of different casualty types between classes of ship, 
Passenger ship includes ferries, hydrofoil & hover craft. Cargo ship includes general 
cargo, bulk carriers and unitised cargo ships. Tanker includes chemical tanker, gas 
tankers and all kind of oil tankers. Others include tugs, naval ships and miscellaneous 
craft. 
Passenger ships have more ramming accidents but no founderings while fishing 
vessels have much more foundering accidents but less rammings (see Table I in Annex-
C). The possible reason why passenger ships are suffering ramming accidents is that 
passenger ships call at small ports frequently where the port facilities are not adequate, 
such as short wharf, insufficient breakwater and no tug boat available. On the other hand 
many fishing vessels are operating off shore and more exposed to danger of heavy 
weather. 
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Table 4.11 Cross-tabulation of casualties by ship type 
Ship Type of casualty Row 
type Total 
Collision Stranding Ramming Foundering 
Passenger 7 3 3 13 
53.8% 23.1% 23.1% 100.0% 
2.9% 3.7% 13.0% 3.4% 
Tanker 45 12 4 2 63 
71.4% 19.0% 6.3% 3.2% 100.0% 
18.6% 14.8% 17.4% 5.7% 16.5% 
Cargo 73 24 10 6 113 
64.6% 21.2% 8.8% 5.3% 100.0% 
30.2% 29.6% 43.5% 17.1% 29.7% 
Fishing 87 33 3 22 145 
60.0% 22.8% 2.1% 15.2% 100.0% 
36.0% 40.7% 13.0% 62.9% 38.1% 
Others 30 9 3 5 47 
63.8% 19.1% 6.4% 10.6% 100.0% 
12.4% 11.1% 13.0% 14.3% 12.3% 
Column 242 81 23 35 381 
Total 63.5% 21.3% 6.0% 9.2% 100.0% 
Source: Author 
Fig 4.10 shows the distribution of casualties by ship size. Clearly it is the small 
ships (less than 100 ton account for 38%) that have the highest rate of accident. This can 
be explained by that such vessels are used mainly in coastal traffic where the closeness 
to land and heavier traffic density almost certainly accounts for the higher incidence of 
collisions and strandings. Another possible reasons are lack of professional knowledge .. 
due to low training, fewer number of officers and lack of navigation equipment. 
Ship age distribution of all ships, cargo ships and tankers in this study are 
depicted in Fig 4.11, where also the corresponding distributions of all ships of the total 
Korean fleet excluding fishing vessels in the year of 1990 are given. The similarity 
between the sample and the Korean fleet distributions is evident from the graphs. It is 
therefore reasonable to assume that the age distribution of ships selected in this study 
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does not differ substantially from that of the Korean fleet. 
Table 4 in Annex-C, however, disclose that the age distributions in different types 
of casualties are not the same. The average age of ships in founderings(18.8 years) is 
much higher than in rammings (11.1 years) and collisions(12.8 years), and the mean age 
of vessels in groundings(14.8 years) is higher than in rammings and collisions. Tukey-b 
test is employed to test the differences between groups(type of casualty) which is the 
most widely used in multiple comparisons. 14-281 As usual the differences are taken to be 
statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level. The test presents that the ship age 
distribution in founderings is significantly different to the distributions in rammings and 
collisions. 
4.4 ANALYSIS OF CAUSE RELATIONSHIPS 
4.4.1 POSSIBLE CAUSES OF CASUALTIES 
For an accident to occur there clearly has to be a cause. The potential number of 
causal factors and their combinations associated with marine casualties is extensive as 
indicated. The number of possible permutations ,P, of a group of n objects is the 
number of ways that a sub-group of r objects may be arranged when taken from the 
group. If three objects A,B & C are considered, and letting r=2, the possible 
permutations of the objects will be AB, BA, AC, CA, BC and CB. In other words, 1P2 
= 6. The number of permutations of n things taken r at a time is given by the formula 
P(n,r) = n(n-J)(n-2) ... (11-r+l). 
The formula can be simplified by the use of factorial notation. Factorial n, denoted by 
n!, means 
n! = n(n-l)(n-2) ... 3 -21, the product of integers from n to 1. 
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Fig 4.10 Distribution of casualties by Ship size 
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Frequency (%) 
Non-Fishing(N 
1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21 -25 26-30 Over 30 
Ship's age 
Source: Author 
77 
Chapter 4 
In general, 
nPr nl (n-:t) I 
The number of permutations of a group of objects includes groupings of the same 
objects in a different order. However, the order of grouping of the objects is often 
unimportant. For this case the number of combinations of the objects is under 
consideration. The nurnber of possible combinations .c, of a group of n objects is the 
number of ways that a sub-group of r objects can be taken from the group, without 
regard to order. Hence the possible combinations of two from the three objects A, B and 
C will be AB, AC and BC, so 3C2 = 3. It is denoted by a variety of equivalent symbols, 
such as; 
( ~) ncr C(n,r) 
and the formula is 
ncr nl 
rl (n-r) I 
As an example of this the causal factors given in the block scheme of Fig 4.2 are 
considered. 82 factors are listed in the scheme. In principle, if only one factor is taken 
as a cause of a casualty, there are 82 possible factors which can appear as a cause. If 
two factors are needed, there are P= 82 x 81 = 6,642 possible different causal 
permutations, when order of the blocks is of importance. If no attention is paid to the 
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order, the number of different causal combinations is C= 1h x 82 x 81 = 3,321. In 
general, k factors of 82 can be combined in P or C ways which are calculated by the 
formulas14-291 • 
p 821 c 821 
(82-k) I kl (82-k) I 
The blocks of the scheme in Fig 4.2 form the possible causes of the accident. The 
analysis of each accident is limited to the possible causes identified in the "Written 
Verdicts". The variable possible causes are classified in one of the following categories 
in this study: 
I. Essential: is given to those possible causes which most likely had a clear and 
undisputed affect on the circumstances leading to the accident. 
2. Likely: is given to those factors which likely affected the circumstances leading 
to the accident although the information is not complete. 
3. Possible: is given to those factors which have been judged to have less 
importance in contributing to the accident. 
4. Conducing: is given to those factors which had a little influence on developing 
the accident or those factors on which there is lack of information and whose 
significance is therefore difficult to judge. 
5. Indefinite: The causal relationship of a indefinite factor to the incidence of a 
accident is indefinite or insignificant. 
Table 4.12 Weight coefficient used in this study 
Category of the Factor Weight Coefficient 
Essential Factor 1.0 
Likely Factor .75 
Possible Factor .5 
Conducing Factor .25 
Indefinite Factor .0 
The effect of each factor upon the casualty is measured by its weight coefficient. 
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The values of weight coefficients are determined after the classification of the factors 
according to the following table. Table 4.12 shows the maximum values of weight 
coefficients involved. 
Helsinki University of Technologyl4-301 study classified the factors in four 
categories (essential, part, conducing and indefinite) and three more weighting principles 
were added including: 
(I) the sum of weight coefficients of the part and conducing factors for each 
casualty may not be greater than I. 
(2) if the sequence of events contains one or more essential factors belonging to 
the group "Actions" and' the sum of coefficients of the part and/or conducing 
factors of the previous branches of the sequence is equal to I, then the weight 
coefficient of these essential factors is taken to be 0. 
This corresponds to the situation where environmental conditions and the 
condition of the navigator altogether exceed the human capability to take the right 
action. 
(3) if the sequence of events of a casualty is not considered to be satisfactorily 
cleared up, then the sum of the coefficient of all factors should be less than I. 
As the result of those weighting principles, environmental factors were 
overestimated but human factors were far less evaluated in general. The most unexpected 
result was the low proportion of human factors in collisions, only 17 percent, though the 
usual figure most often quoted is about 70-90 percent. 14-31 114•321 One obvious reason for 
the low ratio is the weighting principle number (2). 
The weighting principle number (2) is not employed in this study to avoid the 
distortion of results. The number (I) is a principle to get the probability of each factor, 
so it does not meet the purpose of this study. The published "Written Verdicts" is the 
report of accident inquiry even though it is not the detailed report, clearly the principle 
number (3) is also not necessary in this study. 
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Let the weight coefficient of a factor i in a casualty j be W!l, and the number of 
factors included in the analysis n, and the number of the casualties in the data base m. 
Then the "effect level" e; of a factor i is defined by the equation: 
The effect level is a useful measure in ranking different factors according to. their 
overall effect on casualties. 
A typical example of "Written Verdicts" is quoted below to demonstrate how the 
verdict is comprised and how to trace the possible causes from them. 
CASE STUDY: 
MN HA:NLIM MERCHANT COLLISION WITH MN ORIENTAL FERM 
(No. 90-45, lnchon District Marine Accident Inquiry Agency) 
I. The text (findings) 
The collision occurred due to reckless manoeuvring of MJV Hanlim Merchant having not considered the 
drift by tidal stream. The secondary factors were the act of MJV Oriental Ferrn anchored at fairway and 
the negligence of the port control centre contribute to the accident. 
2. Statement 
Name of ship 
Port of registry 
Owner 
Gross tonnage 
Engine power 
The examinee 
Rank 
Certificate 
Date of casualty 
Location of casualty 
Hanlim Merchant 
lnchon, Korea 
Hanlim shipping company 
9,814.50 ton 
Diesel 7,200 HP 
XXX XXX XXX 
Master 
Class I 
1808 hours June 13 1990 
37° 21' 23".6 North, 126° 31' 58".8 East 
Oriental Ferrn 
Manila, Philippine 
Dakila ocean navigation corporation 
22,145 ton 
XXX XXX XXX 
Pilot 
lnchon pilot 
MN Hanlim Merchant is a log/bulk carrier of 9,815 grt engaged in ocean-going trade. Built in 1969, this ship is 
powered by a 7,200 l-IP diesel engine giving a full speed of 13.5 knots, and. is fined with an automatic steering system. 
This ship is manned by a master and three qualified deck officers. 
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She sailed from·Bangkok at 1755 hours on June 4 with 14,700 tons of raw sugar on board, draught 8.67 metres forward 
and 9.07 metres aft. She approached'lnchon and anchored· at 1255 hours on. June 13 4.2 miles from the port'limit due 
to congestion in the inner anchorage. 
At 1715 hours she started to proceed under master"s command throllgh inbound route at half speed( to knots) to take 
pilot at 1800 hours near the Palmi-do, and to. anchor at inner·anchorage(C-3). 
When she was abeam to Pukchangja-so lighthouse at 1745 hours, the course was altered to 076 degree. At this time 
the ship(M/V Stephenson) was ahead of her and a LPG tanker was following. She adjusted her course to 078 degree 
at 1751 hours because she was drifting to port. 
At 1753 hours when M/V Hanlim Merchant was .passing No.8 buoy, the LPG tanker contacted her requesting to 
overtake on her port side and she agreed. The distance between the ships was 0.9 mile to the forward ship and 0.7 
mile from the following vessel. At the same time she found an anchored vessel at 20 degrees to port, range 2 miles 
by radar and sight. 
At 1756 hours she reduced her speed(slow) and at 1758 hours stopped engine in order to maintain the distance from 
the M/V Stephenson. 
At 1802 hours she approached the waypoint. At this point the engine was used (dead slow) to facilitate course 
alteration onto 035 degrees intending to pass the stem of the anchored vessel, and then stopped· engine again. At this 
time the distance to the anchored vessel was 0.7 mile and 0.4 mile to M/V Stephenson. 
Suddenly M/V Stephenson turned to port and Hanlim Merchant found a barge ahead, outbound. The master ordered 
helm to port 15 degrees and used engine(dead slow) to enhance the rudder effect. Subsequently M/V Stephenson 
turned back to starboard and proceeded to pass astern of the anchored vessel. 
The master of Hanlim Merchant decided to pass ahead of the anchored vessel. He had to take account of the proximity 
of MN Stephenson (0.3 mile), anchored vessel (0.6 mile) and the outbound barge. Course was altered to 016 degrees 
at 1803 hours. 
The· master realised that she was being set to north-eastward by the tidal stream. Alteration of course to port was 
restricted by the.proximity of the LPG tanker on the port.bow. He finally adjusted her course to 015 degrees at 1806 
hours despite realising that this would pass very close to the anchored vessel. 
At 1808 hours he ordered "stop engine' when collision was imminent. She. finally collided with the-anchored vessel 
with 45 degree of an angle of intersection. 
The weather was fine with wind force 3 and sea state 2, but there were 1.5 knot of tidal stream north-eastward. 
Meantime MN Oriental Ferm (the anchored vessel) is a log/bulk carrier and manned by 24 Philippine crew. She 
anchored near to Jangan-so at 2200 hours on June 11 with 32,356 tons of American log. She proceeded to inner 
anchorage by the pilot and arriving at 2120 hours. The pilot anchored the ship in the fairway at 2120 hours on June 
12 and reported to the port control centre. 
In consequence of this accident, M/V Hanlim Merchant received hull damage (damage to No.2 guy stanchion and to 
hull)·and cargo·damage (4,600 tons·lost). M/V Oriental Ferm received hull damage to bulbous bow and fore peak tank. 
The total complement of Inchon port control centre is 15, comprising the chief, nine operators (for communication with 
ship), 3 engineers(maintenance) and 2 support staff. Normal 24 hour operation in the control room is maintained by 
3 operators per watch. 
The operator on watch was informed by the pilot that M/V Oriental Ferm was anchored at 0.8 mile east of Palmi-do, 
but he did not confirm the position or order further movement. 
The port was heavily congested and the number of anchored ships were more than the usual port capacity. 
November 1 1990 Inchon District Marine Accident Inquiry Agency 
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Fig 4.12 Diagram of the Collision case 
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The causes (3 factors) of the accident identified in the inquiry are explained in 
"The text" above. However other possible causes can be traced from the statement. 
Considering the possible causal factors for MN Hanlim Merchant, all together 7 factors 
are identified by the block scheme exhibited in Fig 42. The category of the causes are 
in the brackets. 
Environment 
1. Narrow channel (5) 
2. Heavy surrounding traffic (4) 
3. Other ship passing too close distance (3) 
4. Strong tidal stream (2) 
5. Other ship is on collision course (2) 
Human factors 
6. Improper harbour organization (4) 
7. Improper decision of master (1) 
The possible causes identified by the block scheme are listed below with the 
number of occurrences in brackets. The total number ship casualties considered was 3 81. 
(I) Environment: This group deals with the environment of the ship such as weather 
conditions and waterway configurations. 
1. Reduced visibility by fog 
2. Reduced visibility by snow 
3. Reduced visibility by rain 
4. Ship was in stormy weather 
5. Reduced efficiency of radar by rain/snow heavy sea 
6. Reduced efficiency of equipment by heavy ship motion 
7. Small ships are in the fairway 
8. Heavy surrounding traffic 
9. Other ship passing/overtaking too close 
10. Other ship on collision course 
11. Narrow channel or Passage 
84 
( 122) 
(6) 
(20) 
(59) 
(11) 
(8) 
(31) 
(25) 
(18) 
(57) 
(77) 
12. Low water level 
13. Strong current or tidal stream 
14. Faults/Deficiencies of navigational aids 
liS. Wrong/Poor marking of fairway 
16. Deficiencies in charted information on chart or publications 
17. Improper rules or regulations 
18. Management pressure 
19. Equipment fault or deficiency in other ship 
20. Other ship - Manoeuvring against rules 
21. Other ship - No reaction to the critical situation 
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(5) 
(31) 
(3) 
(3) 
(8) 
(7) 
(28) 
(10) 
(60) 
(85) 
(2) Technical faults & deficiencies: This group deals with technical problem like 
technical failures of equipment both on board and ashore. 
1. Breakdown of main engine 
2. Breakdown of auxiliary engine 
3. Breakdown of steering 
4. Breakdown of rudder 
5. Breakdown of propeller 
6. Breakdown of radar 
7. Breakdown of compass 
8. Breakdown of navigation lights 
9. Breakdown of other navigation equipment 
10. Breakdown of external communication equipment 
11. Poor bridge design 
12. Poor quality of materials 
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(8) 
(2) 
(1) 
(1) 
(5) 
(13) 
(2) 
(6) 
(2) 
(2) 
(4) 
(6) 
13. Poor maintenance or inspection 
14. Lack of equipment 
15 . Poor stowage 
16. Cargo shifting 
17. Electricity blackout 
18 . Broken mooring ropes 
19. Fracture of ship structure 
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(10) 
(17) 
(14) 
(4) 
(2) 
(2) 
(13) 
(3) Human element: In spite of his propensity for making errors and despite any desire 
to eliminate him from systems in which he can generate damage, man is still the most 
important single item in any system, no matter how complex. Therefore five sub-groups 
were recognised, weighted taking into account importance and diversity. 
Personal factor 
I. Attack of sickness or illness (1) 
2. State of tiredness (5) 
3. State of drunkenness (2) 
4. Stress (1) 
5. Navigator asleep on duty (6) 
Organization & Training 
6. Improper shipboard organization (30) 
7. Improper harbour organization (25) 
8. No/lack of seafaring experience (8) 
9. No/lack of professional knowledge (15) 
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Watchkeeping 
I 0. No Officer on the bridge 
11. Captain left bridge in critical situation or before officer was 
adapted to conditions 
12. Negligence of lookout 
13. Did not use every equipment available in the situation 
14. Navigator occupied in other tasks 
15. Improper reporting or take-over 
16. No small correction on chart or pubs 
17. Error in voyage planning 
System interface 
18. Ship to shore 
19. Ship to ship 
20. Ship to tug 
21. Ship to office 
Control tasks 
22. Wrong appreciation of other ship on radar or by sight 
23. Wrong appreciation of navigational aids on radar or by sight 
24. Excessive speed under the circumstances 
25. Negligence in the critical situation 
26. Sailed in wrong side of fairway 
27. Sailed in unmarked waters 
28. Miscalculation of position 
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(27) 
(21) 
(92) 
(56) 
(25) 
( 11) 
(I) 
(31) 
(6) 
(9) 
(1) 
(10) 
(23) 
(3) 
(92) 
(98) 
(27) 
(4) 
(1) 
Chapter 4 
29. Did not fix position regularly or at all (46) 
30. Improper decision (50) 
31. No reaction to the critical situation (51) 
32. Improper manoeuvre (engine, steering, etc.) (77) 
33. Misuse/misread of radar, compass, etc. (5) 
( 4) Summing up Possible Causes: Table 4. 13 summarizes all possible causes as revealed 
by the block scheme analysis. According to the table, 183 possible causes are of 
indefinite category. 380 items are classified as conducing, 175 of which belong to the 
environmental group. The group of essential causes comprises 245 as follows; "control 
tasks" - 111, "environmental factors" - 85, "watchkeeping" - 27, "technical factors" - 17 
and "personal/training/system interface factors" - 5. Control tasks and environment seem 
to constitute the most serious problem areas in this sample. Fig 4.13 shows that in 
general, environmental and training/system interface are less important factors than 
technical, control tasks and watchkeeping. 
Table 4.13 Possible causes 
I Causes/Category · · 11 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 : l .5 I Total .I ... ·. 
Environmental factors 85 93 172 175 149 674 
Technical factors 17 37 32 22 6 114 
Health 3 7 1 4 0 15 
Human Organization 2 18 27 26 5 78 
factors & Training 
System 0 0 6 19 1 26 
Interface 
Watchkeepin 27 84 95 45 13 264 
g 
Control tasks Ill 137 131 89 9 477 
I Total 11 245 I 376 I 464 I 380 I 183 I 1,648 I 
Source: Author 
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Fig 4.13 Frequency of possible causes 
Essential 
Likely 
Possible 
Conducing 
Indefinite 
Frequency(%) 
• Environment El Technical D Personal & etc 
IS1 Watchkeeping 121 Control task 
Source: Author 
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The basic descriptive statistics for possible causes for the five causal groups are 
shown in Table 4.14. The ship control tasks group has the lowest mean value which 
means the highest influence on the casualty, while the environmental causal group has 
the lowest significance index. The first group has somewhat higher standard deviation, 
1.69, than the other groups and the standard deviations in the other four groups are fairly 
similar. Since all the groups contain sufficient number of cases, the standard error of the 
mean for each group is fairly small, 0.05 to 0.12. 
Table 4.14 Descriptive statistics for the possible causes 
Causal factor group Count Mean Standard Standard error 
deviation 
Environmental group 674 3.3116 1.6918 0.0651 
Technical group 114 2.6754 1.2300 0.1152 
Watchkeeping group 264 2.7462 1.0342 0.0634 
Ship control tasks group 477 2.4717 1.2035 0.0549 
Other Human factor group 119 3.2185 0.9519 0.0871 
Total 1,648 2.9272 1.4932 0.0368 
Source: Author 
4.4.2 MOST COMMON CAUSAL FACTORS 
The most common causal factors in each type of casualty and in each sub-area are 
discussed in this section. The number of occurrences are in brackets. The most common 
causal factors in each type of casualty are: 
( 1) Collisions 
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
1. Reduced visibility by fog 
2. Other ship-No reaction to the critical situation 
3. Other ship-Manoeuvring against to rules 
4. Other ship on collision course 
5. Narrow channel or passage 
( continued) 
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(98) 
(84) 
(58) 
(50) 
(47) 
TECHNICAL FAULTS & DEFICIENCIES 
1. Breakdown of navigation lights 
2. Lack of equipment 
3. Poor quality of materials 
HUMAN ELEMENTS 
1. Negligence of lookout 
2. Excessive speed under the circumstance 
3. Negligence in the critical situation 
4. Improper manoeuvre (engine. steering gear. etc) 
5. No reaction to the critical situation 
( 6) 
( 5) 
( 4) 
(82) 
(78) 
(70) 
(54) 
(44) 
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Reduced visibility by fog is the most common causal factor in collision accidents 
and Table 9 in Annex-C also supports this result (44% of collisions occur in fog). 
(2) Groundings 
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
1. Narrow channel or passage 
2. Reduced visibility by fog 
3. Ship was in stormy weather 
4. Strong current or tidal stream 
5. Reduced visibility by rain 
TECHNICAL FAULTS & DEFICIENCIES 
1. Lack of equipment 
2. Breakdown of radar 
3. Breakdown of propeller 
HUMAN ELEMENTS 
1. Did not fix position regularly or at all 
2. Error in voyage planning 
3. Negligence in the critical situation 
4. Improper manoeuvre (engine. steering gear. etc) 
5. Did not use every equipment available in the situation 
(3) Rammings 
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
1. Ship was in stormy weather 
2. Reduced vi si bi l i.ty by rain 
3. Management pressure 
TECHNICAL FAULTS & DEFICIENCIES 
1. Breakdown of main engine 
HUMAN ELEMENTS 
1. Negligence in the critical situation 
2. Did not fix position regularly or at all 
3. Improper decision 
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(21) 
(17) 
(14) 
(12) 
(11) 
( 9) 
( 3) 
(33) 
(21) 
(15) 
(12) 
(12) 
(12) 
( 4) 
( 4) 
( 4) 
( 6) 
( 6) 
( 4) 
(4) Founderings 
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
1. Ship was in stormy weather 
2. Management pressure 
TECHNICAL FAULTS & DEFICIENCIES 
1. Poor stowage 
2. Fracture of ship structure 
3. Poor maintenance or inspection 
HUMAN ELEMENTS 
1. Negligence in the critical situation 
2. Improper manoeuvre (engine. steering gear. etc) 
3. Improper decision 
Source: Author 
(21) 
( 9) 
(13) 
(11) 
(7) 
( 9) 
( 9) 
( 5) 
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"Ship was in stormy weather" is the most common factor in rammmg and 
foundering accidents and this phenomenon is also explains by Table 2 in Annex-C. 56 
percent of ramming and 63 percent of foundering accidents occur in strong wind (force 
6 and over) whilst only six percent of collisions occur under similar conditions. 
The most common causal factors in each sub-area are: 
(1) Tonghae area 
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
1. Ship was in stormy weather 
2. Other ship-No reaction to the critical situation 
3. Reduced visibility by fog 
TECHNICAL FAULTS & DEFICIENCIES 
1. Breakdown of compass 
2. Fracture of ship structure 
HUMAN ELEMENTS 
1. Did not use every equipment available in the situation 
2. Improper harbour organization 
3. Improper manoeuvre (engine. steering gear. etc) 
(2) Pohang area 
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
1. Other ship-No reaction to the critical situation 
2. Reduced visibility by fog 
3. Ship was in stormy weather 
(continued) 
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( 6) 
( 5) 
( 4) 
( 2) 
( 2) 
(7) 
( 6) 
( 6) 
(7) 
( 6) 
( 5) 
TECHNICAL FAUtTS & DEFICIENCIES 
1. Poor stowage 
2 . .Lack of equipment 
HUMAN ELEMENTS 
1. Neg 1 i gence of 1 ookout 
2. ;Negligence in the critical s:ituation 
3. Improper manoeuvre (engine. steering gear. etc) 
(3) Ulsan area 
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
1. Other ship-No reaction to the critical situation 
2. Other ship on collision course 
3. Other ship-Manoeuvring against rules 
HUMAN ELEMENTS 
1. No reaction to the critical situation 
2. Negligence i.n the critical situation 
3. Improper manoeuvre (engine. steering gear. etc) 
( 4) Pusan area 
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
l. Reduced visibility by fog 
2. Other ship-No reaction to the critical situation 
3. Other ship on collision course 
4. Ship was in stormy weather 
TECHNICAL FAULTS & DEFICIENCIES 
1. Breakdown of auxi ],i ary engine 
2. Lack of equipment 
HUMAN ELEMENTS 
1. Negligence in the critical situation 
2. Excessive speed under the circumstance 
3. Negligence of lookout 
4. Improper manoeuvre (engine. steering gear. etc) 
(5) Masan area 
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
1. Reduced visibility by fog 
2. Other ship on co 11 is ion course 
3. Other ship-Manoeuvring against rule 
TECHNICAL FAULTS & DEFICIENCIES 
1. Poor quality of materials 
2. Lack of equipment 
HUMAN ELEMENTS 
1. Neg 1 i gence ·Of ·1 ookout 
2. Negligence in the critical situation 
3. Excessive speed under the circumstance 
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( 2) 
( 2) 
( 9) 
( 9) 
( 6) 
( 6) 
( 5) 
( 5) 
( 5) 
( 4) 
( 4) 
(20) 
(20) 
(17) 
(13) 
( 2) 
( 2) 
(24) 
(18) 
(16) 
(13) 
(14) 
( 8) 
( 8) 
( 2) 
( 2) 
(11) 
(11) 
(10) 
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(6) Yosu area 
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
1. Na~row channel or passage 
2. Reduced visibility by fog 
3. Other ship-No reaction to the critical situation 
TECHNICAL FAULTS & DEFICIENCIES 
1. Lack of equipment 
2. Breakdown of radar 
HUMAN ELEMENTS 
1. Negligence of lookout 
2. Excess.i ve speed under the circumstance 
3. Improper manoeuvre (engine. steering gear. etc.) 
(7) Cheju area 
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
1. Other ship-No reaction to the critical situation 
2. Ship was in stormy weather 
3. Reduced visibility by fog 
TECHNICAL FAULTS & DEFICIENCIES 
1. Poor stowage 
2. Breakdown of radar 
HUMAN ELEMENTS 
1. Negligence of lookout 
2. No officer on the bridge 
3. Did not fix position regularly or at all 
(8) Mokpo area 
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
1. Reduced visibility by fog 
2, Narrow channel or passage 
3. Other ship-Manoeuvring against rules 
TECHNICAL FAULTS & DEFICIENCIES 
1. Breakdown of radar 
2. Poor bridge design 
HUMAN ELEMENTS 
1. Negligence in the critical situation 
2. Excessive speed under the circumstance 
3. Improper decision 
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(21) 
(17) 
(15) 
( 3) 
( 2) 
(24) 
(14) 
(12) 
(11) 
(10) 
( 9) 
( 5) 
( 5) 
(12) 
( 8) 
( 8) 
(22) 
(15) 
(10) 
( 3) 
( 2) 
(19) 
(13) 
(11) 
Chapter 4 
(9) Kunsan area 
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
1. Reduced v.i si bi l ity by fog 
2. Na~row channel or passage 
3. Other ship on collision course 
TECHNICAL FAULTS & DEFICIENCIES 
1. Breakdown of radar 
2. Lack of equipment 
HUMAN ELEMENTS 
1. Negligence in the critical situation 
2. Improper manoeuvre (engine. steering gear. etc.) 
3. Improper decision 
(I 0) Inchon area 
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
1. Narrow channel or passage 
2. Reduced vi Sl bi 1 i ty by fog 
3. Other ship-Manoeuvring against rules 
TECHNICAL FAULTS & DEFICIENCIES 
1. Lack of equipment 
2. Poor maintenance or inspection 
HUMAN ELEMENTS 
1. Excessive speed under the circumstance 
2. Negligence in the critical situation 
3. Did not use every equipment available in the situation 
Source: Author 
4.4.3 EFFECT LEVEL OF CAUSAL FACTORS 
( 9) 
( 8) 
( 5) 
( 1) 
(1) 
( 6) 
( 6) 
( 4) 
(17) 
(16) 
( 9) 
( 3) 
( 2) 
(14) 
(12) 
(7) 
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The average effect of a causal factor of each group can be examined by 
calculating separately the mean value of the weight coefficients given to the factors of 
each group. The mean values of weight coefficients are shown in Table 4.15 which is 
based on all casualties in the sample. On the basis of Table 4.15 and Table 4.12 it is 
clear that health condition, working environment and ship control tasks, when those are 
present and have been identified as one of the causes of a casualty, have on the average 
a more marked effect on the occurrence of the casualty than the factors of other group. 
Technical faults & deficiencies and watchkeeping are another group of factors which 
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have more effect on the occurrence of the casualty than the other group of factors. 
Table 4.15 Mean weight coefficient by factor groups 
Group Sub-group Number of factors Mean weight 
weighted 
External conditions 226 0.44 
Environmental 
conditions Waterway conditions 258 0.25 0.42 
Working environments 190 0.63 
Technical fault and deficiencies 114 0.58 
Health condition 15 0.65 
Organization/Training 78 0.46 
Human System interface 26 0.30 factors 0.59 
Watchkeeping 264 0.56 
Control tasks 477 0.63 
Source: Author 
By employing the effect level the relative importance of the three factor groups 
can be compared. Table 4.16 shows the effect levels of the three main group with sub-
groups. 
Table 4.16 The relative importance of each group of causal factors 
Main group Sub-group Effect level (%) 
External conditions 0.12 
Environmental 
conditions Waterway conditions 0.08 0.33 
Working environments 0.14 
Technical fau Its and deficiencies 0.08 
Health condition 0.01 
Human Organization & Training 0.04 
factors System interface 0.01 
0.59 
Watchkeeping 0.17 
Control tasks 0.35 
Source: Author 
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Ship control tasks sub-group of human factors is the most important (35%) causal 
factors of marine casualty, watchkeeping conditions account for 17 percent, working 
environments for 14 percent, external conditions for 12 percent and so on. As a whole, 
59 percent of collision, stranding, ramming and foundering accidents are attributable to 
human errors in this study. 
Table 4.17 shows the effect levels of the three groups in different type of 
casualties. Human factors are the most dominant (63%) cause of collision incidents, 
environmental conditions accounts for 30 percent of groundings and technical faults and 
deficiencies ( 40%) is dominant in foundering incidents. 
Table 4.17 The relative importance of the three factor groups in different 
type of casualties (PARK J S) 
Collision Grounding Ramming Foundering 
(n=242) (n=Sl) (n=23) (n=35) 
Environmental 0.35 0.30 0.34 0.25 
conditions 
Technical faults 0.02 0.10 0.12 0.40 
and 
deficiencies 
Human factors 0.63 0.60 0.54 0.35 
Source: Author 
By comparison, Tuovinenl4-331 reported that environmental factors are the most 
dominant(77%) cause of collision accidents, human factor accounts for 45 percent of 
groundings and technical deficiencies and their reasons are dominant(48%) in foundering 
incidents. Table 4.18 is the summary of the results of their study. 
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Table 4.18 The relative importance of the three factor groups in different types of 
casualties (TUOVINEN P) 
Collision Grounding Ramming Foundering 
(n=SI) (n=219) (n=120) . (n~23). 
Environmental 0.77 0.44 0.49 0.41 
conditions 
Technical 0.07 0.11 0.22 0.48 
deficiencies 
Human factors 0.16 0.45 0.29 0.11 
Source: TUOVINEN P. et al 1983. a e 52 ( ~ p g 
Table 4.19 presents the most influential single factors in different type of 
casualties. In collision three factors belong to the group environmental conditions and 
two factors to the human factor group. But four factors belong to the group human 
factors and one to environmental conditions in grounding accidents. In foundering 
incidents, two factors belong to the group technical faults and two to the human factors 
group. 
Table 4.19 The most influential factors in different type of casualties 
Collision (n=242) 
Negligence of lookout 
Other ship - No reaction to the critical situation 
Other ship - Manoeuvring against rules 
Negligence in critical situation 
Reduced visibility by fog 
Grounding (n=SI) 
Not fix position regularly or at all 
Error in voyage planning 
Negligence in critical situation 
Stormy weather 
Reduced visibility by fog 
Ramming (n=23) 
Stormy weather 
Negligence in critical situation 
Not fix position regularly or at all 
Breakdown of main engine 
Improper decision 
(continued) 
98 
Effect Level 
0.10 
0.10 
0.09 
0.08 
0.08 
Effect Level 
0.13 
0.07 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
Effect Level 
0.15 
0.08 
0.08 
0.07 
0.06 
Foundering (n=35) 
Stormy weather 
Poor stowage or securing 
Fracture of ship structure 
Negligence in critical situation 
Improper manoeuvre 
Source: Author 
Effect Level 
0.15 
0.13 
0.12 
0.08 
0.07 
From the Table 4.19 the following conclusions can be drawn: 
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(1) In cases of collision the most probable causes seem to be related to the working 
environment or human error (negligence of lookout and negligence in critical situations 
show higher effect levels). Of environmental conditions, other ship's no reaction to the 
critical situation or other ship's manoeuvring against International rules and reduced 
visibility by fog are major factors in collisions. 
(2) For vessels grounding navigational and ship control tasks seem to be the most 
significant factors such as not fixing vessel's position regularly, error in voyage planning 
and negligence in critical situations. 
(3) In the cases of rammings stormy weather is the most influential factor whilst 
breakdown of main engines often occur. 
( 4) In the cases of founderings the most important causes seem to be of technical 
faults and environmental conditions (poor stowage and/or securing, fracture of ship 
structure and stormy weather show higher effect levels). 
Table 4.20 shows the effect levels of the three groups in different part of the 
Korean coastal waters. Human factors are the most dominant cause in all the areas, 56 -
68 percent, environmental conditions group accounts for 27 - 41 percent and technical 
faults and deficiencies for 0 - 15 percent. Human factors group has a higher effect level 
in Ulsan, Masan and Yosu areas, while Kunsan, Mokpo, Pusan and Inchon areas have 
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higher values in the environmental conditions group than others. 
Table 4.20 The relative significance of the three factor groups in different sub-areas 
Sub-area Environmental Technical faults and Human 
conditions deficiencies . factors 
Tonghae area (n=23) 0.31 0.12 0.57 
Pohang area (n=31) 0.31 0.12 0.57 
Ulsan area (n=l7} 0.32 0 0.68 
Pusan area (n=64) 0.35 0.06 0.59 
Masan area (n=32) 0.32 0.05 0.63 
Yosu area (n=57) 0.33 0.07 0.61 
Cheju area (n=42) 0.27 0.15 0.58 
Mokpo area (n=49) 0.36 0.06 0.58 
Kunsan area (n=22) 0.41 0.03 0.56 
lnchon area (n=44) 0.35 0.08 0.57 
Source: Author 
Table 4.21 presents the most significant single causal factors and their effect 
levels in different parts of Korean waters. The noticeable point is that "not using every 
item of aid/equipment available in the situation" is the one of the most serious causal 
factors in the Tonghae area. Another conspicuous point is that reduced visibility by fog 
and rogue vessels are the most crucial causal factors in the Inchon area. The main causal 
factors in other areas are more or less the same; negligence of lookout, other ship's 
manoeuvring against rules, negligence in critical situations, improper manoeuvre and not 
using every item of equipment available in the situation show higher effect levels. 
Clearly "reduced visibility by fog" is one of the top three causal factor in the west 
coast region and is ranked fourth or fifth place in the south coast area, but it is not the 
major factor in the east coast waters. 
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Table 4.21 The most influential factors in different sub-areas 
Tonghae area {n=23) 
Not use every available aids/equipment in the situation 
Improper manoeuvre 
Other ship - No reaction to the critica·l situation 
Improper decision 
Stormy weather 
Pohang area {n=31) 
Negligence of lookout 
Other ship - No reaction to the critical situation 
Negligence in critical situation 
Improper manoeuvre 
Poor stowage or securing 
Ulsan area (n=17) 
Other ship - Manoeuvring against rules 
No reaction to the critical situation 
Other ship - No reaction to the critical situation 
Improper manoeuvre 
Error in voyage planning 
Pusan area {n=64) 
Negligence in critical situation 
Other ship - No reaction to the critical situation 
Negligence of lookout 
Improper manoeuvre 
Reduced visibility by fog 
Masan area {n=32) 
Negligence of lookout 
Other ship - Manoeuvring against rules 
Negligence in critical situation 
Reduced visibility by fog 
Not fix position regularly or at all 
Yosu area (n=S7) 
Negligence of lookout 
Improper manoeuvre 
Other ship - No reaction to the critical situation 
No reaction to the critical situation 
Reduced visibility by fog 
Cheju area (n=42) 
Negligence of lookout 
Other ship - No reaction to the critical situation 
Not fix position regularly or at all 
No reaction to the critical situation 
Stormy weather 
(continued) 
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0.10 
0.10 
0.10 
0.07 
0.07 
0.09 
0.08 
0.07 
0.06 
0.04 
0.12 
0.10 
0.08 
0.07 
0.06 
0.11 
0.08 
0.08 
0.07 
0.07 
0.12 
0.12 
0.10 
0.08 
0.06 
0.12 
0.07 
0.07 
0.06 
0.06 
0.08 
0.07 
0.06 
0.06 
0.06 
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Mokpo area (n=49) 
Negligence in critical situation 
Reduced visibility by fog 
Improper manoeuvre 
Improper decision 
Other ship - Manoeuvring against rules 
Kunsan area (n=22) 
Negligence in critical situation 
Improper manoeuvre 
Reduced visibility by fog 
Negligence of lookout 
Improper decision 
lnchon area (n=44) 
0.12 
0.09 
0.07 
0.07 
0.05 
0.09 
0.09 
0.06 
0.06 
0.06 
Reduced visibility by fog 0.07 
Other ship - Manoeuvring against rules 0.07 
Negligence in critical situation 0.06 
Not use every available aids/equipment in the situation 0.05 
Improper manoeuvre 0.05 
Source: Author 
4.5 CONSEQUENCES OF CASUALTIES 
Chapter 4 
The most important known consequences of the casualties m this study are 
summarized in Table 4.22. 
Table 4.22 Summing up consequences of casualties 
Consequences Number of accidents 
Live lost 35 ( 139 lives lost ) 
Injuries 11 ( 54 persons injured) 
Total losses 75 
Hull damages 249 
Engine damages 30 
Cargo damages 24 
Damage to objects 20 
Propeller damages 17 
Rudder damages 9 
Oil outflow 16 ( I ,417 tons spilled ) 
Source: Author 
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The evident common measure of the seriousness of a casualty is the monetary 
value of the consequences. Unfortunately, however, the primary source of data in this 
study does not contain information on this aspect. 
Table 4.23 shows the loss of life by casualty type, and the average and expected 
number of lives lost in each casualty type is given. It is evident that foundering is the 
most serious casualty type to threaten the lives of seaman. 
Table 4.23 Lives lost by casualty type 
Type of Number of Lives Number of Expected 
. 
casualty cases lost casualties number 
per casualty 
Collision 20 70 242 0.2893 
Stranding 5 12 81 0.1481 
Ramming 2 3 23 0.1304 
Foundering 8 54 35 1.5429 
Total 35 139 381 0.3648 
Source: Author 
The last column of Table 4.23 demonstrates the mean or expected number oflives 
lost in each ship involved in the casualty. In the case foundering accident 1.5 lives are 
expected to be lost per casualty, while 0.29 life is expected to be lost in collision 
incident. 
Table 4.24 Total losses by casualty type 
Type of Number of Number of Expected number 
casualty total losses casualties per casualty 
Collision 35 242 0.1446 
Stranding 13 81 0.1605 
Ramming 0 23 0 
Foundering 27 35 0.7714 
Total 75 381 0.1969 
Source: Author 
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The 75 total losses out of 381 casualties are distributed by casualty types in Table 
4.24. Clearly foundering accidents caused a higher rate of total losses, but no total losses 
were reported by ramming incidents. In general the expected number(O.l969) is high, 
and the number implies that approximately one of five ships involved in the casualties 
has met with total loss. The high total loss ratio of Korean fleet was reported by JAMRI 
(Japan Maritime Research Institute) that the ratio is twice the world average. 14-341 
Information on the 16 oil outflows was derived from a sample of 289 ships. More 
than 16 oil spi lis resulting from ship casualties are likely to have taken place in the 
Korean waters in the years 1986-90, but because of the publicity given to oil accidents 
the sizes and effects of the unknown cases are probably small. 
Seven of the oil outflows were the consequence of collisions; seven took place 
in groundings and two in connection with founderings. The total amount spilled in the 
reported oil leakages was I ,417 tons, but the reported amounts are evidently very rough 
estimates. About 1,027 tons of the total amount was spilled in one tanker collision, 
about 154 tons in one cargo vessel grounding and about 100 tons in one tanker 
foundering, thus the remaining cases were of an essentially smaller order of magnitude. 
Hull damage, cargo damage, damage to object, propeller damage and rudder 
damage were ranked in five different categories: no, slight, moderate, serious damage and 
unknown severity. This classification is susceptible to subjective interpretation, but it 
gives some measure to estimate the severity of the damages. Table 4.25 classifies 
severity of hull damage in different casualty types. Clearly collisions bring about more 
severe hull damage. 
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Table 4.25 Number of hull damage by casualty type 
Collision Grounding Ramming Foundering Row 
Total 
No damage 41 4 12 0 51 
18.6% 
Slight 72 16 7 0 95 
damage 31.0% 
Moderate 72 28 3 4 107 
damage 35.0% 
Serious 21 17 0 0 38 
damage 12.4% 
Unknown I 3 I 4 9 
2.9% 
Column 207 68 23 8 306 
Total 67.6% 22.2% 1.5% 2.6% 100% 
Number of Missing Observation 75 
Source: Author 
4.6 SUMMARY 
(I) The negative binomial model presents a closer fit to the observed distribution 
than the Poisson, when subjected to a chi-square test. The negative binomial model 
shows there is 71 percent chance that there will be no accident (of collision, grounding, 
ramming and foundering), and there is 22 percent chance of one accident on any day. 
(2) The casualty frequency for Korean ships above 500 tons is very high, 
approximately 2.5 times that of Norwegian ships. Merchant ship accidents tend to occur 
in ports & harbours, while fishing vessel casualties are most frequent in coastal waters 
and open sea. The geographical distribution of casualties shows that the highest number 
of casualties occurs in the Pusan!Ulsan area, and the south coastal water has a higher 
number of accidents than the east & west coasts of Korea. 
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(3) The seasonal distribution of the number of ship casualties shows a clear 
periodic feature. Smaller ships have more accidents during winter whilst larger vessels 
have more in summer. High number of collisions occur in summer period and of 
founderings occur in winter period. This seasonal variation of collision accidents differs 
from that in European waters where more collisions occur in winter period. 
(4) According to block scheme analysis of each accident environmental 
conditions are often present as important causes of casualties. Reduced visibility by fog 
is the most common causal factor. Human errors of seafarers are dominant (59%) causal 
factors in casualties: specially negligence in critical situation, negligence of lookout, 
excessive speed under the circumstances and improper manoeuvre. 
(5) The average effect of a causal factor of each group was examined by 
calculating the mean values of weight coefficients. Health condition of watchkeepers, 
working environments and ship control tasks group, when those are present and have 
been identified as one of the causes of a casualty, have on the average a more marked 
effect on the occurrence of the casualty than the factors of other groups. 
(6) By applying the effect level the relative importance of the causal factors were 
compared. In general the ship control tasks sub-group of human factors was the most 
significant marine casualty factor with 0.353 probability while the working environments 
sub-group of environmental conditions had a probability of 0.14. In collisions negligence 
of lookout and other ship's failure to the critical situations were the most important 
factors, while not fixing position regularly and error in voyage planning were principal 
factors in grounding incidents. Stormy weather was the most influential factor in 
rammings whereas stormy weather, poor stowage and fracture of ship structure were the 
factors in foundering accidents. 59 percent of casualties concerned was attributable to 
human error of the seafarers involved. 
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(7) The most influential single causal factors and their effect levels in different 
part of Korean waters were analyzed. Reduced visibility by fog and rogue vessels were 
the most important causal factors in the Inchon area. Another noticeable point is that 
"not using every item of aid/equipment available in the situation" was the one of the most 
serious causal factors in the Tonghae area. 
(8) The consequences of casualties were examined. Foundering was the most 
serious casualty type to threaten the lives of seamen. Clearly foundering accidents 
caused a higher rate of total loss, but no total losses were reported by ramming incidents. 
(9) The total amount spilled in the reported oil leakages was 1 ,417 tons, but the 
amount of spillage was small except in a few cases. 
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EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS 
OF EXISTING TRAFFIC SERVICES 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 5 
In navigating on the high seas ships largely -proceed in isolation. When 
occasionally they meet, all the measures needed to ensure their safe passage are covered 
by the established steering and sailing rules. By contrast, when navigating the waters 
nearer to ports of arrival and departure, the routes taken by shipping tend to converge 
and become constrained by underlying hydrographic features and adjacent coastlines, 
giving rise to areas of relatively high traffic concentration. Local movements by smaller 
vessels, ferries, fishing vessels and pleasure craft may add to congestion and the density 
of shipping may build up to such an extent that encounters between them no longer occur 
in isolation, as on the high seas, but rather in a sequence each offering varying degrees 
of hazard or, perhaps worse, simultaneously in the form of a complex multi-ship 
situation. It is in these circumstances where some level of marine traffic service 
operating in such a way as to complement and not to conflict with the normal rules for 
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collision avoidance may, and experience would suggest does, help to reduce the attendant 
risks of collision and so contribute to overall safety of navigation. 
The provision of a navigation service to. shipping implies assisting vessels in some 
way with their passage. The issue of hydrographic data and establishment of 
navigational aids such as lights, buoys and other position fixing systems may therefore 
be regarded as the first basic steps towards an area traffic service. These should ensure 
that vessels are aware of any natural constraints on their choice of routes, but overall 
patterns will still be largely random, and to progress to an improved level of service the 
next logical step is to attempt to produce some orderliness in the traffic flow. The 
principle of traffic routeing, whereby vehicles on conflicting journeys are prevented from 
meeting in potential collision circumstances by following separated paths, is equally 
applicable to all modes of transport. 
Unlike road or rail transport, where the constraints on direction of movement are 
largely achieved by engineering features implicit in the system design, at sea and in the 
air too, movement through navigable space can only be ordered in a practical way by the 
designation of artificial boundaries. It is just over 25 years since the particular 
configuration of the worlds' first marine traffic separation scheme, that in the Strait of 
Dover, was so designated and implemented by the Intergovernmental Maritime 
Consultative Organisation (IMCO), as a recommendation for all ships to follow. [S-IJ 
New traffic systems including Traffic Separation Schemes (TSS), may be 
evaluated through accident and traffic analysis. Referring to the Dover Straits, 
Bowdidge[5·21 stated that; 
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Over the period examined, it can be fairly assumed that the introduction 
of traffic routeing and surveillance leading to the advent of the Channel 
Navigation Information Service (CNIS), has contributed significantly to 
the observed reduction in the average number of collisions from 17 to 5 
per annum. 
Dare and Lewisonl5•31 analyzed the number of casualties and the amount of damage 
occasioned for the periods 1967-72 and 1973-79, They claimed that; 
There has been a reduction of about one half in the numbers of both 
collisions and strandings in the Dover Straits and a much greater reduction 
in the amount of damage. 
Johnson15·41 analyzed the time trends of collision incidents over 15 years (1962-1977) in 
the Dover Straits. From the results it is apparent that over the five year period following 
the introduction of the TSS there were 23 percent fewer collision than in the previous 
five years. During the next five year period, when the TSS routeing scheme was 
supported by the CNIS, there was a further 55 percent of reduction in the number of 
collisions. CockcroftlS·SJ has assessed the effectiveness of routeing off north west Europe 
by comparing collision statistics for every 5 year periods since 1957 to 1981 and asserted 
that there has been a considerable improvement in traffic safety in the coastal region after 
introducing routeing schemes. 
Meantime, Fujii & Kakul5•61 reported that MTSL (Maritime Traffic Safety Law) 
routeing in Tokyo Bay was effective in decreasing the number of collision & grounding 
accidents, and the introduction of a traffic service with an advisory centre contributed to 
a further drop in the number of accidents. From the data according to the authors, it is 
evident that over the five year period following the introduction of the TSS there were 
15 percent fewer collision and 23 percent fewer grounding than in the previous five 
years. After the Tokyo Bay Traffic Advisory Centre became operational, there was a 
further 32 percent of reduction in the number of collisions. 
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This chapter describes the effectiveness of the existing traffic services in Korean 
waters through the accident and traffic analysis, and introduces accident danger index to 
compare the level of danger in different time periods. l!he primary source of traffic data 
is the "Statistical Year Book of Shipping and Ports" by KMPA. And the primary sources 
of accident data are the "Written verdicts and their appendices" by the "Maritime 
Accidents Inquiry Agency" and the "Marine casualty diary (1962-1983)" by the "Korea 
Shipowners Association". Secondary sources are; 
• Shipping directory Korea by Korea Maritime Research Institute 
• The status quo of partners by Korea Shipping Association 
• Register of ships by Lloyd' s Register of Shipping 
• Commercial shipping fleets by Fairplay information systems 
The locations of existing traffic services including TSS and VMRS in Korean coastal 
waters are illustrated in Fig 5.1. 
5.2 THE INCHON INBOUND AND OUTBOUND ROUTES 
Inchon Hang(port) is the port of the capital city of Seoul, and has both inner and 
outer harbours. The outer harbour consists of an anchorage and some oil berths in the 
river, and two tidal basins. The inner harbour is a non-tidal basin which is entered 
through twin parallel locks. The inner harbour and two tidal basins have been built upon 
reclaimed land between the mainland coast and former islands. Extensive reclamation 
and harbour development has taken place and reclamation is still in progress. Inchon 
Hang has several characteristics including; 
e a large rise and fall of tide, over 8.5 metres(28 ft) at spring tide with strong 
associated tidal currents of a maximum 3.3 m/sec on the flood and 2.1 m/sec on 
the ebb. 
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e fog occurs on about 58 days a year, mostly during the months of March to 
August, and snow occurs on about 25 days a year, 
e inshore islands and shoals are a hindrance to navigation in the approach to 
Inchon Hang. 
There has been a rapid growth of vessel movements in the port, as can be seen 
on Fig 5-2, at an annual rate of as much as 14 percent during the period to reach a total 
of 44,785 vessel movements in 1990. To cope with this situation, the Inchon traffic 
separation scheme was introduced for the inbound and outbound routes in the approach 
to Inchon Hang. The inbound routes of the scheme follows the channel through Tong-
sudo (East channel), and the outbound route follows the channel through So-sudo (West 
channel) with the departure point in Pando-sudo. The scheme is not IMO adopted, but 
there are local regulations applying to it. The regulation came into force from 15th April 
1981 and applies to all vessels of 500 tons or more (later amended to "not less than 30 
metre length" on April 17 I99J)I5•71: 
(I) Ships of 500 tons or more shall navigate within the traffic lane, incoming 
shipping to Inchon using Tong-sudo and outgoing shipping the So-sudo. 
The ship proceed from Inchon Hang to Asan Man can navigate Tong-sudo and 
the ship proceed from the NW area of Tokchok-do to Inchon Hang can navigate 
So-sudo, but those ships shall navigate to the far right side of the route and shall 
not impede the passage of other traffic following the scheme. 
(2) Ships of less than 500 tons shall navigate according to (I) as practicable and 
shall not impede the passage of other traffic following a traffic lane. 
(3) If, however, there is any obstacles on the route and dangers to traffic, able 
to not follow the scheme. But those ships shall navigate to the far right side of 
the route and shall not impede the passage of other traffic following the scheme. 
In essence an extension of the basic "keep to the right-rule of the road" 
determining flow in one-way main traffic lanes with inshore areas set aside for local 
shipping movements in any direction (see Figure 5.3), the Inchon traffic separation 
scheme existed for 12 years, but there was no documentation concerning numbers and 
types of vessels transiting. 
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Fig 5.2 Trends of vessel movements in lnchon 
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5.2.1 SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION 
Cl) Sea area: The area covered, which is shown in Fig.5.3, includes not only the 
designated waterways but also regions where ships converge or cross before entering, and 
extends from latitude 37° 00' north to 37° 25' north, and from 126° 05' east to 126° 35' 
east. The Inchon and Pyongtaeg harbours are excluded. 
(2) Types of casualties: The analysis includes casualties reported in "Written Verdicts" 
which satisfy one or more of the following conditions: 
(i) collisions involving vessels not less than 500 gross tons, but excluding 
collisions with buoys, anchored vessel or floating objects. 
(ii) groundings involving vessels not less than 500 GRT. 
(3) Period: The 14 year span April 15 1976 to April 14 1990 can be divided into two 
five year periods and a four year periods: 
Period No. of years Duration Remarks 
A 5 April 15 1976- Pre-routeing 
April 14 1981 period 
B 5 April 15 1981- Routeing 
April 14 1986 scheme 
c 4 April 15 1986- Routeing 
April 14 1990 scheme 
5.2.2 TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (COLLISIONS AND GROUNDINGS) 
( l) Occurrence and time: In the 14 years period there were 18 collisions, involving 27 
vessels and excluding ships below 500 tons, and six groundings in the area under study. 
Table 5.1 summarizes the number of accidents in the area of concern during the 14 year 
period. The table indicates that there was no difference in the number of accidents 
before and the first five year period after the introduction of routeing scheme, but 
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mcrease in the number of accidents during the period of C. The number of collision 
accidents was increased considerably during the period of C while the grounding 
incidents decreased remarkably. The difficulty, however, here is that the number of 
accidents are so small that it is impossible to test for significant differences. 
Table 5.1 Number of accidents in Inchon routeing scheme 
Period A B c Total 
Number of collisions 5 5 8 18 
(Number of ships involved) (9) (7) ( 11) (27) 
Number of groundings 3 3 0 6 
Total number of accidents 8 8 8 24 
(12) (I 0) (I\) (33) 
Source: Author 
(2) Position: As can be seen from Figure 5.4, which shows the position of accidents, the 
majority of accidents, 17 out of 24 incidents, occurred in the Tong-sudo or its southern 
approach, three accidents in So-sudo or its southern approach and four accidents at the 
northern end or approach of the routes. All the accidents before the routeing scheme was 
introduced occurred in Tong-sudo and its southern approach, six accidents in Tong-sudo 
and its southern approach and two at the northern approach to the routes during the 
period B. But the location of accidents was more spread over the whole area during the 
period C, namely three accidents in Tong-sudo and its southern approach, three in the So-
sudo and its southern approach and two at the northern end of the routes. 
The accidents, which the details are known, occurred after the introduction of the 
routeing scheme comprises: seven meeting collisions, one crossing collision and one 
grounding incident. Six cases occurred under reduced visibility (less than 300 metres 
visibility), and seven ships violated the "keep to the right-rule of the road". 
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Fig 5.4 Locations of Traffic Accident (lnchon) 
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A grounding occurred just off the route to avoid immediate meeting collision. Table 5.2 
specifies the details of the accident. 
Table 5.2 Accidents in Inchon after the introduction of routeing scheme 
-
No Ship Type Visibility :Pilot Local rule lit! OutWard 
I Ship A Collision 200m NIA met Inward 
Ship B (M) boarded violated Outward 
2 Ship C Grounding clear boarded violated Outward 
3 Ship D Collision 200-250m boarded met Inward 
Ship E (M) NIA violated Outward 
4 Ship F Collision clear NIA met Inward 
Ship G (M) NIA O.K Outward 
5 Ship H Collision 50 m NIA met Outward 
Ship I (M) NIA violated Inward 
6 Ship 1 Collision 30m NIA violated Outward 
Ship K (M) boarded violated Inward 
7 Ship L Collision 200-300m NIA met Outward 
Ship M (M) NIA met Inward 
8 Ship N Collision 300m NIA violated Outward 
Ship 0 (c) boarded met Inward 
9 Ship P Collision clear NIA met Inward 
Ship Q (M) NIA met Outward 
Source: Author 
(3) Size of Vessel (gross ton) : Table 5.3 evidences the average size of vessels in the 
accidents in the waterway varied, from 11 ,769 tons to 7,247 tons and to 8,738 tons ·· 
excluding unknown tonnages, but there is no indicative difference (8,815 to 7,24 7 tons 
and to 8,738 tons) if one large tanker of 44,263 grt is excluded during the pre-routeing 
period. So it appears possible that the introduction of routeing has led to a reduction in 
the number of ships involved in the traffic accidents for larger ships (1 0,000 g.r. t and 
over), but not for smaller vessels. 
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Table 5.3 Size of ships involved in accidents 
GRT Period A Period B Peripd C Total 
catego!)' 
No GRT No . GRT No GRT No GRT 
500- 2,999 3 4,308 3 3,789 2 2,248 8 10,345 
3,000 - 4,999 2 6,942 2 7,901 3 9,879 7 24,722 
5,000 - 9,999 I 6,333 0 0 2 13,053 3 19,386 
10,000 - 19,999 •. 5 79,378 3 46,288 2 27,942 10 153,608 
20,000 & over •·• I 44,263 0 0 2 42,995 3 87,258 
Unknown 0 0 2 a 0 0 2 a 
Total 12 141 ,224 10 57,978+a 11 96,117 33 295,319+a 
Source: Author 
Since accident danger is proportional to traffic density, a simple formula can be 
used to estimate the accident danger(S d) for one trip as N/2Q, where Nand Q are number 
of traffic accidents in each period and the number of vessels entering Inchon Hang in the 
corresponding period. 
Table 5.4 Number of vessels in traffic accident (N) and Number of vessels entering 
Inchon Hang (Q) for the period of A through C. 
GRT 500 - 3.000- 5.000- 10.000- 20 .000 Total 
category 2.999 4.999 9.999 19.000 & over 
NA 3 2 1 5 1 12 (percentage) 25. 0 16.7 8.3 41. 7 8.3 
NB 3 2 0 3 0 8 (percentage ) 37. 5 25. 0 0.0 37.5 0.0 
Ne 2 3 2 2 2 11 (percentage) 18.2 27.2 18.2 18.2 18.2 
QA 4.257 3.666 1.693 2. 770 653 13 .039 
Os 9.217 4.083 1.816 3,236 1. 276 19,628 
Oc 19.721 4,461 2.564 3. 011 1.943 31.700 
NA/2QA 0.00035 0.00027 0.00030 0.00090 0. 00077 0. 00046 
N8/2Q8 0.00016 0.00024 0.00046 0.00020 
Nc/20c 0.00005 0.00034 0. 00039 0.00033 0.00051 0. 00017 
Total 0.00012 0.00029 0.00025 0. 00055 0.00039 0.00024 
Source: Author 
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The number of vessels entering Inchon Hang, Q, is calculated from the Statistical 
Year Book issued yearly by Korea Maritime and Port Administration. 2Q denotes the 
number of ships entering and departing Inchon Hang. 
Table 5.4 suggests that the overall accident danger per trip was decreased 
considerably after introduction of the routeing scheme, 0.00046 to 0.00020, and slowly 
thereafter. It appears highly probable that the introduction of the routeing scheme has 
led to a reduction in accident danger for most size categories except the category of 
3,000-4,999 and 5,000-9,999 gross tons. 
(4) Type of Vessel: Distribution of traffic accidents by type of vessel are summarized 
in Table 5.5. Over 68 percent of the vessels involved in traffic accidents are cargo 
vessels and 18.8 percent are tankers. From the table, it is apparent that the number of 
tankers involved in casualties is decreasing, but that of cargo vessels has remained 
unchanged. The details of these collision and grounding incidents are included in the 
Annex D. 
Table 5.5 The accidents by type of vessel 
Vessel Total Period A Period B Period C 
Type 
No % No % No % No % 
Tankers 6 18.8 3 25.0 2 22.2 I 9.1 
Cargo ships 22 68.7 8 66.7 6 66.7 8 72.7 
Fishing vessels 2 6.3 I 8.3 I 11.1 0 0 
Naval ship 2 6.2 0 0 0 0 2 18.2 
Unknown I 0 0 I 0 0 
Total 33 100.0 12 100.0 10 100.0 11 100.0 
Source: Author 
However, further analysis is not feasible due to lack of traffic data such as size 
and type of vessel distribution in different time periods. 
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5.3 TRAFFIC SEPARATION SCHEME OFF KANJOL-GAP 
Kanjol-Gap is a point, fringed with rocks which extends one mile offshore, at 
south-east coast of Korea and is in between the port of Ulsan and Pusan, approximately 
five miles south from Ulsan and 20 miles north from Pusan. 
"fhere is heavy traffic with many tankers including LPG & chemical tankers using 
the two oil refineries and a heavy & chemical industrial complex at Ulsan. To cope with 
the situation, a traffic separation scheme (TSS) was introduced in October 1982. The 
scheme, comprising lanes I mile wide, for northbound and southbound traffic divided by 
a separation zone, two cables wide, established off Kanjol-Gap (see Figure 5.5). The 
scheme has not been adopted by IMO, but the following rules have been promulgated 
by the Korean authorities: 
Ships of 300 tons or more shall navigate within the traffic lanes, northbound 
shipping using the east lane and southbound shipping the west lane, and shall 
keep near to the outer limit of the lane. Ships of less than 300 tons shall adhere 
to the scheme if practicable and shall not impede the passage of other traffic 
following a traffic lane. 
Ships shall always keep a listening watch on VHF channel 16 within the limits 
of the traffic separation scheme. [S·BJ 
Although this traffic scheme has existed for I 0 years, no documentation is 
available about the numbers and types of transiting. 
5.3.1 SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION 
()) Sea Area: The area covered, which is shown in Fig.5.5, includes not only the 
designated TSS but also regions where ships converge or cross before entering the TSS, 
and extends from latitude 35° 10' north to 35° 30' north, and from longitude 129° 10' 
east to 129° 35' east. Harbours are excluded. 
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(2) Type of casualties: The analysis includes casualties reported in "Written Verdicts" 
which satisfy one or more of the following conditions: 
(i) collisions involving vessels not less than 300 Gross Tons, but excluding 
collisions with buoys, anchored vessel or floating objects. 
(ii) groundings involving vessels not less than 300 Gross Tons. 
(3) Period: The 10 year span October 25 1977 to October 24 1987 can be divided into 
two equal periods: 
Period No. of years Duration Remarks 
A 5 October 25 1977- Pre-routeing 
October 24 1982 period 
B 5 October 25 1982- Routeing 
October 24 1987 scheme 
5.3.2 TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (COLLISIONS AND GROUNDINGS) 
Cl) Occurrence and time: In the I 0 years there were 10 collisions (16 vessels involved 
excluding ships less than 300 tons) and two groundings in the area. 
Table 5.6 Number of accidents off Kanjol-gap TSS 
·. ,, . 
Period A B . ,.··· Total 
Number of coll isions 6 4 10 
(Number of ships involved) (9) (7) (16) 
Number of groundings 2 0 2 
Total number of accidents 8 4 12 
(11) (7) (18) 
Source: Author 
Table 5.6 shows that before routeing was considered there were eight (1 1 ships 
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involved) accidents, and four accidents after the introduction of the traffic separation 
scheme. So it appears likely that the introduction of routeing has led to a reduction in 
the number of accidents, and in the number of ships involved in the casualties. Accident 
danger index, however, can not be administered due to lack of traffic data in this area. 
(2) Position: As can be seen from Fig 5.5, which shows the position of collisions and 
groundings, the majority of collisions occurred in or just to the north of the traffic lane, 
and all the groundings occurred on the shoal off Kanjol-gap and the nearby rock. If we 
consider those collisions occurred after introducing the traffic separation scheme, three 
out of four collisions were within the traffic lane. Therefore appropriate traffic 
surveillance is required to reduce the number of collisions in the area. 
(3) Size of vessel(Gross tons) : Table 5.7 shows tonnage category of ships involved in 
traffic accidents during the 10 years period. Considerable decrease in the number of 
ships in traffic accidents is recognized through all tonnage groups other than 3000-4999 
grt. So it appears probable that the introduction of a traffic separation scheme has led 
to a reduction in the number of ships involved in traffic accidents. 
Table 5.7 Size of ships involved in accidents 
Tonnage Period A Period B 
category 
No. GRT No. GRT 
- 499 4 I,707 3 I,355 
500 - 2,999 4 4,9I9 2 I,I93 
3,000 - 4,999 0 0 2 7,295 
5,000 - 9,999 I 6,732 0 0 
I 0,000 - I9,999 I 14,309 0 0 
20,000 & over I I04,902 0 0 
Total II I32,569 7 9,843 
Source: Author 
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Fig 5 .5 Traffic Separation Scheme off Kanjoi-Gap 
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(4) Type of vessel: The distribution of accidents by type of vessel is shown in Table 
5.8. Over 55 percent of the vessels involved in traffic accidents were cargo' vessels and 
33.3 percent tankers. However, it should be noted that the number of tankers involved 
in the casualties remained unchanged. The details of these casualties are included in the 
Annex D. 
Table 5.8 The accidents by type of vessel 
Type of vessel Total Period A Period B 
No. % No. % No. % 
Tankers 6 33.3 3 27.3 3 42.9 
Cargo ships 10 55.6 7 63.6 3 42.9 
Fishing vessels 2 11.1 I 9.1 I 14.2 
Total 18 100.0 11 100.0 7 100.0 
Source: Author 
Further analysis, however, is not possible due to lack of traffic data including size 
and type of vessel over different time periods. 
5.4 JINHAE-MAN TRAFFIC SEPARATION SCHEME 
Jinhae-man is a landlocked basin on the south-east coast of Korea between 
mainland and the NW side of Koje-Do with moderate depths and few dangers. There 
is considerable domestic ferry, passenger vessel, naval ship and coastal traffic in this 
area. To cope with the situation, the Traffic Separation Schemes in the approaches to 
Masan, Chungmu and Jinhae passages were introduced in this water in July 1982. 
Vessels not less than 20 metre length are required to navigate within the traffic lanel5•91. 
The scheme was established leading through Gadeog-Sudo, thence NW through Budo-
Sudo, W through Jinhae Man and NNE into Haengam Man. Vessels are recommended 
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to adhere to the lanes, speed is restricted to 15 knots within 12 cables of the turn NE of 
Byeongsan-Yeoldo (see Figure 5.6). The Traffic Separation Scheme comprises Gadeog-
sudo and Budo-sudo. The Gadeog-sudo is the entrance to the Jinhae-man, about 7.4 Km 
of width, 12.8-36 m of depth, about 33 Km of length to the port of Masan via Budo-sudo 
with many small islands and rocks. Although this traffic scheme has existed for 10 
years, no documentation exists on details of transits. 
5.4.1 SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION 
( 1) Sea area: The area covered, which is shown Fig. 5.6, includes not only the designed 
traffic separation schemes but extends from latitude 34° 50' north to 35° 1 0' north, and 
from longitude 128° 30' east to 128° 55' east. This area includes Gadeog-Sudo, Budo-
Sudo and Jinhae-Man (harbours are excluded). 
(2) Type of casualties: The analysis includes casualties reported in "Written Verdicts" 
which satisfy one or more of the following conditions: 
(i) collisions involving vessels not less than 20 metre length (equivalent to 50 
gross ton), but excluding collisions with buoys, anchored vessel or floating 
objects. 
(ii) groundings involving vessels not less than 20 metre length (equivalent to 50 
gross ton). 
(3) Period: The 10 year span July 14 1977 to July 13 1987 can be divided into two 
equal periods: 
Period No. of years Duration Remarks 
A 5 July 14 1977- Pre-routeing 
July 13 1982 period 
B 5 July 14 1982- Routeing scheme 
July 13 1987 
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5.4.2 TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (COLLISIONS AND GROUNDINGS) 
(]) Occurrence and time: In the 10 year period there were nine collisions (15 vessels 
involved excluding ships less than 50 tons) and six groundings in the area. The details 
of these casualties are included in the Annex D. 
Table 5.9 Number of accidents in Jinhae-man TSS 
Period A B Total 
Number of collisions 3 6 9 
(Number of ships involved) (5) (10) {15) 
Number of groundings 3 3 6 
Total number of accidents 6 9 15 
(8) (13) (21) 
Source: Author 
The Table 5.9 shows that before routeing was considered there were six accidents, 
and nine accidents after the introduction of the new scheme. The number of collision 
incidents increased after the introduction while the number of grounding incidents 
remained unchanged. Unfortunately, however, more detailed analysis is not feasible due 
to lack of detailed traffic data. 
(2) Position: As can be seen from Fig 5.6, which shows the position of all collisions 
and groundings, seven collision incidents out of nine occurred in the traffic lane. If we 
consider the collisions occurred after introduction of the traffic separation scheme, five 
out of six collisions occurred within the traffic lane. Therefore appropriate traffic 
surveillance is required to reduce the number of collisions. 
(3) Size ofvessel(Gross ton): Table 5.10 shows, classified by tonnage, the number of 
ships involved in traffic accidents during the 10 year period. 
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This is one of the major routes for domestic ferry, passenger and cargo vessels. 
Consequently all vessels involved in incidents were smaller than those involved in Inchon 
and Kanjol-Gap area (the average size of vessels in the traffic incidents has increased 
from 326 tons to 864 tons). This is probably due to the average size of vessel using the 
traffic scheme increasing, however, detailed analysis is not feasible due to a lack of 
traffic data. 
Table 5.10 Size of ships involved in accidents 
Tonnage Period A Period B 
category 
No. GRT No. GRT 
- 99 2 114 I 87 
100 - 299 2 212 2 413 
300- 499 2 843 I 337 
500- 999 2 1,436 3 2,025 
1,000 - 2,999 0 0 2 4,917 
3,000 & over 0 0 0 0 
Unknown 0 0 4 a 
Total 8 2,605 13 7,779+a 
ource: Author 
(4) Type of vessel: The distribution of accidents by type of vessel is shown in Table 
5.11. Over 47 percent of vessels involved in traffic accidents are cargo vessels, about 
21 percent are passenger ships and 16 percent are tug boats. 
Table 5.11 The accidents by type of vessel 
Type of vessel Total Period A Period B 
No. % No. % No. % 
Cargo ships 9 47.4 3 37.5 6 54.5 
Passenger ships 4 21.1 4 50.0 0 0 
Tug boats 3 15.8 0 0 3 27.3 
Tankers 2 10.5 I 12.5 I 9.1 
Fishing vessels I 5.3 0 0 I 9.1 
Unknown 2 0 0 2 
Total 21 100.0 8 100.0 13 100.0 
ource: Author s 
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It is noted that no passenger ship incidents occurred after the introduction of the 
scheme, but the tug boat and cargo ship incidents were being increased significantly in 
period B. However, further analysis is not feasible due to lack of traffic data such as 
type and size of vessel movements in different time periods. 
5.5 PUSAN VESSEL MOVEMENT REPORTING SCHEME 
5.5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Pusan Hang(port), one of the principal ports in Korea, is situated on the south-
eastern corner of the Korean Peninsula and alternatively known as Busan. Pusan Hang 
is divided by Yeong Do(island) into two harbours. South harbour (used mainly by 
fishing and coastal vessels) lies south-west of the island and North harbour, (with the 
deep water berths), lies north-east of the island. Both harbours are divided into Outer 
and Inner harbours, both North harbour and Inner South harbour are protected by 
breakwaters. There are two other harbours for small ships within the harbour limits; the 
Kamchon harbour in the Gamnaepo (which will be Pusan~s subsidiary port and a base 
for the deep-sea fishing industry), and Dadaepo which affords good shelter to small local 
vessels (the anchorage is used by fishermen as a place of refuge). 
Since Pusan Hang is the busiest port in Korea, a Vessel Movement Reporting 
Scheme (VMRS) was introduced from September 1978 to cope with the traffic. 
A:lthough this scheme has existed for IS years, no detailed data are available. 
The Korea "Open Port Orderliness Act" has been promulgated for the safety of 
traffic and to preserve order within the harbour limit. 1his Act gives the legal basis of 
the VMRS: 
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Ships incoming/outgoing into/from the harbour limit of Open port shall report to 
the District Maritime and Port Authority 
Ships incoming/outgoing into/from the harbour limit and migrating within the 
limit of Open port shall comply with the port traffic control 
The VMRS was introduced in most major ports in Korea as illustrated in Figure 
5.1, Pusan Hang was chosen to determine the effectiveness of the VMRS in this study 
on the grounds that it is one of the principal ports and the busiest port for ocean-going 
vessels. Figure 5.7 shows the time trends of vessel's movements in Pusan Hang for 15 
years, from 1976 to 1990. It clearly indicates the significant increase of vessel 
movements in the period. 
5.5.2 SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION 
(]}Sea area: The area covered, which is shown in Fig.5.8, includes not only "within the 
harbour limit" but also regions where ships converge or cross before entering the harbour 
and extends from latitude 35° 00' north to 35° 1 0' north, and from longitude 128° 55' 
east to 129° 1 0' east. The analysis is focused into the area of North harbour and it's 
approaches and the following areas are excluded: 
Dadaepo 
Gamnaepo and Kamchon Hang 
Inner harbour of the South Harbour 
(2) Types of casualties: lihe analysis includes casualties reported in "Written Verdicts" 
which satisfy one or more of the following conditions: 
(i~ collisions excluding fishing vessels, miscellaneous vessels(non-powered barge, 
launch, yacht, a lighter and etc.) and vessels less than five gross tons. 
(ii) groundings involving vessels as same as (1) 
(iii) rammings including contact with anchored Vessel, moored vessel, dock, 
breakwater, buoy and etc. involving vessels as same as (1) 
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Fig 5. 7 Trends of vessel movements in Pusan 
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(3) Period: The 15 year span October I 1973 to September 30 1988 can be divided into 
three equal periods: 
. 
Period No of years Duration Remarks 
A 5 October I 1973 - No service 
September 30 1978 
B 5 October I 1978- VMRS service 
September 30 1983 
c 5 October I 1983- VMRS service 
September 30 1988 
5.5.3 CASUALTIES 
(I) Occurrence and time: In the IS year period there were 77 collisions (135 vessels 
involved), 36 groundings and 59 rammings in Pusan Hang area. The details of these 
casualties are included in the Annex D. Although Table 5.12 indicates that before 
VMRS was introduced there were 61 incidents, 68 incidents for first five years after the 
introduction of VMRS and 43 incidents during the period C, there was no significant 
difference in the number of incidents per annum before and after the introduction of the 
vessel movement reporting scheme. There was increase rather than decrease in the total 
number of incidents and vessels involved during the first five year after the introduction 
of VMRS, but the number of incidents dropped considerably during the period C. 
Table 5.12 Number of accidents in Pusan 
Period A B c Total 
Number of collisions 29 26 22 77 
(No. of ships involved) (52) (44) (39) (135) 
Number of groundings 8 18 10 36 
Number of rammings 24 24 11 59 
Total number of accident 61 68 43 172 
(84) (86) (60) (230) 
Source: Author 
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The number of collisions and the number of vessels involved in collisions 
decreased by approximately I 0 percent and 1'5 percent respectively during the first five 
year period and 15 percent and 11 percent during the second five year period, so it 
appears probable that the introduction of VMRS has contributed to some extent to a 
reduction in the number of collision incidents. 
Table 5.13 presents the influential causal factors of grounding incidents which 
occurred during the period A and B. From the table, it is apparent that leading 
contributory causal factors to the noted increased grounding incidents are heavy weather, 
inadequate voyage planning and the negligence of ship control tasks. 
Table 5.13 Main causal factors of grounding incidents 
Main causal factors Period A Period B 
Environmental conditions 
Storm & bad weather 1 6 
Watchkeeping situations 
Improper manning on bridge 1 0 
Negligence of lookout 1 2 
Lack of experience 0 1 
Voyage planning 0 2 
Old chart or no small correction 3 0 
Ship control tasks 
Not fix position regularly 0 2 
Unskilled/improper manoeuvring 0 2 
Negligence in critical situation 2 2 
Technical fault & deficiencies 
Poor inspection of main engine 0 1 
Source: Author 
(2) Position: Figure 5.9 shows the position of collision accidents, and Table 5.14 is a 
summary of the accidents by location of incidents. 
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Looking into the location of collision incidents, 25 (86%) collisions occurred in 
the north harbour and four (14%) in the approaches and outside the harbour limit before 
the introduction of VMRS, while 17 (65%) collisions were in the north harbour and two 
(8%) in the south outer harbour and seven (27%) in the approaches and outside harbour 
limits during the first five year period after the introduction of VMRS in the area. 
Meantime six collisions (27%) occurred in the north harbour, eight (36%) in the south 
harbour and eight (36%) in the approaches during the period C. The number of collision 
incidents in the north harbour is decreasing(25-17-6), while the number in south outer 
harbour is increasing(0-2-8) remarkably. One collision incident during the period B and 
three incidents during the period C occurred in or around the No.3 Fairway, where is the 
entrance of Kamchon Hang. So it appears that the south outer harbour and the entrance 
of Kamchon Hang is a further dangerous location meriting attention. 
Table 5.14 Location of accidents 
' Location Period A Period B Period C Total 
COLLISION 
at North Inner harbour 11 7 2 20 I 
at North Outer harbour 14 10 4 28 
at South Outer harbour - 2 8 10 
at Approaches (within the Hr limit) 3 1 3 7 
at the outside of harbour limit 1 6 5 12 
Total 29 26 22 77 
RAMMING 
to pier (Inner Harbour) 14 14 5 33 
to ship/breakwater/buoy/etc (Inner Hr) 3 2 1 6 
to pier (Outer Harbour) 5 4 1 10 
to ship/breakwater/buoy/etc (Outer Hr) 2 4 4 10 
Total 24 24 11 59 
GROUNDING 
Inner harbour east breakwater 3 1 1 5 
on/around Ko-Am rock 1 3 1 5 
on/around Tongmudari-Am rock 1 3 1 5 
on the front Mangmi-Mal - 6 1 7 
on/around Saeng Do - 2 0 2 
on the front of Cheonghak pier 1 1 0 2 
on the other obstacles 2 2 6 10 
Total 8 18 10 36 
Grand Total 61 68 43 172 
Source: Author 
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If we look at the location of grounding incidents, three ships stranded on the Inner 
harbour east breakwater, one on the Ko-Am and one on the Tongmudari-Affi before the 
introduction of VMRS, while one ship stranded on the Inner harbour east breakwater, 
three on the Ko-Am, three on the Tongmudari-Am, two on the Saeng-Do and six on the 
rocks in front of Mangmi-Mal during the first introduction period. So it can be said that 
Ko-Am, Tongmudari-Am, Saeng-Do and the rocks in front of Mangmi-Mal were the 
most dangerous places for the stranding of ships during the period B. The location of 
grounding incidents, however, during the period C is different to the period B. 
(3) Size of vessel(Gross ton): Table 5.15 illustrates the number of ships by size 
classification involved in accidents. The average size of vessels has increased from 3,172 
tons to 5,063 and to 5300 tons (excluding unknown tonnage). A considerable decrease 
in the number of ships involved is identified in the size group of 500-2,999 and 3,000-
4,999 tons. 
Table 5.15 Size of ships involved in accidents 
Tonnage Total Period A Period B Period C 
category 
No GRT No GRT No GRT No GRT 
. 99 20 1,129 5 343 7 319 8 467 
100· 499 19 5,918 5 1,713 7 2,814 7 1,391 
500· 2,999 89 114,774 41 47,736 31 39,871 17 27,167 
3,000· 4,999 46 174,205 21 81,824 17 61,723 8 30,658 
5,000· 6,999 5 30,066 2 11,819 2 12,109 I 6,138 
7,000· 9,999 8 72,873 5 44,695 3 28,178 0 0 
I 0,000-19,999 16 227,360 4 49,812 7 101,140 5 76,408 
20,000 & over 10 305,073 I 28,488 5 153,803 4 122,782 
Unknown 17 a 0 0 7 a 10 a 
Total 230 931,398+a 84 266,430 86 399,957+a 60 265,011+a 
Source: Author 
Using the formula introduced in section 5.2.2 the period is divided into following 
three categories which is different from the criterion of the period used so far. It is due 
to the limitation of traffic data. 
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Table 5.16 shows that overall traffic accident danger (Sd) notably decreased after 
the introduction of traffic measures, 0.00084 to 0.00068 and to 0.00031 thereafter. The 
reduction of accident danger is observed in most size categories of vessels except for 
small tonnage groupings. So it appears that VMRS is more effective for larger tonnage 
ships. 
Table 5.16 Number of vessels in traffic accident(N) and Number of vessels 
entering Pusan Hang(Q) for period of 1976-1988 
GRT Less 100- 500- 3QOOc 5000- 10000- 20000 Total 
category 100 499 2999 4999 9999 19999 & over 
N, 2 4 29 14 3 3 1 56 ( % ) 3.6 7.1 51.8 25.0 5.4 5.4 1.7 
Ne 7 7 31 17 5 7 5 79 ( % ) 8.9 8.9 39.2 21.5 6.3 8.9 6.3 
N 8 7 17 8 1 5 4 50 ( %c) 16.0 14.0 34.0 16.0 2.0 10.0 8.0 
0, 2.135 8.252 12.829 4.746 2.516 2.155 396 33.209 
Os 2.685 11.122 23.382 7.010 4.442 6.158 2.875 57.674 
Oc 4.810 17.887 29.422 7.392 5.297 8.371 7.312 80.491 
N,I2Q, 0.00047 0.00024 0.00113 0.00147 0.00060 0.00070 0.00126 0.00084 
N6/2Q6 0.00130 0.00031 0.00066 0. 00121 0.00056 0.00057 0.00087 0.00068 
Ncl20c 0.00083 0.00020 0.00029 0.00054 0.00009 0.00030 0.00027 0.00031 
Total 0.00088 0.00024 0.00059 0.00102 0.00037 0.00045 0.00047 0.00054 
Source: Author 
( 4) Type of vessel: The distribution of accidents by type of vessel is shown in Table 
5.17. About 69 percent of the vessels involved in traffic accidents are cargo vessels and 
some 14 percent are tankers. The percentage contribution of cargo ships shows a 
tendency to decrease, 78.5 percent to 72 percent and to 50 percent, while the percentage 
contribution of passenger ships, tugs and other vessels have a significant upward trend. 
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Fig 5.9 Locat ion of Coll ision accidents (Pusan) 
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Further analysis, however, is not possible due to lack of traffic data including size and 
type of vessel movements in different time periods. 
Table 5.17 The accidents by type of vessel 
Type of Total Period A Period B Period C 
vessel 
No % No % No % No % 
Cargo ships 151 69.3 66 78.5 59 72.0 26 50.0 
Tankers 30 13.8 12 14.3 11 13.4 7 13.5 
Passengers 12 5.5 2 2.4 4 4.9 6 11.5 
Tugs 13 6.0 2 2.4 4 4.9 7 13.5 
Other vessels 12 5.4 2 2.4 4 4.8 6 11.5 
Unknown 12 0 0 4 8 
Total 230 100 84 100 86 100 61 lOO 
Source: Author 
5.6 SUMMARY 
A casualty and traffic analysis is used to evaluate the effectiveness of the existing 
traffic services and an accident danger index is introduced to compare the accident 
danger in different time periods. 
The difficulty in this chapter is that many of the number of accidents are so small 
that it is impossible to test for significant differences in different time periods. Another 
difficulty is that detailed analysis are not feasible in many parts due to lack of traffic 
data. 
Even though the absolute number of collisions has increased, the overall accident 
danger index for one trip has reduced significantly following the introduction of a 
routeing scheme in lnchon. According to the analysis, there were; 
e eight collisions (7 meeting & I crossing) and one grounding 
e six incidents were under reduced visibility(less than 300 metres) 
e six cases violated the local sailing rules 
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The analysis suggests that appropriate traffic surveillance and stricter enforcement of the 
routeing scheme are required here. 
It appears likely that introduction of a Traffic Separation Scheme in Kanjol-Gap 
has led to a reduction in the number of accidents. But three collisions out of four after 
the introduction of TSS occurred within the traffic lane. Therefore appropriate traffic 
observation and surveillance are necessary to further reduce, perhaps with a view to 
repositioning the traffic lane or its navigation mark. 
Numbers of collisions increased (three to six incidents) after the introduction of 
TSS in Jinhae-Man, but the number of groundings remain unchanged. All ships involved 
in accidents were less than 3,000 gross tons. Unfortunately, however, further analysis 
is not feasible due to lack of traffic data. It is recommended that data be gathered for 
further analysis. 
Even though there is no significant difference in the number of accidents per 
annum before and after the introduction of a Vessel Movement Reporting Scheme in 
Pusan Hang and its approaches, the overall accident danger index reduced significantly. 
The location of collision incidents were wide spread; 
0 South outer harbour: no collision incidents before the introduction of VMRS, two 
incidents (8%) during the period 8 and 8 incidents (36%) 
during the period C. 
0 Approaches and outside of harbour limit: four collision incidents(l4%) before 
the VMRS, seven incidents (27%) during the period 8 and 
eight incidents (36%) during the period C. 
Accordingly, adequate traffic observation and surveillance are necessary to increase the 
navigation safety in the Pusan Hang area. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY ON 
SAFETY AND VESSEL TRAFFIC 
KOREAN COASTAL WATERS 
6.1 SURVEY DESIGN 
Chapter 6 
THE MARINE 
SERVICES IN 
Vessel Traffic Service(VTS) is a relatively new service offered by the Korea 
Maritime and Port Administration (KMPA). Its main objective is the safety of traffic, 
efficient traffic flow and affording aid to navigation through the reduction of vessel 
conflicts and the improved interchange of information. Fig 5.1 illustrates the locations 
and types of existing VTS systems in Korean waters. 
As part of this analysis, the following objectives may be attained by means of the 
survey: 
• to determine the perceived relative importance of the various factors associated 
with the environment, geography and traffic in the assessment of navigational and 
marine risk; 
11 to classify ports and sea areas on the basis of the risk perceived; 
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• to classify the marginal effectiveness of various options in reducing marine risk; 
• to seek opinions on the type and level of VTS services that should be provided 
by area; 
11 to evaluate background and qualifications of VTS operators; 
,. to estimate the 'users' and 'operators' points of view with regard to VTS services. 
After reviewing the relevant literaturel6-I][6-2n6-3U6-4U6-5l and discussions with 
informants and interested organizations, and after studying the published research on this 
topic l6-4ll6-5ll6-6l and bearing in mind the objectives of this study, a preliminary 
questionnaire was designed (divided into five parts). 
11 Part A seeks basic information about the respondents, such as shipboard 
experience, marine background and the areas with which they are familiar; 
11 Part B is concerned with the factors which endanger safety of navigation and 
overall risk by areas; 
11 Part C is a survey of opinions on the options for risk reduction; 
11 Part D seeks an evaluation of the background and qualification of VTS operators; 
11 and finally, part E refers to the effectiveness of Vessel Traffic Service systems. 
Each set of the questionnaire ~English and Korean version) is given at Annex-F. 
A pilot study using the Korean version of the questionnaire was carried out in 
January-February 1993 to ensure validity. 'fhe questionnaire responses are listed against 
shipboard experience and marine background in table 6_1 and 6.2 below which shows the 
background-wise spread achieved. 
After correction and review, the Korean version of the questionnaire was mailed 
on 30th March 1993_ A self-addressed envelope was enclosed with every questionnaire_ 
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Table 6.1 Questionnaire responses by shipboard experience 
Number of years Number of responses 
0 years 3 
I to 5 years 9 
6 to 10 years 7 
11 to 20 years 5 
over 20 years 3 
Source: Author 
Table 6.2 Questionnaire responses by marine background 
Marine background Number of responses 
Shipowners' representatives 3 
Port/Harbour officials 6 
Lecturers of education/training institute 5 
Marine accident inquiry agency 5 
Classification surveyors 2 
Pilots 4 
Other marine background 2 
Source: Author 
During the planning stage, considerable thought was given to the question 
"Whether it was preferable to have a relatively small number of responses from people 
who could be individually interviewed and were experienced in navigation in Korean 
waters, or whether to seek a wide response by post with no guarantee that those 
responding would have any useful experience or that they fully understood the 
questionnaire ?". Ideally, it would be desirable to extend the sample by continuing the 
interview technique to those who are known to have experience of navigating in Korean 
waters, but this is not feasible in this study. Consequently, it was decided that sufficient 
high quality and reliable responses would be preferable to a wide response of unknown 
quality. 
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The population surveyed comprised mariners navigating in Korean waters and 
persons in contact with the services provided by VTS. The "Shipping Directory Korea" 
and the "Membership List of Korea Merchant Marine Officers Association" was used to 
reach a population of some 860 persons with maritime interests (Table 6.3). 
Table 6.3 List of population receiving the questionnaire 
Masters/Chief mates of foreign trade ships 372 
Masters of coastal ships 152 
Pilots 75 
Port/Harbour officials 53 
VTS operators 85 
Shipowners' representatives (Port captain & Marine superintendent) 41 
Seafarers· education/training institute 24 
Maritime organizations 31 
Marine accidents inquiry agencies 18 
Classification societies 12 
Total 863 
Source: Author 
6.2 DATA BASE 
There were 385, (207 from masters/mates and 178 from shore staff) duly 
completed questionnaires returned by August 31, 1993. Several measures were taken to 
respect respondents' anonymity. No names were attached to the questionnaire, and only 
statistical summaries of data are shown in this paper. 
The large amount of information collected can be managed, described and 
analyzed most effectively by computer. The questionnaire responses were coded and a 
data file created. The analysis was made using the "Statistical Package for Social 
Science (SPSS/PC+)".16-71 Annex-E presents the coding scheme for questionnaire with 
variable names, variable label and value labels. 
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6.3 RESPONDENTS' PROFILES 
(I) Shipboard experience: Table 6.4 represents the respondents' profiles in I 0 different 
occupational groups. They include I97 masters/mates of merchant vessel, who are now 
engaged full-time on board ship; I 0 masters/mates of passenger/ferry; I5 pilots; 28 
shipowner's representatives who were previously masters or mates of merchant vessels; 
15 port/harbour officials who have full-time shipboard experience, 15 lecturers of 
seafarers' education/training institutes and 13 officials ofmaritime organization who were 
previously master/mate of merchant ships. 
Table 6.4 Shipboard Experience 
Occupational Grouping Number of Average Full-time Shipboard 
respondents Experience (Year) 
Masters/Mates of merchant vessel 197 15 
Masters/Mates of ferry 10 18 
Pilots 15 23 
Lecturers of seafarers· 15 11 
education/training institute 
Classification surveyors 6 5 
Port/harbour officials 22 3 
Government employees 12 8 
Shipowners' representatives 28 9 
Maritime organizations 13 11 
VTS Operators 67 I 
Source: Author 
The average number of years of experience in the occupational group of 
masters/mates of merchant vessel, masters/mates of ferry, pilots, lecturers of 
education/training institute and staffs of maritime organization are I5, I8, 23, II and II 
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years respectively. 24 VTS operators have, on the average, four years and 43 operators 
have no full-time shipboard experience. 
The government employees are the officials of the Marine Accident Inquiry 
Agency, and the shipowners' representatives are the port captains or marme 
superintendents of shipowners. Maritime organization includes shipowners' association, 
shipping association, merchant marine officers' association and seafarers' unions. 
Reference to the first three occupational groupings in Table 6.4 as "mariners", and 
to the subsequent groupings as "non-mariner" is then used. 
It .should also be noted that the number of respondents in each occupational 
groupmg is relatively small except for masters/mates of merchant vessel and VTS 
operators. The following re-grouping is therefore adopted: 
· Masters/Mates group - first two groupings (n=207) 
· Pilot/Lecturer/Surveyors group - next three groupings (n=36) 
· Government/Port officials group - next two groupings (n=34) 
· Shipowners/Maritime organization group· - next two groupings (n=41) 
· VTS operator group. (n=67) 
(2) The average size of vessel: Table 6.5 shows the average size of vessel on which they 
have worked. Seven percent of them worked on the size group less than 1000, 16 
percent on 1000-5000, 38 percent on 10000-30000 group and 31 percent on 30000 & 
over. In general 23 percent of them worked on coastal vessel(less than 50000 tons) and 
77 percent on ocean going vessels. There were 52 respondents who have no ship-board 
experience. 
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Table 6.5 Average Size of Vessel 
Value Label Frequency Percent Cum. Percent 
Less than I 00 2 0.6 0.6 
I00-500 ton 9 2.7 3.3 
500- I 000 ton I2 3.6 6.7 
I 000-5000 ton 53 I6.0 22.5 
5000- I 0000 ton 30 9.0 31.6 
I 0000-30000 ton I25 37.7 69.3 
30000 & Over IOI 30.4 IOO.O 
Source: Author, Missing cases=) 
(3) Familiar areas: Table 6.6 represents the familiarity of sub-areas. In all, 62 (16%) 
respondents claim to be currently familiar with the Tonghae area. Corresponding figures 
for the Pohang, Ulsan, Pusan, Masan and Yosu areas are 128 (33%), 152 (39%), 252 
(65%), 87 (23%) and 151 (39%). A total of 84 (22%) respondents claim to be familiar 
with Cheju area, 94 (24%) with Mokpo area, 60 (16%) with Kunsan area and 169 (44%) 
with Inchon area. 
Table 6.6 Familiar Areas 
Area Number of Mariners Number of Non-mariners 
Tonghae Area 4I 2I 
Pohang Area 96 32 
Uisan Area I I I 4I 
Pusan Area I82 70 
Masan Area 64 23 
Yosu Area I I 7 34 
Cheju Area 65 I9 
Mokpo Area 73 2I 
Kunsan Area 46 I4 
Inchon Area I25 44 
Source: Author 
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6.4 RISK PERCEPTION 
Terry16-SJ explains that risk is a curious and complex concept. In a sense it is 
unreal in that it is always concerned with the future, with possibilities, with what has not 
yet happened. If there is certainty there is no risk. Thus risk is a thing of the mind, 
intimately linked to personal or collective psychology. The concept of risk being a 
product of probability and consequence is not readily grasped by the general public or, 
indeed, many professionals. The Royal Society has defined 'risk' as "the probability 
that a particular adverse event occurs during a stated period of time, or results from a 
particular challenge". 
A number of different types of risk can be distinguished: individually perceived 
risk, collectively perceived risk, calculated risk and real risk.16·91 We will consider 
'perceived risk' in this section. Perceived risk is the risk that ohe thinks is the case. It 
might be personal risk to oneself, as with the possibility of personal injury, or the risk 
to other people or things. 
(1) Risk factors: In question Bl the respondents were asked to what extent marine risks 
would be increased by certain risk factors. 'fable 6. 7 shows the ranking of different risk 
factors by occupational groups. Masters/mates of merchant vessel and ferry, Shipowners' 
representative /maritime organization and YTS operators occupational groups agree that 
"reduced visibility by fog or snow" is the leading factor in increasing marine risk. 
Government employee/port officials and pilots/lecturers of education institute/and 
classification sUIVeyor groups rank "human factor in ship handling" in first place. 
Government employees/Port officials and pilots/lecturers of education institute/ 
and classification surveyor groups rank "reduced visibility" in second place, but 
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masters/mates of merchant vessel and ferry group claims that "greater number of fishing 
boats in shipping routes" is the second important factor to increase the risks. 
Shipowners· representative/maritime organization group ranks "human factor in ship 
handling" in second place, and VTS operators group ranks "stormy weather" in second 
place. 
Table 6.7 Ranking of risk factors by Occupational groups 
Occupational Groups 
Risk Factor 
Masters/ Pilot/ Govern'!/ Shipowners YTS 
Mates of Lecturer/ Port /Maritime Operators 
vessel Surveyors officials organization 
Reduced visibility I 2 2 I I 
Stormy weather 5 6 5 5 2 
Strong current 8 7 8 9 10 
More fishing boats in 2 5 6 4 4 
shipping routes 
More pleasure boats 11 11 11 11 9 
in shipping routes 
Narrow 9 10 4 8 7 
channel/passage 
Higher density of 6 4 7 7 6 
traffic(merchant ship) 
Poor design of 10 9 10 10 11 
fairway 
Poor navigational 7 7 9 6 8 
aids 
Human factor in ship 3 I I 2 3 
handling 
Violation of rules 4 3 3 3 5 
Source: Author 
Three occupational groups except YTS operator group rank "more pleasure boats 
in shipping routes" in the last place. Finally overall ranking of risk factors increasing 
marine risks is: 
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(I) Reduced visibility by fog or snow 
(2) Human factors in ship handling 
(3) Violation of rules and regulations 
(4) Greater number of fishing boats in shipping routes 
(5) Stormy weather 
(6) Higher density of traffic (merchant vessels) 
(7) Poor navigational aids 
(8) Strong current or tidal streams 
(9) Narrow channel or passage 
( 1 0) Poor design of fairway 
( 11) Greater number of pleasure crafts in shipping routes 
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There were several other factors manifested in increasing risks for the open 
question. Superannuated hull, machinery and navigation instruments and lack of 
equipment, especially radar, were supported by respondents (n=28). The following are 
other supported factors with the number of respondents in brackets. 
- VTS: 
- Pilot: 
poor and unskilled services, inexperienced operators (11) 
disobedience to boarding time, infringement of embarking and/or 
disembarking point ( 1 0) 
- Miscellaneous vessel including barge and tugs: disordered operation and violation of 
rules and regulations (I 0) 
- Fatigue and insufficient sleep due to frequent entering/leaving ports and small number 
of crew (8) 
- Shipowner makes unreasonable demand ofmaster; ask to sail in reduced visibility or 
heavy weather condition, ask to overload (8) 
- Lack of information to mariners such as dredging, fishing farm or nets in fairway, 
construction works, etc. (7) 
- Tug boats: superannuated tugs, insufficient power (4) 
To test statistically if there is any significant difference between the views of the 
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five occupational groupings, an analysis ofvariance(ANOVA) technique(tukey-b multiple 
comparison test) was used. Differences are marked if the significance level is not less 
than 0.05. According to the test, the VIS operators group differs from the masters/mates 
group and pilot/lecturer/surveyors group in the views of the risk factor "reduced 
visibility". VIS operators group assesses that this factor would increase risk less than 
the other two groups, The VIS operators group opines that "stormy weather" would 
increase risk with a significance level' of 0.05. 
The VIS operators group differs from the pilot/lecturer/surveyors group, 
masters/mates group and shipowners' representative/officials of maritime organizations 
in a reduced view of the risk factor "strong current & tidal streams". Clearly the 
masters/mates group, however, differs from all of other four groups in the view of the 
factor "more fishing boats in shipping ,lane". 
The VIS operators group differs from the pilot/lecturer/surveyors group and 
masters/mates group in the views of the risk factor "higher density of traffic". VIS 
operators group assesses that the factor would increase risk less than the other two 
groups. In addition the pilot/lecturer/surveyors group assesses the factor would increase 
the risk more than shipowners/maritime organization group. 
The masters/mates and pilot/lecturer/surveyors group differ from VTS operators 
group in the opinions of risk factor "poor design of fairway" and "poor navigation aids". 
The former groups give a higher causal value than the latter. 
The VIS operators group differs from all of the other four groups in their low 
scoring view .of the risk factor "human factor in ship handling" and "rule violation". 
In conclusion the VIS operators group assesses the risk factors with less weight 
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than any other group. This curiosity may be well linked to less shipboard experience and 
lower qualifications. 
(2) Overall risk by sub-area: The risk related to each geographical sub-area was 
investigated. The list below gives the rankings obtained from perceptions in the 
questionnaire with the number of respondents in brackets. Both mariners and shore staffs 
agree that Inchon area is the higher risk area with Pusan, Ulsan, Mokpo and Masan 
ranked in descending order. 
(I) Taean Bando to Inch on area (n = 249) 
(2) Pusan area (n = 286) 
(3) Ulsan area (n = 235) 
( 4) Maemul, Maenggol Sudo & Mokpo area (n = 191) 
(5) Masan,Jinhae, Kadok Sudo & Koje-do area (n = 186) 
(6) Yosu, Kwangyang & Yosu Haeman area (n = 222) 
(7) Kunsan, Changhang area (n = 161) 
(8) Cheju area (n = 178) 
(9) Pohang area (n = 205) 
(I 0) Tonghae area (n = 160) 
6.5 OPTIONS FOR IMPROVING MARINE SAFETY 
(I) Options: Question C I asked respondents to what extent certain options could 
improve marine safety. Table 6.8 shows the ranking of different options to reduce 
marine risk by occupational groupings. "Additional Vessel Traffic Services" is the option 
suggested by the questionnaire which receives the greatest approval of government/port 
officials, pilot/lecturer/classification surveyors and VTS operators groups. 
Masters/mates consider "stricter enforcement of prohibition of fishing and 
excursion on shipping routes" the most important option for reducing marine casualties. 
According to shipowners' representative and officials of maritime organization 
"additional traffic separation schemes" is the principal solution to improve marine safety. 
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"Improved education and training for mariners" is ranked in second place by the 
government/port officials and pilot/lecturer/surveyors groupings. The masters/mates 
group ranks "additional traffic separation schemes" in second place, the 
shipowners/maritime organization group ranks "additional VTS" in second place. 
"Stricter enforcement of prohibition of fishing and excursion on shipping routes" 1s 
ranked in second place by VTS operators group. 
Table 6.8 Ranking of options by Occupational groups 
Occupational Groups 
Options 
Masters Pilot/ Government Shipowners/ VTS 
/Mates Lecturer/ /Port Maritime Operators 
Surveyors officials organization 
Improved weather 4 4 8 6 4 
information 
Institution of speed 10 10 10 10 10 
limit in more areas 
Stricter enforcement 9 8 7 9 5 
of ship safety 
regulations 
Additional dredging 8 9 9 8 8 
Upgraded fixed and 5 7 5 7 7 
floating navigational 
aids 
Additional Traffic 2 3 3 I 6 
Separation Schemes 
Additional 6 6 6 4 8 
recommended 
courses on charts 
Additional Vessel 3 I I 2 I 
Traffic Services 
Improved education 7 2 2 5 2 
and training for 
mariners 
Stricter enforcement 1 5 4 3 3 
of prohibition of 
fishing and excursion 
on shipping routes 
Source: Author 
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The following options are, repeatedly ranked as one of the last three by most 
occupational groupings: 
Institution of speed limit in more areas 
Stricter enforcement of ship safety rules and regulations 
Additional dredging in more areas 
There were several other options suggested for the open question. Improved 
communication including; "legislation to install radio telephone on all kinds of vessel; 
encouragement to use more equipment and to communicate with other vessels in sight; 
and to establish separate channels for radio telephone lines between ship and shore 
avoiding congestion in channel 16" received the greatest approval by the respondents. 
The same technique was employed' to test statistically if there is any significant 
difference between the views of the five occupational groupings. Differences are 
annotated if the significance level is not less than 0.05. According to the multiple range 
test (Tukey-B procedure)l6•10116' 11116- 121, the masters/mates group and government 
employees/port officials group are significantly different at the 0.05 level in the opinions 
of the option "improved weather information". The former group gives more weight on 
the option than the latter. 
The VTS operators group differs from the masters/mates group and the 
shipowners/maritime organization group in the view of the option "stricter ship safety 
regulation". The latter two groups are more pessimistic regarding the option. 
The masters/mates group and VTS operators group are significantly different at 
the 0.05 level in the opinions of the option "upgraded navigational aids". The former 
group gives more weight on the option than the latter. 
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In the views of the option "more traffic separation scheme", the masters/mates 
group differs from VTS operators group and government employee/ port officials group. 
The masters/mates group is more optimistic for the option. 
The YTS operators group differs from masters/mates, shipowners/maritime 
organizations and pilot/lecturer/surveyors group in the opinions of the option "more 
recommended routes". The operators group gives less weight than the others. However, 
the operators group gives more weight for the option "extended VTS service" than 
masters/mates group. 
The masters/mates group minimises the importance of training of seafarers as 
compared with other groups. This group, however, gives much more weight on the 
option "prohibition of fishing/excursion on fairway" than other groups. 
(2) Implementation and/or modification of Vessel Traffic Services: In Question C2 
(questions), the respondents, who work in specific port or area only, were asked to 
express their views on how VTS should be implemented and/or modified. Consequently 
the number of respondents is small on these questions. Table 6.9 and 6.10 summarize 
their opinions with respect to each area. 
A state-of-the-art VTS service is on operation at the port of Pohang from January 
1993, thus half of respondents sought to maintain the present level in the Pohang area. 
Almost all respondents declared that the VTS service should be upgraded or implemented 
in where no service exists. No respondent wished to downgrade or close the VTS 
service, and only two respondents sought not to implement VTS in their area. 
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Table 6.9 Implementation/Modification to YTS 
If area has VTS service now No VTS service now 
AREA 
Downgrade Maintain at Improve lmplemen Do not 
or close present or t implement 
level upgrade 
Tonghae area ....... 0 0 9 6 I 
Pohang area ........ 0 5 6 2 0 
Ulsan area ......... 0 I 7 7 0 
Pusan area ......... 0 0 31 6 0 
Masan/Jinhae/Koje- 0 0 4 4 0 
do area ............ 
Yosu/Kwangyang 0 0 I 12 I 
area ............... 
Cheju Haehyup, 0 0 I 4 0 
Jangjug-sudo area 
Maemul, Maenggol 0 0 0 I 0 
Sudo, Mokpo area 
Kunsan/Changhang 0 0 4 7 0 
area ............... 
Taean-bando to 0 I 18 16 0 
I nchon area ........ 
Source: Author 
Table 6.10 identifies levels of YTS provision and, represents the respondents' 
view on the adequate YTS level, YTS type and formal authority of YTS. A majority of 
respondents agreed that Level Ill and IV are adequate, and YTS for the port and their 
approaches is the suitable type. Port authority is the most acceptable organization as the 
formal authority of YTS by the questionnaire which receives the greatest approvals in all 
area, and very few respondents want the Coast Guard(Marine police in Korea) or Pilot 
association to be vested with formal authority. This view is supported by other research: 
All respondents were asked where the formal authority of YTS should be vested. 
There was a preference for the Harbour Authority, either in the person of the Port 
Director or the Harbour Master to the National Government. IMO was also 
mentioned, though more in the context of providing the formal framework to 
enable other authorities to establish their schemes. 16- 131 
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Table 6.10 VTS level, type and formal authority 
Adequate YTS Level Type of VTS Formal Authority of VTS 
I 11 Ill IV Port Port& Coas Port Coast Pilot Other 
AREA VTS approa- -tal Auth- Guard Assoc 
ches YTS ority 
-
iation 
Tonghae 0 2 7 3 2 11 0 13 I 0 0 
Pohang 0 0 5 3 3 6 2 10 0 I I 
Ulsan 2 0 5 6 3 10 2 10 0 4 I 
Pusan 3 0 16 15 3 24 6 24 4 4 2 
Masan 0 0 2 4 I 4 2 7 0 0 0 
Yosu I 0 11 0 2 11 I 13 I 0 0 
Cheju I 0 3 0 0 3 2 5 0 0 0 
Mokpo 0 0 0 I 0 0 I I 0 0 0 
Kunsan 0 0 9 I 0 7 3 10 0 0 0 
lnchon I 0 16 8 2 20 4 21 4 I 0 
Note I) Level I : A vessel movement reportmg system cons1s1mg or VHF commumcat1on and vanous 
vessel reporting 
2) Level 11 : Basic radar surveillance; The VMRS of Level I coupled with basic radar surveillance. 
The radar assumed to be a standard shipboard radar without advanced features. 
3) Level 111 : Advanced radar surveillance; This system includes complete communication plus an 
advanced slate-of-art YTS radar surveillance system. 
4) Level IV : Automatic dependent surveillance based on the use of differential GPS relransmissions. 
This system consists of an automated transponder installed on the participating vessel. 
Source: Author 
6.6 VTS OPERA TORS 
In recent years there has been a rapid growth in Vessel Traffic Services (VTS). 
This growth has led to a significant increase in the number of VTS operators required 
worldwide. The International Maritime Organization(IMO) has issued guidelines thus: 
The VTS authority should ensure that VTS operators have the qualifications and 
have received special training appropriate to their tasks within the VTS and meet 
the language requirements mentioned in paragraph 3.4, in particular with regard 
to VTS operators authorized to issue traffic instructions or to give navigational 
assistance. 16-141 
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Despite these reconunendations, there is little conunon ground in the qualification 
and training requirements of YTS operators worldwide or even between authorities within 
national boundaries. A study into these matters has, therefore, been carried out by the 
International Association of Lighthouse Authorities(IALA) YTS conunittee, and the 
results are published through IMO, so called "Guidelines on the recruitment, qualification 
and training of YTS operators". VTS operators are defined in these guidelines as follow; 
A YTS operator is the appropriately qualified person who performs the functions 
of the YTS. YTS operator further means a person who provides, if duly 
authorised, instructions and information to vessels and decides what action should 
be taken in response to data received. This person may be directly responsible 
for conununications within a defined geographical within a YTS area, or may 
relay such information and decisions through an intermediary. 
These guidelines use the seven prime functions identified as a basis for defining 
the tasks, skills and knowledge required by an effective YTS operator. These are !6-' 51 : 
F I - Acquiring data 
F2 - Allocation of space 
F3 - Routine control of vessels 
F4 - Manoeuvres to avoid collisions 
FS - Enforcement function 
F6 - Remedial function 
F7 - Other functions 
Of course, the tasks, skills and knowledge required by YTS operator depend on 
the level and type of YTS, each have special and differing operational and training 
requirements. COST 301 Task force identified the following seven general knowledge 
areas considered necessary to the YTS operator: 
I. Knowledge and use of the English language 
2. General nautical knowledge 
3. Special nautical knowledge 
4. Equipment handling expertise 
5. Legal knowledge 
6. Local geographic knowledge 
7. General education. 
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The above areas are almost self evident. Barber & Hughesl6- 161 claimed the following 
further skills are essentiaL 
Levels of training may vary, dependent on the level of the VTS operator, but for 
a modem system, including the radar surveillance of a busy port and its 
approaches, the following skills are essential:-
I. The ability to communicate clearly, concisely and correctly using modem 
V.H.F. equipment. This is a vital requirement at the heart of an effective 
Vessel Traffic System. 
2. The ability to use and interpret radar tracking information correctly and to 
be aware of the limitations of radar surveillance equipment. 
3. The ability to understand the problems of the mariner navigating within 
a VTS area - i.e. the Pilot!MasterNTS relationship. 
4. The ability to create co-operation between the shore based operator and the 
mariner aboard ship, and to ensure that mariners in the Traffic area are 
aware of the VTS and of its purpose to enhance navigation safety. 
5. The ability to solve problems and, in particular, to be able to deal with a 
number of different problems and tasks at the same time. 
6. The ability to respond quickly and effectively to developing situations. 
7. The ability to respond quickly and effectively to hazardous and emergency 
situations. 
8. To be aware of the legal implications of VTS. 
There are some I 00 YTS operators in Korea, but the individuals are merely 
expected to communicate information to participating vessels. The services are limited 
within the harbour limits (Type: Port YTS), and to vessel movement reports (Level I) and 
basic radar surveillance (Level II) in the port of Inchon, Pusan, Ulsan and Pohang as 
illustrated in Figure 5.1. 
The respondents were asked to express their views on the operators· background, 
experience and qualification to perform their tasks in Question D. This question is to 
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seek opinions of respondents about the VTS operator who undertakes the tasks mentioned 
in the IMO's definition above. 
As can be seen in Table 6.11, 94 percent of mariners and 87 percent of shore 
staffs group agrees that marine experience is essential for VTS operators to perform their 
tasks, where as only 25 percent of VTS operators agrees. Shore staffs include 
shipowners' representatives, port/harbour officials, lecturers of education & training 
institute, government employee, officials of maritime organization and classification 
surveyors. 
48 percent of mariners and 61 percent of shore staffs consider that previous 
experience of ship handling is desirable for VTS operators, while eight percent of VTS 
operators considers so. According to VTS operators group, 77 percent of them suggests 
experience of ship handling and communication is advisable for the operators. 
Master's experience is advised for VTS operators by half of the mariners( 50%) 
and shore staffs (36%), while the majority (69%) of VTS operators group claims a radio 
operator's certificate is desirable for operators. Other experience in the third row of 
Table 6.11 includes ability of English and maritime related rules and regulations. 
These results are supported by other research - "The Mariner's Requirements for 
VTS".16-17J 
As a precursor to seeking the views of VTS authorities of the background and 
experience they sought from potential VTS operators, the users were asked what 
they expected. 
One continual complaint by mariners about VTS operators was that they did not 
appreciate the mariner's problem and the environment in which he worked, and 
in consequence the information and advice they offered fell short of what the 
mariner needed and expected. It was to be expected that the mariner would 
therefore look for reasonably high qualifications on the part of both the VTS 
officer-in-charge and the VTS operator. In the event, 80 percent of mariners 
expected the VTS officer-in-charge to be a pilot or possess a Master's certificate. 
The level required of the VTS operator was only slightly lower, with nearly half 
looking for the same qualifications as the officer-in-charge and the majority of the 
remainder stipulating a Class 3 certificate or better. 
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Table 6.11 VTS operators 
Mariners Shore staffs VTS Openilors Total 
Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent 
I. Is marine e1perience 
essential ? 
Essential ................... 209 94% 83 87% 17 25% 309 80% 
Not necessarily ............. 13 6% 12 13% 47 70% 72 19% 
Not necessary ............... 0 0 0 0 2 3% 2 1% 
No opinion .................. 0 0 0 0 I 2% I 0 
2. What kind of previous 
experience is required ? 
Shiphandling ................ 103 48% 53 61% 2 8% 158 48% 
Communication ............... 0 0 I 1% 4 15% 5 2% 
Shiphandling & Corn. ........ 109 SI% 33 38% 20 77% 162 49% 
Other ....................... 3 1% 0 0 0 0 3 1% 
3. What 1.-·el of 
qualification is 
necessary? 
Pilot ....................... 4 2% 3 J% I 2% 8 2% 
Master's experience ......... 108 50% 33 36% 2 4% 143 39% 
Master's certificate ........ 24 11% 12 13% I 2% 37 10% 
C/Mate's certificate ........ 68 31% 26 28% 8 14% 102 28% 
2nd Mate's certificate ...... 12 5% 14 15% 5 9% 31 9% 
Radio operator 
······- --·-·· 
2 1% 4 5% 38 69% 44 12% 
Source: Author 
6.7 EFFECTIVENESS OF VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICES 
Ten sub-sets of questions relating to the effectiveness of VTS were asked in 
section E of the questionnaire. Indices have been developed from the answers to those 
questions in order to provide a measure of the perceived importance and effectiveness 
of VTS. Table 6.12 provides the summary of the views of all respondents (n=385). 
As shown in the table, the median is between 3.58 and 4.24. "VTS assistance m 
reduced visibility condition" has the highest median ( 4.24) and "assistance with 
communication problems" has the lowest median (3.58), however, VTS assistances are 
generally favourably rated by the respondents. 
Views of the services in question are analysed in each question, focusing on the 
different viewpoints by the occupational groups. Figure 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 show the 
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effectiveness indices of VTS service by occupational groups. It shows that VTS 
operators assess the services with slightly more severity than any other group. 
Table 6.12 Summary of views on the effectiveness of VTS 
VTS ASSfSTANCE (0) 
IN REDUCED VISIBILITY 
CONDITIONS ............. 
IN ADVERSE WEATHER 
CONDITIONS ............. 
IN DENSE TRAFFIC AREAS 
IN AREAS CONGESTED WITH 
FISHING OR PLEASURE BOATS .. 
IN RESTRICTED WATERS ... 
IN AREAS WITH VESSELS ACTING 
CONTRARY TO RULES .......... 
TO VESSELS IN EMERGENCY .... 
WITH FOREIGN LANGUAGE 
PROBLEMS, LACK OF EXPERfENCE 
WITH COMMUNICATION 
PROBLEMS ................... 
PROVISfON OF NOTICES TO 
SHIPPING ................... 
Note: (0) No opinion 
(3) Average 
Source: Author 
(I) Very unimportant 
(4) Important 
I 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
I 
2 
0 
(I) (2) (3) 
2 2 10 
I 5 39 
0 2 18 
I 6 30 
0 8 30 
0 5 23 
0 5 23 
0 11 56 
I 14 85 
0 4 25 
(2) Unimportant 
(5) Very important 
(4) (5) Median 
117 253 4.24 
163 177 3.91 
131 234 4.18 
148 200 4.04 
139 208 4.08 
147 210 4.09 
121 236 4.19 
180 137 3.69 
158 125 3.58 
168 188 3.98 
(I) Assistance in reduced visibility conditions: Vessel Traffic Services provide assistance 
in visibility reduced by fog, snow and/or rain. This assistance includes monitoring of 
ships' positions; provision of information on objects and floats; advice offered on request 
or when determined necessary. 
Of all services performed by VTS, assistance in reduced visibility condition is 
perceived as the most important with the highest average index(4.6). Masters/Mates of 
merchant vessel and ferry, pilot/lecturer/surveyors and VTS operators group recognized 
these services as the most important. 
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(2) Assistance in adverse meteorological conditions: Vessel Traffic Services provide 
assistance to vessels in adverse meteorological conditions. This assistance includes 
provision of information on tides and currents; monitoring of ships' positions; provision 
of advice on request or when judged necessary. 
These service are rated average(lO%), important(42%) and very important (46%) 
by the groups. The highest average effectiveness rating for these services comes from 
the VTS operators group and the lowest from masters/mates group. 
(3) Assistance in dense traffic areas: Vessel Traffic Service assists vessels flow in dense 
traffic areas. This assistance includes providing advance traffic information; establishing 
and maintaining radio contact among vessels; warning other traffic of vessel acting 
contrary to regulations or in an unexpected manner; monitoring ship's movement; 
providing advice on the timing of various manoeuvres to assist traffic and/or to avoid a 
potentially hazardous situation. 
These services are rated average(5%), important(34%) and very important (61%) 
by occupational groups. Given their undoubted importance, these services have merited 
a higher effectiveness index that is the highest after that for assistance in reduced 
visibility conditions. Shipowners/maritime organization group recognized these services 
are the most important among all the services. 
( 4) Assistance in areas congested with fishing vessels and pleasure crafts: In areas 
congested with fishing boats and pleasure craft, VTS provides assistance by services such 
as; providing advance information to larger vessels on the presence & avoidance of 
fishing fleets or pleasure vessels; it also provides advance information to fishing boats 
on the approach of larger vessels. 
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Figure 6.1 
Effectiveness Indices of VTS by Occupational grouping (1) 
Masters/Mates 
Group 
Pilot/Lecturer/ 
Surveyors Group 
Government/Port 
Officials Group 
Shipowners & 
Maritime 
organization 
Group 
VTS Operators 
Group 
VTS Assistance in 
reduced Visibility 
condition 
VTS Assistance in 
adverse VVeather 
condition 
VTS Assistance in 
dense Traffic areas 
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These services are rated average(8%), important(38%) and very important (52%) 
by the groups. llhe highest average effectiveness rating for these services comes from 
the pilot/lecturer/surveyors group and the lowest from VTS operators group. 
(5) Assistance in restricted waters: VTS provides assistance to vessels in restricted 
waters, for example, near blind bends, narrow passages, rocks, shoals, shallow waters, 
structure on seabed, bridges and floating objects. These services .consist of providing 
advance notice; and providing traffic information in the area of hazard; and monitoring 
ship's movements so as to regulate the flow of traffic. 
The importance of these services are rated average(8%), important(36%) and very 
important( 54%) by the occupational groups. The highest average effectiveness rating for 
these services comes from the government/port officials group and the lowest from the 
VTS operators group. 
(6) Assistance in areas with vessels acting contrary to rules/regulations: VTS provides 
assistance to vessels acting contrary to rules & regulations such as excessive speed in 
reduced visibility or proceeding in the wrong side of fairway or unmarked waters. These 
services include warnings to other traffic on the presence of rogue vessels. 
These services are rated average(6%), important(38%) and very important (55%) 
by the occupational groups. The highest average effectiveness rating for these services 
comes from the pilot/lecturer/surveyors group and the lowest from VTS operator group. 
Multiple range test was employed to test statistically if there is any significant difference 
between the views of the five occupational groupings. 
According to the multiple comparison procedure, the pilot/lecturer/surveyors group 
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differs from the VTS operators group in the views of the effectiveness in VTS assistance 
to vessels acting contrary to rules & regulations. Differences are marked by an asterisk 
if the significance level is not less than 0.05. No two groups are significantly different 
at 0.05 level in other sub-sets of VTS activities. 
. - . . 
······ONEWAY······· 
Variable EF ROGUE VTS ASSISTANCE FOR THE ROGUE VESSELS 
By Variable GROUP Occupational Group 
Sum of Mean F 
Source D.F. Squares Squares Ratio 
Between Groups 4 5.2917 1.3229 3.0223 
Within Groups 380 166.3343 .4377 
Total 384 171.6260 
Standard Standard 
Group Count Mean Deviation Error 95 Pet Conf Int 
Masters/ 207 4.4300 
Pi lot/Le 36 4.7222 
Governme 34 4. 6471 
Shipowne 41 4.4634 
VTS oper 67 4.3134 
Total 385 4.4597 
Group Minimum Maximum 
Masters/ 2.0000 5.0000 
Pil ot/.Le 4.0000 5.0000 
Governme 3.0000 5.0000 
Shipowne 2.0000 5.0000 
VTS oper 2.0000 5.0000 
Total 2.0000 5.0000 
Multiple Range Test 
Mean Group 
4.3134 VTS oper 
4.4300 Masters/ 
4.4634 Shipowne 
4. 6471 Governme 
4.7222 Pi 1 at/Le 
V M S G P 
T a h o i 
S S i V 1 
t p e o 
o e o r t 
p r w n I 
e s n m L 
r I e e e 
* 
.6853 .0476 4.3360 To 
.4543 .0757 4.5685 To 
. 5971 .1024 4.4387 To 
.6744 .1053 4.2505 To 
.7008 .0856 4.1425 To 
.6685 .0341 4.3927 To 
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F 
Prob. 
.0179 
for Mean 
4.5239 
4.8759 
4.8554 
4.6763 
4.4844 
4.5267 
Figure 6.2 
Effectiveness Indices of VTS by Occupational grouping (2) 
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(7) Assistance rendered to vessels in emergency: VIS assists vessels experiencing 
engine failure, fire on board, loss of control, radar failure, radio failure and any other 
emergency situation. These services consist of identifying the vessel in distress; routeing 
other vessels away from the scene of accident; closely monitoring the situation; providing 
all other required rescue services. 
These services .are rated average(6%), important(31 %) and very important (61 %) 
by the occupational groups. The highest average effectiveness rating for these services 
comes from the government/port officials group and the lowest from VIS operator group. 
Government/port officials group recognized these services are the most important among 
the all services. 
(8) Assistance to vessels with foreign language difficulties, lack of expenence or 
knowledge problems: VIS provides further service m the early identification and 
publicising of vessels whose crews are experiencing language difficulties m their 
communications. 
These services are rated average(15%), important(47%) and very important (36%) 
by the occupational groupings. The lowest average effectiveness rating for these services 
comes from the masters/mates group. 
(9) Assistance with communication problems: As the VIS centre monitors all 
communications, it may provide assistance to vessels having communication difficulties, 
on request or when judged necessary. These services are, repeatedly ranked in the last 
place with lowest average index from all groups. 
Cl 0) Provision of Notices to Shipping: When VIS personnel are made aware of a new 
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Effectiveness Indices of VTS by Occupational grouping (3) 
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hazard to navigation, a Notice to Shipping is passed to the vessels. Theses services are 
rated average(?%), important(44%) and very important(49%) by the groups. 'The highest 
average effectiveness rating for these services comes from the government/port officials 
group and the lowest average effectiveness rating for these services comes from the VTS 
operators group. 
It is acknowledged that perceptions and expert opinions require testing objectively. 
This remains a topic for further study. 
6.8 SUMMARY 
A questionnaire survey was carried out across the board of maritime industry 
including mariners navigating in Korean waters, pilots, shipowners' representatives, 
port/harbour officials, VTS operators and other maritime interests of some 860 persons. 
There were 385 duly completed questionnaires returned by the closing date. 
The risk factor "reduced visibility by fog/snow" is the leading response factor in 
increasing marine risk with "human factors in shiphandling" second. "Greater number 
of pleasure crafts in shipping routes" ranks in the last place. There were some notable 
discrepancies between the views of occupational groups. Generally the VTS operators 
group assesses the risk factors with less weight than any other group. This curiosity may 
be explained by the relatively low shipboard experience and qualification. 
The marginal effectiveness of various options to reduce marine risk was examined. 
"Additional Vessel Traffic Services" received the greatest approval from the respondents 
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seeking to improve .marine safety. And "prohibition of fishing in shipping routes" and 
"additional Traffic Separation Schemes" were ranked in second and third place in 
reducing marine risk. 
In the question of the modification of VTS, almost all respondents deClared that 
the VTS service should be upgraded or implemented where no VTS exists and no 
respondent has the expressed opinion to downgrade or close the service. The majority 
of the respondents agreed that Level Ill or IV are adequate in their area, VTS for the port 
and their approaches is the suitable type. The Port authority is the most acceptable 
formal authority for their VTS. 
In the question of views on the VTS operators' background, experience and 
qualification, the majority of respondents agree that marine experience is essential for 
VTS operators to perform their tasks. The previous experience of shiphandling & 
communication is suggested by the majority of respondents. 
The median with regard to ten sub-sets of VTS services & activities was 
examined in order to provide a measure of the perceived importance and effectiveness 
of YTS activities. The median was between 3.58 and 4.24, "VTS assistance in reduced 
visibility condition" has the highest value (4.24) and "YTS assistance with 
communication problems" the lowest value (3.48). VTS assistances, however, are 
generally favourably rated by the respondents. Views of the services are analysed, 
focusing on the different viewpoints by the occupational groupings. Generally VTS 
operators group assesses the services with slightly more severity than any other group. 
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EFFECTIVENESS OF 
VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICES 
7.1 INTRODUCTIGN 
Chapter 7 
Vessel Traffic Services have been variously defined and exist in a number of 
configurations, but their fundamental objectives are "safety of traffic and efficient traffic 
flow" achieved by providing information and advice on other traffic and navigational 
hazards to the vessels participating iri the system. In some cases the VTS centre has its 
own radar coverage of the waterway and directly maintains surveillance of vessel 
movements with complete communication systems. In other cases the centre will 
maintain the estimated track of vessels based on VHF communication and vessel 
reporting. This latter method is typically termed a Vessel Movement Reporting System 
(Level I),. and other VTS systems are categorized into Basic radar surveillance (Level 11), 
Advanced radar surveillance (Level Ill) and Automatic dependent surveillance (Level IV) 
in the United States Coast Guard study. The candidate VTS level in this study is Level 
Ill technology. 
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The estimation of the effectiveness of Vessel Traffic Services(VTS) is a diverse 
and complex problem. A review of the VTS effectiveness literature covering U.S.A, 
Canadian and European research suggests three potential approaches in estimating 
effectiveness: 
e Simulation of a VTS system; 
e Collection of opinions from experienced mariners and VTS operators; 
e Statistical analysis of casualties in situations "with and without" VTS. 
In the literature there has been some discussion in the use of simulation to address 
VTS effectiveness. This method includes the use of full bridge simulators coupled with 
a simulation of a VTS centre, as well as various forms of mathematical simulation. 
Some work of this type has been done in Europe.P·ll However, such methods are 
nowhere near capable of addressing VTS effectiveness in the overall context of this 
study. 
Synthesis of expert opinion, to collect the opinions of experienced mariners and 
VTS operators, has been used in the Canadian Coast Guard Study 17-21 , COST 301 Study 
17
-
31 and U.S. Coast Guard Study 1741 in connection with the estimation of the 
effectiveness of varying levels of VTS in different waterway types. Responses to the 
questionnaire used in connection with this aspects of COST 30 I show large variations, 
Even the discussions within COST 301 with VTS operators and other marine experts 
have confirmed that opinions on VTS effectiveness are highly subjective. Pilots are, as 
expected from the Canadian Coast Guard Study report, more pessimistic about the 
potential value of VTS in reducing collision and stranding rates than other occupational 
groupmgs. 
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Another method used to estimate the effectiveness of VTS is statistical analysis 
of casualties in situations "with and without" VTS. This method has been used in the 
COST 301 study.l1·51 A simplified fault tree analysis was used to indicate the complex 
relationships between factors. The causal relationships were collected and analyzed using 
a block scheme. The sequence of events relevant to the casualty is traced by connecting 
the appropriate blocks with lines. The effect of each factor upon the casualty is 
measured by a weighting coefficient. The study pointed out that usually a maritime 
casualty can be seen as a dynamic sequence of certain events in the controlloop(s) which 
results in poor control of the process, or the breaking of the control loop. 
The authors, however, feel there is a limitation in assessing the effectiveness of 
VTS by casualty analysis alone. In general, they conclude that all studies on causal 
factors of casualties are based on limited information collected after the casualties. This 
information does not usually cover the general situation in time or place. Therefore, the 
most important feature of the "ship plus VTS" system cannot be quantified. The effect 
of the VTS on the ship environment and time-dependent causal factors can not be 
studied. Although an analysis of VTS effects using the existing casualty data can 
consider tactical interactions by a VTS, but the positive effect of strategic planning of 
VTS can not be considered in full. 17·61 
The primary objective of the effectiveness analysis in this chapter is to determine 
the expected percentage of the "addressable" casualties that could be prevented with the 
introduction of some form of VTS. Figure 7.1 provides an overview of this analysis. 
In simplified form, it determines the YTS benefits by multiplying casualty rate reduction 
factors by the effect level of causal factors. This method is a new approach to quantify 
the YTS effectiveness unlike any other earlier studies. Combining the casualty rate 
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reduction factors with the effect level of causal factors, it produces more rational index 
of the effectiveness than the only synthesis opinion of expert or statistical an'alysis. This 
approach could reduce the overestimation of the percentage of the benefit by the another 
filtering process (selection of VTS addressable factors). 
As shown in Figure 7.1 the development of the casualty rate reduction factors was 
based on a synthesis of expert opinion in Chapter 6 and the estimation procedure in 
section 7.5, and the development of effect levels was based on the casualty analysis using 
functional block diagram in Chapter 4. 
The casualties were based on the Written Verdicts by Marine Accident Inquiry 
Agency. From this a subset of "VTS addressable" causal factors was determined based 
on a detailed review of the Verdicts narratives. The "addressable" causal factors 
consisted of those where it was initially felt that a VTS system had at least some 
potential to prevent the accident from occurring. That a casualty was "addressable" did 
not mean that a VTS could prevent it with I 00 percent probability. 
The causal factors of the casualties in the data base are constructed for Korean 
waters using the above-mentioned functional block diagram procedure in Chapter 4. As 
a result, the effect levels of the causal factors were obtained. These results will form the 
basis for an estimation of the effectiveness of VTS. 
7.2 LITERATURE SURVEY RELATED TO VTS EFFECTIVENESS 
7.2.1 RISK ASSESSMENT -PROBLEM AREA IDENTIFIER 17·'1 
A further questionnaire was designed to assess the effectiveness of various levels 
of VTS systems on the collision and stranding(groundings) rate. 
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Figure 7.1 Overview of VTS Effectiveness Analysis 
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The questionnaire was personally administrated by researchers to mariners (mainly 
ship masters) with experience in a variety ofEuropean waters. The COST 301 study 
team felt that the best way to gather estimates was from personally administrating the 
questionnaires to the subjects to ensure they fully understood the questions. 
From the questionnaire results (Table 7.1) the study noted three main conclusions 
related to the effectiveness of YTS on collision rates. 
• The more complex the shore support facilities become, the less difference there 
is between the effectiveness ratings. 
• The results suggest that experienced mariners see little or no benefit in terms 
of risk reduction in the introduction of a control service rather than an information 
service. 
• The maximum benefit to be obtained through the introduction of a YTS system 
is approximately 60 percent overall. 
The study then weights collision effectiveness by relative proportion of the 
different types of encounters (meeting, crossing and overtaking). For areas with a normal 
mix of the various types of encounters, the mean collision reduction rate was estimated 
to be approximately 0.5 for a YTS system with radar surveillance but no transponder 
identification. 
The questionnaire results of the potential effectiveness of defined levels of 
YTS in reducing stranding rates are illustrated in Table 7.2. The study recognises two 
points of interest: 
• The results are consistent with those for collision rates in that the subjects see 
only a small benefit in terms of risk reduction in the introduction of a control 
service rather than an information service at either of the YTS levels. 
• The maximum benefit which is likely to be obtained through the introduction 
of any Yl'S system is estimated to be 55 percent. 
The report also points out that the potential benefits of YTS for reducing stranding 
rates is somewhat less than for reducing collision rates. 
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Table 7.1 
Estimated Effect of VTS on Collision Rate based on 
Expert Opinion from Research under the COST 301 Progranune 
Estimated Reduction of 
Collision Rate 
Shore Support Level Meeting 
International Collision 
Regulations Only 0 
IMO Traffic Separation .68 
Vessel Traffic Information 
Service based on a Ship 
Reporting System .47 
Vessel Traffic Information 
Service based on Ship 
Reporting & Surveillance .57 
Vessel Traffic Information 
based on Transponder 
Identification, Location 
and Information Exchange .61 
Vessel Traffic Control 
Service based on a Ship 
Reporting System .44 
Vessel Traffic Control 
Service based on Ship 
Reporting & Surveillance .53 
Vessel Traffic Control 
Service based on 
Transponder Identification, 
Location and Information 
Exchange .58 
Crossing Overtaking 
0 0 
. 25 . 04 
. 33 . 22 
. 45 . 32 
. 52 . 42 
. 42 . 30 
. 45 . 39 
.54 .51 
Source: KEMP J.F., GOODWIN E.M. and PICK K. (1986). Risk 
Assessment - Problem Area Identifier. COST 301 
Final Report on Task 2. 46. 
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Table 7.2 
Estimated Effect of Shore Support on Stranding Rate based on 
Expert Opinion under the COST 301 Programme 
Estimated Reduction of 
Shore Support Level Stranding Rate 
Existing Level of 
Lighthouse and Buoyage 
and Statutory On-Board 
Equipment 0 
Enhanced Level of 
Lighthouse and Buoyage .25 
Accurate Radio Navigation 
Aid Coverage (i.e., Decca 
Navigator or Loran C) with 
Compulsory Carriage of Equipment 
on Ships .44 
IMO Traffic Separation .29 
Vessel Traffic Information 
Service based on a Ship Reporting 
System with Radar Surveillance .40 
Vessel Traffic Information 
Service based on Transponder 
Identification, Location, and 
Information Exchange .49 
Vessel Traffic Control Service 
based on Ship Reporting System 
with Radar Surveillance .45 
Vessel Traffic Control Service 
based on Transponder 
Identification, Location, 
and Information Exchange .55 
Source: KEMP J.F., GOODWIN E.M. and PICK K. (1986). Risk 
Assessment Problem Area Identifier. COST 301 
Final Report on Task 2.46. 
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7.2.2 NATIONAL VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICES STUDY, CANADIAN COAST 
GUARD, 198417-81 
This study, conducted to measure the costs and benefits of the Canadian YTS, is 
one of the main documents specifically addressing the effectiveness of YTS. The level 
of system sophistication and the·geographical configuration ofthe waterway were the key 
factors considered in the development of a detailed model of YTS costs and benefits. 
Four different waterway configurations and a number of alternative YTS system 
configurations are suggested for the estimation of the effectiveness of YTS. The four 
waterway types are; 
11 Open simple waterways (i.e., an open bay or wide strait), 
11 Open complex waterways (i.e., an approach to a busy harbour), 
11 Confined simple waterways (i.e., a river) and 
11 Confined complex waterways (i.e., a harbour). 
Different YTS system features include; 
11 Traffic Separation Schemes (TSS); 
11 Movement Restriction Regulations (MRR); 
11 Bridge-to"Bridge VHF reporting at designated points (BIB); 
11 Ship-to-Shore VHF communications and information exchange plus 
simulated vessel tracking (S/S); 
11 Ship-to-Shore VHF communications and information exchange plus 
simulated radar surveillance supplemented by computerized target tracking, 
interactive target analysis, hazard warning, and data storage and retrieval 
(SIR+). 
Estimates of YTS effectiveness in terms of the percent reduction in accidents for 
"YTS addressable" collisions, groundings, or strikings were developed using the 
knowledge and experience of a team of personnel with marine-related backgrounds. 
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Table 7.3 
VTS Effectiveness for Addressable Casualties 
based on Canadian National VTS Study 
(Percent Reduction in Casualties) 
Open Waters Confined Waters 
Simple Complex Simple Complex 
Traffic Traffic Traffic Traffic 
Pattern Pattern Pattern Pattern 
(OC) (OC) (CS) (CC) 
VTS System 
B/B Bridge-to-Bridge 
without TSS/MRR 12 10 15 10 
with TSS/MRR 35 25 20 15 
S/S Ship-to-Shore 
without TSS/MRR 35 20 40 30 
with TSS/MRR 40 30 45 35 
S/R S/S plus Basic 
Radar Surveillance 
without TSS/MRR 45 50 45 50 
with TSS/MRR 55 55 55 65 
S/R+ S/R plus Automated 
Analysis 
without TSS/MRR 55 65 50 55 
with TSS/MRR 65 70 60 70 
Note: TSS: stands for Traffic Separation Scheme 
MRR: stands for Movement Restriction Regulations 
Source: Canadian Coast Guard (1984). Vessel Traffic 
Services, Final Report. 
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These persons consisted of former mariners, VTS regulators and consultants, as well as 
Coast Guard management. The results are illustrated in Table 7.3 by type of waterway 
and level of VTS service. According to Table 7.3, the various levels of VTS 
effectiveness in reducing accidents were estimated to range from 15 to 70 percent. When 
applied to the whole existing Canadian VTS systems the mean VTS effectiveness was 
approximated to be about 43.3 percent. 
A VTS update studyl7•91 was completed in 1988 by Government Consulting 
Group(GCG) for the Canadian Coast Guard. The same benefit/cost approach, employing 
a risk assessment framework, was used as the study completed in 1984. Both 1984 
National VTS Study and 1988 VTS Update Study derived VTS risk reduction 
effectiveness percentages for four levels of service and for four types of waterways. 
Table 7.4 shows the results of the study. The VTS effectiveness in reducing casualties 
was estimated to range from 15 to 75 percent. The ship-to-ship system without a shore-
based VTS centre is not shown in Table 7.4. 
Table 7.4 VTS Effectiveness percentage used in the 1988 Update Study 
LEVEL OF VTS OPEN WATERS CONFINED WATERS 
SIMPLE COMPLEX SIMPLE COMPLEX 
VHF Only 25 15 40 20 
Basic Radar 55 60 50 55 
Advanced Radar 65 75 55 60 
Source: Canadian Coast Guard, 1991 VTS Update Study, p.14 
7.2.3 USCG - PORT NEEDS STUDY (VTS BENEFITS), 1991 17·IOJ 
This study was undertaken to estimate the benefits and costs of potential U.S. 
Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) in selected U.S. deep draft ports on the 
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Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Coasts. The level of VTS perfonnance, casualty type, vessel 
size and the waterway type were the primary factors considered in the development of 
a detailed model of VTS costs and benefits. The casualty risk model divides the 23 
study zones into six waterway types (Sub-zone type). These consists of: 
A. Open approach (i.e., entrance from sea) 
B. Convergence area (converging of major traffic lanes or channels) 
C. Open harbour or bay 
D. Enclosed harbour 
E. Constricted waterway (i.e., narrow passages with blind turns) 
F. River 
Three levels of VTS service have been defined, for which the effectiveness of 
VTS is estimated in combination with other factors (i.e., casualty type, waterway type, 
and vessel size). Two of the levels represent the technologies applied as part of the 
candidate VTS design (Level I & Ill). 
• Level I A Vessel Movement Reporting System cons1stmg of VHF 
communication and various vessel reporting waypoints. No radar 
surveillance is included 
• Level 11 The VMRS of Level I coupled with basic radar surveillance. The 
radar technology was assumed to be a standard shipboard radar 
without" advanced features. 
• Level Ill This system includes complete communication plus an state-of-the-
art VTS radar surveillance system. This level represents the new 
Coast Guard Candidate VTS Design. 
Three focus groups were fonned to assess the effectiveness that varwus 
configurations of VTS systems would have in reducing casualties to vessels, including 
collisions, groundings and rarnmings. The objective of these focus groups was to provide 
detailed quantitative estimates of the effectiveness of alternative VTS system in reducing 
vessel accidents for a number of specific accident scenarios. These effectiveness 
estimates take the form of the percentage reduction in casualties for particular vessel 
accident scenarios. The focus groups each contained five or six individuals, each with 
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some combination of deep draft vessel navigation experience, vessel traffic service 
experience and knowledge of the circumstance that have attended recent vessel casualties 
and/or 'near misses'. 
Table 7.5 YTS Effectiveness Factors 
SUBZONE TYPES SUBZONE TYPES 
A B OR C D E OR F 
VTS VTS VTS VTS 
LEVEL LEVEL LEVEL LEVEL 
I I I I I Ill 
LARGE AND MEDIUM VESSELS 
COLLISIONS 
TWO VTS PARTICIPANTS .11 .68 .19 .52 
ONE VTS PARTICIPANT .00 .27 .00 .27 
RAMMING 
NAV AIDS .00 .00 .00 .00 
OTHER .22 .43 .22 .36 
GROUNDING 
SHOAL .10 .20 .10 .20 
OTHER .05 .46 .05 .25 
SMALL VESSELS 
COLLISIONS 
TWO VTS PARTICIPANTS .13 .65 .18 .55 
ONE VTS PARTICIPANT .00 .27 .00 .27 
RAMMING 
NAV AIDS .00 .00 .00 .00 
OTHER .25 .50 .20 .38 
GROUNDING 
SHOAL .10 .20 .10 .20 
OTHER .06 .51 .02 .25 
Source: US. Coast Guard (1991). Port Needs Study (VTS Benefits) 
Table 7.5 presents a matrix of YTS effectiveness factors (i.e., casualty reduction 
factors) for the candidate YTS design. The study applies Levels I and Ill effectiveness 
factors to the forecasted NO-YTS case vessel casualties in each study sub-zone to 
estimate the avoided casualties attributable to the candidate design. The study applies 
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the factors by casualty type, vessel size, and sub-zone type to each of the 99 sub-zones. 
The VTS effectiveness factor for each of these VTS levels, casualty types and 
vessel sizes represents a judgement call. The VTS effectiveness factor matrix is the 
product of combining the results of recent published international research on VTS 
effectiveness with the results of a series of three Focus Group panel sessions conducted 
as part of this project, and application to the "VTS Addressable Casualties" from the 
Coast Guard historical file of vessel casualties. 
7.2.4 1991 VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICES UPDATE STUDY, CANADA 17·111 
Comments received after the 1988 VTS Update Study reference indicated that the 
effectiveness percentages shown in Table 7.4 were probably appropriate for VTS 
collision prevention, but were perhaps a little generous for groundings, particularly in 
river situations. Since the study was completed, the U.S. Coast Guard Port Needs Study, 
conducted by Volpe National Transportation Systems Centre, contracted A.T.Kearney, 
Inc. to review this whole area. Their study report reviewed the literature and concluded 
that the use of a focus group was the most viable approach for developing this system. 
The resulting VTS effectiveness numbers were divided into three major casualty types: 
collisions, groundings and rammings(strikings). 
The major differences between the 1988 study values and the A.T. Kearney 
effectiveness percentages for collisions relate to the VHF Only option. There are also 
some slight differences between the numbers for simple and advanced radar in confined 
waterways. A compromise between the two sets of numbers would result in the modified 
YTS effectiveness percentages for collisions between participating vessels, for various 
casualty type. 1he V1S effectiveness percentages used in this study are summarized in 
Tables 7.6, 7.7 and 7.8. 
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Comparing these with Table 7.4, it is apparent that some of the revised 
percentages in Table 7.6 are lower than those used in the 1988 study. Similarly, the 
revised effectiveness percentages in Table 7.8 pertaining to all groundings are also lower 
for the VHF Only option; however, they are higher by about 15 percent for the Basic and 
Advanced Radar options in open waterways. Overall, the changes to the VTS 
effectiveness percentages are not significant, although they may be considered to improve 
the quantification of VTS effectiveness. 
Table 7.6 Modified VTS Effectiveness Percentage for Collisions and 
Strikings involving participating vessels 
OPEN WATERS CONFINED WATERS 
LEVEL OF VTS SIMPLE COMPLEX SIMPLE COMPLEX 
VHF Only 20 10 35 IS 
Basic Radar 55 60 45 50 
Advanced Radar 65 75 55 60 
Source: Canadian .__oast Guard, 1991 V18 Uvdate Stud1 . p yp . 20 
Table 7. 7 Modified VTS Effectiveness Percentage for Non-participating 
vessels Colliding with Participating vessels 
OPEN WATERS CONFINED WATERS 
LEVEL OF VTS SIMPLE COMPLEX SIMPLE COMPLEX 
VHF Only 15 10 30 10 
Basic Radar 40 45 35 40 
Advanced Radar 50 55 40 45 
Source: Canadian Coast Guard, 1991 VTS Uodate Stud1 , p y p .20 
Table 7.8 Modified VTS Effectiveness Percentage for all Groundings 
of participating vessels 
OPEN WATERS CONFINED WATERS 
LEVEL OF VTS SIMPLE COMPLEX SIMPLE COMPLEX 
VHF Only 10 5 20 10 
Basic Radar 65 70 45 50 
Advanced Radar 75 85 55 60 
Source: Canadian Coast Guard, 1991 VTS U. date Stud , p yp .20 
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7.2.5 SURVEY ON VESSEL TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS l7-121 
The second survey on 'Vessel Traffic Management systems and Brieflntroduction 
to Marine Traffic Studies' was carried out by Fujii, Yamanouchi and Matsui in 1982 
(published in 1984). The survey was based on response from 21 countries covering 246 
VTSs and they summarized the reported gains: 
I. Accident rate in fog was 1.1 per I ,000 trips in the New Rotterdam Waterway 
and it has decreased to 0.3 after the introduction of a VTS. 
2. The average number of collisions per year in the St. Lawrence Seaway was 
12 and operation of VTS resulted in a decrease to 3. 
3. Loss due to delays in the Elbe Waterway in fog was alleviated by 3 million 
US dollars per year and a collision rate has decreased by half after the 
introduction of a radar chain. 
4. The number of head-on collisions in the Dover Straits was 50 in five years 
which has decreased to 32 after the introduction of Traffic Separation Scheme, 
and then to 7 after the establishment of a traffic surveillance system. The number 
of all collisions in these three five-year periods were 69, 53 and 24. 
5. The introduction of traffic routes in Tokyo Bay and establishment of VTS 
resulted in three years the following decrease in the number of casualties: all 
vessels, collisions 42, 20, 14 and groundings 49, 27, 9; vessels over 3,000 ton 
gross collisions 10, 6, I, groundings 13, 8, I. 
7.2.6 VESSEL TRAFFIC SYSTEMS: ANALYSIS OF PORT NEEDS P-!31 
This study, undertaken as a follow-on effort to the U.S. Coast Guard Vessel 
Traffic Systems - Issue Study (March 1973), presented an analysis of port needs for 
vessel traffic systems; and recommended the priority by which these needs should be 
addressed. The overall purpose of this study was to rank 23 ports of the U.S. in order 
of their VTS needs. The ports were selected for analysis on the basis of tonnage of 
cargo handled, number of vessel transits, and number of vessels involved in collisions, 
rammings, and groundings (C/R/G) over a four year period (1969-72). 
195 
Chapter 7 
As part of this study, I ,827 collisions, rammmg, and grounding casualties 
(involving 3,921 vessels) were analyzed. The circumstances of each casualty were 
examined in a case-by-case analysis to determine which accidents could have been 
prevented by VTS and what level of VTS would have been required. Table 7.9 
summarizes the estimated reduction in vessel accidents by the different levels of VTS 
after casualty analysis. 
Table 7.9 Estimated reduction in vessel accidents by VTS service level 
VTS Service Level Collision, Ramming, Collision only 
or Grounding 
Bridge to Bridge 10% 21% 
Radiotelephone 
Regulations 13% 21% 
Traffic Separation Schemes 12% 24% 
Vessel Movement Reporting 23% 49% 
System 
Basic Radar Surveillance 30% 60% 
Advanced Radar 32% 65% 
Surveillance 
Automated Advanced 31% 65% 
Surveillance 
Source: U.S. Coast Guard, 1973. Vessel Tra tc S stems: Anal sis o y if Port Needs, 
Final report 
7.2.7 CASUALTY ANALYSIS OF SELECTED WATERWAYS, 1978 11-• 41 
As described in Section 7.2.6, the Analysis of Port Needs study analyzed the 
greatest number of reported marine casualties during fiscal years 1969 through 1972. 
The purpose of this paper is to update the analysis of several ports and waterways in 
light of marine casualties that have been reported during fiscal years 1973 through 1976. 
The selected areas are those listed on the original analysis. They are Delaware Bay, 
Chesapeake Bay, Tampa Bay, and two segments of the Gulflntracoastal Waterway West, 
Mile 50-130 and Mile 260-290. 
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There are six levels of YTS that could be prescribed for a given casualty. They 
are same as the levels of YTS in Section 7.2.6 except the last level of YTS (Automated 
Advanced Surveillance). 
(a) Delaware Bay: In this area, the casualty analysis (112 casualties) assumed that the 
Traffic Separation Scheme extends from the Bay entrance to the city of Trenton, a 
distance of approximately 120 miles of coverage. It was estimated that 32 accidents out 
of 112 could have been preventable through YTS (28.6%). 
(b) Chesapeake Bay: It was assumed that the levels of YTS employing radar would only 
provided coverage at the entrance TSS, Thimble Shoals Channel, Hampton Roads and 
the ports therein. In this zone, it was estimated that 28.4 percent of the casualties could 
have been prevented by the presence of a YTS. 
(c) Tampa Bay: In this case, the casualty analysis assumed that YTS having radar 
capability extended to all areas of the Bay navigable by deep draft vessels. It was judged 
that 53 casualties of 159 could have been prevented by YTS (33.3%). 
(d) Gulf Intracoastal Waterway West Miles 50-130: It was assumed that all YTS levels 
could be applied to all the waterways interfacing this Mile 50-130 section of the Gulf 
Intracoastal Waterway. It suggested that approximately 28.4 percent of the casualties 
could have been preventable by YTS. 
(e) Gulf Intracoastal Waterway West Miles 260-290: In this case, it was assumed that 
all levels of YTS could be extended over the entire waterway complex. It was estimated 
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that approximately 40.3 percent of the casualties could have been preventable by YTS. 
Table 7.10 shows the YTS preventable percentage of accidents from the five study 
areas. 
Table 7.10 Estimated Percentage of Accidents Preventable by YTS 
Study Area Percent VTS Preventable 
Delaware Bay 29% 
Chesapeake Bay 28% 
Tampa Bay 33% 
Gulf Intracoastal Waterway West 
Miles 50-130 28% 
Miles 260-290 40% 
Average Preventable Accidents 32% 
Source: ECKER W.J (1978), Casualty Analysis of Selected Waterways 
7.2.8 TRENDS IN NAVIGATION SAFETY IN THE DOVER STRAIT, 1978.11-151 
Johnson analyzed the time trends of collision incidents over 15 years ( 1962-1977) 
in the Dover Straits. The Dover Straits Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) was introduced 
in 1967 and the Channel Navigation Information Service (CNIS) in 1972. 
Table 7.11 Summary of Collisions over 15 years in the Dover Strait 
Pre Routeing IMO Routeing Routeing with 
Surveillance and 
Infonnation Service 
MID 62 - MID 67 MID 67 - MID 72 MID 72 ~ MiD 77 
All Waters All Waters Main All Main 
Lanes Waters Laries 
All Collisions 69 53 32 24 11 
Ships on 50 32 16 7 I 
Opposing 
Course 
Source: JOHNSON D.R.(/978). Recent Trends in Navigation Safety in the Dover 
Strait. Proc. Third International Symposium on Marine Traffic Service 
198 
Chapter 7 
From the Table 7.11 it is apparent that over the five year period following the 
introduction of the TSS there were 23 percent fewer collision than in the previous five 
years. Sixty percent of the collisions occurred in the main traffic lanes during the period. 
During the next five year period, when the TSS routeing scheme was supported by the 
CNIS, there was a further 55 percent of reduction in the number of collisions. 46 percent 
of the collisions occurred in the traffic lanes. The reduction of collisions in the traffic 
lanes indicates that the traffic surveillance has an effect on navigational safety. 
7.2.9 SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF WATERWAY NETWORK IN TOKYO BAY 
AREA !7-16117-171 
For the maritime safety in Japanese water, the Maritime Traffic Safety Law 
(MTSL) was enacted in 1973, by which routeing in congested waters was established. 
The Tokyo Bay Traffic Advisory Centre was also established in 1975 and its operation 
started in 1977. The authors examined the time trend of the number of traffic accidents 
in the Tokyo Bay to evaluate the effectiveness of the traffic services. 
Table 7.12 Tokyo Bay Percent Index of Historical Accidents 
Time Period Collision Grounding Total 
1969- I 972 - Base 100% 100% 100% 
1973-1976 - TSS 85% 77% 82% 
1977-1982 - YTS 58% 55% 57% 
Source: FUJII Y & KAKU S. (1981), KURODA K. & KJTA H. (1990) 
From the data according to the authors, it is apparent that over the five year 
period following the introduction of the TSS there were 15 percent fewer collision and 
23 percent grounding than in the previous five years. After the Tokyo Bay Traffic 
Advisory Centre became operational, there was a further 32 percent of reduction in the 
number of collisions. During the same period vessel groundings were reduced another 
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29 percent and the overall accident rate was reduced by 30 percent. 
The nationwide accident reduction during the period of 1977-82, however, was 
far less than for the Tokyo Bay; eight percent in the number of collisions and 13 percent 
in groundings. Accordingly it is apparent that the implementation of the Maritime 
J:raffic Safety Law and the Tokyo VTS were beneficial in reducing the number of 
accidents in Tokyo Bay. 
7.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF YTS 
An internationally agreed definition of a Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) is: 
any service implemented by a competent authority, designed to improve 
safety and efficiency of traffic and the protection of the environment. It 
may range from the provision of simple information messages to extensive 
management of traffic within a port or waterway 17-I&J 
VTS is a relatively recent addition to marine navigational aids and was originally 
applied to port approaches and provided shore-based navigational information to ships 
in the restricted approach waterways. World War 11 had seen the advent of Radar and 
VHF radio, making electronic surveillance and communication by voice efficient and 
easy 17.191. Therefore it was hardly surprising that, in 1948, the world's first harbour 
surveillance was installed, overlooking the approach to the Port of Liverpool. The 
facility was supplemented by the use of portable VHF radio equipment. From this 
beginning, a wide variety of VTS has developed. Some facilities are to this day quite 
simple, being limited to the ability to broadcast routine general information. At the other 
extreme, highly complex traffic management centres exist. 
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At the latter centres, computers process and analyze not only the radar signals but a host 
of other data relevant to the movement of traffic in the area. 
A VTS system might be required to perform functions ranging from the simple 
provision of routine information to the complex regulation of traffic. The specified role 
will govern the type of facility. 
Vessel traffic services need not be limited to port and harbour areas but are also 
found associated with some traffic separation scheme (TSS). For example, in the case 
of the Dover Strait TSS, the Channel Navigation Information Service (CNIS) operates 
radar surveillance, broadcasts navigation information and .co-ordinates a ship movement 
reporting scheme (MAREP) from the British side. A complementary service is operated 
by the French authorities from Cap Oris Nez. 17-201 
The rationale for the provision of this new type of service was to expedite the safe 
movement of shipping in congested waters and the use of VTS has extended from ports 
to waterways. Many nations have developed some form of VTS system. 
U.S. Vessel Traffic Services dates back to 1952 with the establishment of the St. 
Mary's River control system between Lake Superior and Lake Huron. In 1968, the Coast 
Guard began a prototype Harbour Advisory Radar (HAR) experiment in the San 
Francisco Bay area 17-211 and the first VTS system was placed in San Francisco in 1972. 
The Vessel Traffic Services programme of the Canadian Coast Guard has its roots 
in the twin concerns over the significant number of marine accidents taking place in 
Canadian waters in the 1960 · s, and the growing public awareness of the potential 
consequences of major environmental damage from shipping casualties. It commenced 
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m 1967 with the establishment of the first VTS centre in Quebec City, and expanded 
rapidly to become a national programme. 17•221 
The Channel Navigation Information Service (CNIS) for the English Channel had 
been started at stations at Dover in 1972 and at Oris Nez in 1973 17-231, and the Thames 
River Navigation Service, operated by the Port of London Authority, was originally 
established using VHF radio in 1959. 
Rotterdam VTS has been functional since 1957, and the Marine Traffic Control 
system at Le Havre, France was established in 1973 as a radar based system. 
In 1973, Maritime Safety Agency (MSA) of Japan established a harbour traffic 
control system at Kawasaki and later at the port of Yokohama. This is a completely 
television surveyed marine traffic control system using 10 CCTV cameras and one radar 
display to cover most of the navigable water in the approach of the harbour. MSA 
introduced VTS into Tokyo Bay in 1977, and started the practical use ofVTS in the Seto 
Inland Sea in 1987_P-241 
Korea Maritime and Port Administration introduced a Vessel Movement Reporting 
System (VMRS) at Pusan in 1978, and extended the service to all major ports thereafter. 
The Level II (VHF communication with basic radar surveillance) VTS service is provided 
in the port of Pusan, Inchon & Ulsan and the Level Ill (Advanced radar surveillance) in 
the port Pohang from January 1993. And the Level I (VMRS) service is in the port of 
Pyongtak, Masan/Chungmoo/Samcheonpo, Tonghae/Mukho, Kunsan/Daechun, 
Mokpo/Wando, Yosu and Cheju/Seoguipo using MF, SSB and VHF for 24 hours m 
operation except Pyongtak and Samcheonpo as can be seen on Figure 5.1. 
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7.4 VTS ADDRESSABLE CASUALTY AND CAUSAL FACTOR 
Numerous casualties occur within the harbours, ports and coastal waters of Korea, 
but only a few are VTS addressable. Clearly VTS does reduce risk, but it is not a 
panacea. Many casualties are caused by actions or events on board ship that cannot be 
addressed by VTS, such as fire, explosion and shift of cargo. Mechanical casualties such 
as power failure, loss of propulsion or steering are not VTS addressable, yet may lead 
to situations where an operating VTS will benefit other traffic in the water by informing 
of the existing navigational risk, and preventing subsequent casualties. This includes 
notification and possible redirection oftraffic in the vicinity.!7"251 Berthing and docking 
manoeuvres resulting in ramming of lock walls, docks, or moored vessels are not VTS 
preventable. Similarly groundings in narrow channels caused by bank suction and slight 
heading errors are not VTS addressable. In narrow channels, a casualty may occur 
before significant deviation can be determined by VTS. 
Many dynamic casualties (i.e., collisions, groundings, and rarnmings) are 
potentially avoidable with a VTS operating in a port zone, and when one or more of the 
vessels participate. Open water collisions between two vessels caused by surprise, poor 
visibility, or simple miscalculation are classic examples of VTS addressable casualties. 
Collision avoidance, however, may be contingent, upon full communications, advance 
advisories to the vessels, and the ability of the vessels to react in sufficient time to avert 
a casualty .17.261 
An analysis was undertaken in Chapter 4 of all casualties that occurred in VTS 
study areas from 1986-1990. Using the selection criteria for a VTS addressable casualty, 
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381 ship-casualties were identified involving in collision, grounding, ramming and 
foundering incidents. Several international studies 17•271 agree that such accidents, other 
than foundering, are generally VTS addressable (foundering incidents are included in this 
study). Even so it will not bias the final result through another filtering procedure(VTS 
addressable causal factors). 
Many international studies agree that human error is the primary cause of all 
casualties. Whether the reason for this error is inattention, fatigue, mistakes in judgement 
(perhaps resulting from weather, hydrographic or traffic density factors), high-risk 
manoeuvres, or a lack of knowledge or experience, the underlying cause will be a lack 
of complete information on the bridge about what is happening around the vessel. 
Clearly, the mariner stands a better chance of making the correct decision if he has as 
much information as possible. The fundamental VTS role in reducing risk lies in their 
ability to provide the mariner with complete, accurate and timely information. 17-281 
Common causes of VTS addressable casualties include human error, restrictive 
hydrographic conditions, adverse environmental or weather conditions, and insufficient 
regulatory guidance. Clearly the following causal factors are VTS addressable; 
• reduced visibility by fog/mist/snow/etc 
11 excessive speed under the circumstance 
11 sailed on wrong side of fairway or in unmarked waters 
Factors such as: "no officer on the bridge or watchkeeper under other tasks", 
"physical/mental health condition of watchkeeper", "loss of propulsion or steering" and 
"accidental failure including electricity blackout, broken mooring rope and fracture of 
ship structure" are generally not VTS preventable. 
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7.5 ESTIMA 'FION OF VTS EFFECTIVENESS 
In the estimation of VTS effectiveness procedure used in this study the following 
assumptions and limitations are applied: 
(a) Collisions, groundings, rammings and founderings are the only types of casualties 
considered in this study. It is assumed therefore that a VTS does not effect other 
types of casualties. 
(b) The estimation of V17S effectiveness is based on existing aids including: 
· Vessel Movement Reporting System (VMRS); 
· Traffic Separation Schemes (TSS); and 
· Conventional aids - lights, buoys, ranges and loran. 
Therefore the casualties already prevented by existing VTS systems are not 
considered. 
(c) The VTS level and effectiveness in the waters under consideration is assumed to 
be Level Ill (Advanced radar surveillance) system, and consequently only one 
level of VTS is evaluated. 
The causal factors of the casualties in the data base have been analysed using the 
evaluation procedure described in Section 4.3. As a result, the effect level of the causal 
factors has been obtained. l!hese results form the basis for the estimation of the 
effectiveness of VTS. 
The perceived importance and effectiveness of VTS activities which have been 
developed from the answers in Section 6. 7 form the risk reduction rates in the following 
procedure. 
l) The possible effect of a VTS on a each activity (10 sub-sets) is expressed with 
a positive coefficient 8. The value of 8 = 0 indicates that VTS would have totally 
eliminated the causal factors contained in the activity. The value of 8 = I 
indicates that VTS would not have had any effect on the causal factors and 
intermediate values of 8 are used. The effect of each VTS activity upon the 
casualty is measured by its coefficient. The values of weight coefficients are 
determined according to the following table. 
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Category of the VTS activity Weight coefficient 
Very unimportant I 
Unimportant 0.8 
Average 0.6 
Important 0.4 
Very Important 0.2 
2) The formula }:nO/n, n is the number of respondents, yields the casualty 
reduction rate to each of the activity from the Table 6.12 in Section 6.7. For 
example, the rate of the "VTS assistance in reduced visibility condition" is 0.28 
from the formula and the table. 
VTS addressable causal factors are classified into ten sub-sets of VTS activities. 
For example, the causal factor "reduced visibility by fog/snow/etc" is classified into the 
activity sub-set "VTS assistance in reduced visibility condition", and "breakdown of 
navigation equipment" is categorized into "VTS assistance rendered to vessels m 
emergency", and etc. 
The weight coefficients of the causal factors multiplied by their os generate new 
collections of weight factors where the effects of a VTS are taken into account. For 
these collections new sets of effect levels can be calculated in the way explained in 
Section 4.3. The difference between the original and new sets is the total effectiveness 
of a VTS in reducing casualties. 
A simplified example : 
On the basis of casualty sequence and other information. relevant causal factors 
have been found out and their effect levels are given in the first column in the 
case a collision accident. Separately, for each relevant causal factor. possible 
effect of VTS is considered. Numerical value for this effect o is then estimated 
according to the procedure which are explained above. Product of o and the effect 
level produces the new effect level in the last column. 
Causa 1 factor E/L 0 New E/L 
Reduced visibility by fog 0.25 0.28 0.07 
Excessive speed under the circumstance 0.25 0.31 0.08 
Narrow channel 0.25 0.32 0.08 
Small ships on fairway 0.25 0.32 0.08 
Did not fix position regularly 0.5 1 0.5 
Sailed on wrong side of fairway 0.75 0.31 0.23 
Did not use every equipment available 0.5 1 0.5 
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The procedure was applied to the all casualties considered m this study, and then 
estimates the effectiveness. According to these results, the maximum benefit to be 
obtained through the introduction of a VTS system is approximately 46 percent overall. 
The collision reduction rate was estimated to be approximately 50 percent for a VTS 
system with advanced radar surveillance, and 47 percent of grounding and 36 percent of 
ramming accidents could be reduced by an introduction of VTS. However, only 21 
percent of foundering incidents could be decreased by a VTS. 
Table 7.13 Estimated VTS Effectiveness Percentage 
Type of Causal Factor Sum of Weight Coefficient Reduction Rate 
Casualty Group 
Without VTS With VTS 
Environment 185.25 59.43 - 0.679 
Collision Human 326.75 195.85 - 0.401 
Technical 10.25 6.71 - 0.345 
Total 522.25 261.99 - 0.498 
Environment 61.25 27.74 - 0.547 
Grounding Human 122.50 68.69 - 0.439 
Technical 19.75 11.94 - 0.395 
Total 203.50 108.37 - 0.467 
Environment 18.00 11.79 - 0.345 
Ramming Human 28.00 16.34 - 0.416 
(Striking) Technical 6.25 5.37 - 0.141 
Total 52.25 33.50 - 0.359 
Environment 18.75 14.12 - 0.247 
Foundering Human 26.50 16.36 - 0.383 
Technical 29.50 28.67 - 0.028 
Total 74.75 59.15 - 0.209 
Environment 282.75 113.08 - 0.600 
Total Human 504.75 297.24 - 0.411 
Technical 65.75 52.69 - 0.199 
Total 852.75 463.01 - 0.457 
Source: Author 
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Table 7.13 summarizes the results of the estimation procedures by the type of 
casualty and by the causal factor groups 
From the results, it is judged that YTS may reduce 68 percent of causal factors 
classified as environmental conditions, 40 percent of human factors and 35 .percent of 
technical factors in collision accidents. In foundering accidents, however, only 26 
percent of environmental factors, 38 percent of human factors and three percent of 
technical factors could be prevented by a YTS. As a whole 60 percent of environmental 
factors, 41 percent of human factors and 20 percent of technical factors may be prevented 
by a YTS. Typical examples are: YTS assistance in reduced visibility could prevent the 
accident, and YTS assistance in restricted/dense traffic waters may eliminate the causal 
factors including "excessive speed", "sailed on wrong side of fairway" and "heavy 
surrounding traffic". 
The percentages shown in Table 7.13 correspond closely with the other 
quantitative results. For example: the collision reduction rate (50%) obtained from the 
estimation procedure is below the values obtained by the experts' group in the U.S.A and 
Canadian study, but same as the estimates of European study (COST 301). The 
grounding reduction percentage ( 47%) is also very close to the value of COST 301 and 
Japan, but higher than the estimates ofU.S.A. study(1991), and lower than the value of 
Canada. 
The estimated YTS effectiveness percentage for each sub-area is illustrated in 
Table 7 .14. According to the table, it is apparent that Ulsan-area can benefit best from 
the introduction of YTS, while Tonghae-area is the least likely area to benefit. Pohang 
208 
Chapter 7 
and Cheju sub-area have 40-41 percent of casualty reduction rate and six other sub-areas 
are more or less similar (46%- 50%). These order of VTS effectiveness by sub-area do 
not completely coincide with the ranking of overall risk obtained from perceptions in 
questionnaire in section 6.4. The last three sub-areas where is the least perceived risk, 
were Tonghae, Pohang and Cheju area. This corresponds to the order of VTS 
effectiveness by sub-area. Although there is no probabilistic basis, the following 
conclusions can be made taking into account of the ranking of risk perceived, the VTS 
effectiveness percentage, number of casualties per annum and the environmental 
conditions. 
"' Pusan-Ulsan coastal belt is the ports and waterway most in need of 
improved vessel traffic services. 
"' Taean Bando to Inchon area is the most hazardous waterway in Korea and 
is a strong candidate for vessel traffic services. 
"' Yosu/K wangyang, Mokpo and Masan sub-area are the next waters in which 
planning for improved vessel traffic services should be pursued. 
Table 7.14 Estimated VTS Effectiveness Percentage by Sub-area 
SUB-AREA TONGHAE PO HANG ULSAN PUS AN MA SAN 
PERCENTAGE 30% 41% 53% 47% 49% 
SUB-AREA YOSU CHEJU MOKPO KUNSAN INCH ON 
PERCENTAGE 49% 40% 48% 50% 46% 
Source: Author 
7.6 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Sensitivity analysis shows how the value of the criterion changes with changes 
in the value of any variable. This method is popularly used in project appraisal (Cost 
Benefit Analysis) and in optimization process. This consists essentially of varying key 
parameter values, usually one at a time but sometimes in combination, and assessing the 
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effect of such changes on the outcome of the study. This can be useful if information 
about key parameters is such that some common yardstick can be used to assess how far 
each parameter should be varied; it is common to vary primary parameters by a fixed 
percentage (e.g. 1 0% ).1'"291 
In circumstances where firm probabilities cannot be attached to the future value 
of parameters which are likely to affect the outcome of a benefit/cost study, 
sensitivity analysis may represent the only method of describing, quantitatively, 
uncertain outcomes to decision-makers. In this simple technique, different values 
for uncertain variables are used to construct alternative scenarios of outcomes for 
presentation to the decision-maker. 1?-JOJ 
In addition to the solution of the model, one must also secure, whenever possible, 
additional information concerning the behaviour of the solution due to changes 
in the system's parameters. This is usually referred to as sensitivity analysis. In 
particular, such an analysis is needed when the parameters of the system cannot 
be estimated accurately. In this case, it is important to study the behaviour of the 
optimal solution in the neighbourhood of these estimates.P-31 1 
One or more of the key variable inputs of this study may be somewhat uncertain 
and therefore subject to sensitivity analysis. The key variable of the VTS effectiveness 
percentage is the value of weight coefficient o. Consequently, differing values for this 
input are derived in this section and the impact that these variations have on the VTS 
effectiveness noted. 
In this sensitivity analysis, the weight coefficient discussed in section 7.5 have 
been varied by + 10 percent and by -I 0 percent. The values of weight coefficients are 
determined according to the following table. 
Category of the · 
VTS Activity 
Very unimportant 
Unimportant 
Average 
Important 
Very important 
Base 
1 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
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by -10% 
l 
0.9 
0.7 
0.5 
0.3 
1 
0.7 
0.5 
0.3 
0.1 
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In the first sensitivity analysis, the coefficient is increased by 10 percent. This 
implies that the casualty reduction rate to each of the VTS activity will be increased by 
10 percent. For example, the casualty reduction rate by "VTS assistance in reduced 
visibility condition" is 0.18 from the Table 6.12 and the procedure described in section 
7.5. The results indicate that further 7.1 percent of collision, 6.8 percent of grounding, 
5.2 percent of ramming and three percent of foundering incidents could be reduced by 
the I 0 percent increase of the weight coefficient value. 
When the value is reduced by I 0 percent, the maximum benefit to be obtained 
through the introduction of a VTS is approximately 39 percent overall. The collision 
reduction rate is estimated approximately 43 percent, 40 percent for grounding, 31 
percent for ramming and 18 percent for foundering reduction rate. Table 7.15 shows the 
summary of sensitivity analysis of VTS effectiveness by the types of casualty. 
Table 7.15 Sensitivity Analysis of YTS Effectiveness by Casualty Type 
I I Collision Grounding Ramming Foundering Total 
Base 49.9 46.7 35.9 20.9 45.7% 
+ 10% 57.0 53.5 41.1 23.9 52.3% 
- 10% 42.7 39.9 30.6 18.0 39.1% 
Source: Author 
As the results of sensitivity analysis of VTS effectiveness by ± I 0 percent, the 
impact of the difference on the YTS effectiveness rate was estimated 4.3 - 7.8 percent 
by the different sub-areas. The Ulsan area is sensitive to large (7.6 - 7.8%) variations 
relatively ,while Tonghae area is sensitive to small (4.3 - 4.5%) changes. 
Table 7.16 summarizes the results of sensitivity analysis of VTS effectiveness by 
different waters in Korea. 
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Table 7.16 Sensitivity Analysis of VTS Effectiveness by Sub-area 
I Sub-area I Base I + 10% I - 10% I 
Tonghae area 30.2% 34.5% 25.7% 
Pohang area 41.0% 46.9% 35.0% 
Ulsan area 53.1 % 60.7% 45.3% 
Pusan area 47.1% 53.9% 40.3% 
Masan!Koje-do area 49.0% 56.1% 41.9% 
Yosu/K wangyang area 49.1% 56.2% 42.0% 
Cheju Haehyup/Cheju-do area 40.4% 46.2% 34.6% 
• 
Maemul-sudo/Mokpo area 47.9% 54.8% 41.0% 
Kunsan/Changhang area 50.2% 57.4% 42.9% 
Taean Bando to Inchon area 46.0% 52.7% 39.3% 
Source: Author 
As stated above, the VTS effectiveness varied by approximately 2.9 to 7.2 percent 
(± 10% error) by casualty type used in this study. And the value is changed roughly 4.3 
to 7.8 percent (± I 0% variation by different sub-areas). Even so, it still seems 
appropriate to use the original percentage derived in section 7.5. First, the values derived 
in section 7.5 agree closely with the other research in the literature. Second, the purpose 
of this study is to estimate the VTS effectiveness percentage rather than the cost-benefit 
analysis by monetary terms. 
7.7 SUMMARY 
The methods of estimation ofVTS effectiveness are compared and the worldwide 
literature related to the VTS effectiveness is reviewed. The review suggests three 
potential approaches: simulation; synthesis of expert opinion and statistical analysis of 
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casualties. This study adopted dissimilar approaches to estimate the VTS effectiveness 
to the earlier studies; the combination of synthesis of expert opinion and causal analysis 
of casualty. 
The VTS effectiveness is derived by multiplying casualty rate reduction factors 
by the effect level of causal factors. The development of casualty rate reduction factors 
was based on the questionnaire survey, and the evolution of effect levels was based on 
the causal analysis using functional diagram. 
According to these procedures, the maximum benefit to be obtained through the 
introduction of a VTS system was approximately 46 percent overall. The collision 
reduction rate was estimated to be approximately 50 percent for a VTS system with 
advanced radar surveillance. And 47 percent of groundings, 36 percent of rammings and 
21 percent of founderings could be reduced by the introduction of VTS. These figures 
are more or less the same to the earlier studies. 
The VTS effectiveness by the different causal factor groups was examined. VTS 
may reduce about 68 percent of causal factors classified as environmental conditions, 40 
percent of human factors and 35 percent of technical factors in collision accidents. As 
a whole 60 percent of environmental factors, 41 percent of human factors and 20 percent 
of technical factors may be prevented by a VTS. 
From the estimated VTS effectiveness percentage for each sub-area, it is apparent 
that Ulsan-area can benefit best from the introduction of VTS, while Tonghae-area is the 
least likely area to benefit. These procedure revealed that Pusan-Ulsan coastal belt is the 
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area most in need of advanced VTS and the lnchon area is the next waters for VTS 
though there is no firm probabilistic background. 
The key variable of the VTS effectiveness percentage is the value of weight 
coefficient 8. Therefore differing values for this input was discussed and the impact that 
these variations have on the VTS effectiveness noted. As the results of sensitivity 
analysis of VTS effectiveness by ± I 0 percent, the effectiveness is varied approximately 
three to seven percent by casualty type. And the value is changed roughly four to eight 
percent by a ± I 0 percent variation by different sub-areas. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 SUMMARY OF THE MAIN P0INTS 
1. The rapid growth of marine traffic by volume and number in the Korean waters 
has created difficulty in navigation, increased the risk in some areas and thereby 
necessitated measures to be taken to improve the traffic safety. Various measures have 
been taken during the same period to improve navigation safety. The navigational aids 
have been improved, traffic separation schemes have been established in coastal regions 
and vessel movement reporting scheme has been introduced in many port areas. 
Meanwhile, the advanced technology of Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) has been 
introduced in the marine field. In addition, the wide range of developments in the 
surveillance systems, monitoring equipment, electronic navigational aids and 
computerized data processing have suggested some utilization of these systems in traffic 
management. 
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2. Chapter 2 reviewed the environmental features in Korean water. Most of fog at 
sea occurs during summer months and fog being most frequent in July. And rainfalls are 
heaviest during summer months as welL Consequently there are more days of low 
visibility in summer. Winds are stronger during winter months in other hand. 
3. Chapter 3 provided the information on the vessel traffic statistics in the waters. 
The number of Korean registered ships (excluding fishing vessels) has grown slowly but 
continuously. In addition total vessel movements in Korean ports are increasing 
considerably. Coastal and small ·size of ocean-going ships are the main components of 
the coastal traffic in Korean waters. Total cargo traffic has been increased significantly 
whilst coastal traffic has experienced higher increase than average. 
4. Chapter 4 discussed the results from statistical and causal analysis of casualties. 
(1) The negative binomial model is proved to be an adequate model in investigating 
marine accident frequency. 
(2) The casualty frequency for Korean ships above 500 tons is very high, over twice 
that of Norwegian ships. 
(3) Merchant ship casualties tend to occur in ports & harbours whilst fishing vessel 
accidents are most frequent in coastal waters and open sea. 
(4) Geographical distribution of casualties shows that the highest number of casualties 
occur in the Pusan/Ulsan area, and the major port areas have more rammings while more 
groundings occur in Cheju and Mokpo areas where fishing base exists, 
(5) Smaller ships have more accidents during winter whilst larger vessels have more 
in summer. High number of collisions occurs in summer period and of founderings 
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occurs in winter period. lihis phenomenon correlates to the low visibility on a certain 
months. This seasonal variation of collision accidents is.different to the European waters 
where more collisions occur in winter period. 
(6) Older ships are identified to have more founderings than collisions or rammings 
by multiple comparison test. 
(7) Environmental parameters are often present as important causes of casualties. 
Reduced visibility by fog is the most continual causal factor. Human errors of seafarers 
are dominant causal factors in casualties: specially negligence in critical situation, 
negligence of lookout, excessive speed under the circumstances and improper manoeuvre. 
(8) The relative importance of the causal factors were compared by applying the 
effect level. The ship control tasks sub-group of human factors generates the most 
probable factors of marine casualty and the working environments sub-group of 
environmental conditions has a next probability. In collisions negligence of lookout is 
the most important factor, while not fixing position regularly and error in voyage 
planning are the factors in grounding incidents. Stormy weather is the most influential 
factor in rammings whereas stormy weather, poor stowage and fracture of ship structure 
are the factors in foundering accidents. 59 percent of casualties concerned is attributable 
to human error of seafarers involved. Reduced visibility by fog and rogue vessels are 
the most important causal factors in the Inchon area. Another noticeable point is that 
"not using every item of aid/equipment available in the situation" is the one of the most 
serious causal factor in the Tonghae area. 
(9) Foundering is the most serious casualty type to threaten the lives of seamen. 
Clearly foundering accidents caused a higher rate of total loss, but no total losses were 
reported by ramming incidents. lihe total amount spilled in the reported oil leakages was 
I ,417 tons, but the amount of spillage is small except few cases. 
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5. Chapter 5 examined the effectiveness of existing traffic services including TSS 
and VMRS in Korean waters. 
(1) The overall accident danger index has dropped remarkably since the introduction 
of routeing scheme in Inchon approaches. 
(2) It appears likely that introduction of a Traffic Separation Scheme in Kanjol-Gap 
has led a reduction by half in number ofaccidents. 
(3) Even though there was no significant difference in the number of accidents per 
annum before and after the introduction of a VMRS in Pusan, the overall accident danger 
index reduced significantly. 
6. Chapter 6 discussed the questionnaire survey which was carried out across the 
board of maritime industry in Korea. 
(1) Reduced visibility is identified as the leading factor in increasing marine risk and 
"human factors in shiphandling" is the second, while "greater number of pleasure crafts 
in shipping routes" is ranked in the last place. Generally the VTS operators group 
assessed the risk factors with less weight than any other group. This curiosity may be 
explained by less shipboard experience and lower qualifications. 
(2) "Advanced VTS in more areas" is identified as the most preferable option to 
improve marine safety. And "prohibition of fishing in shipping routes" and "additional 
TSS" ranked in second and third place in reducing marine risk. 
(3) In the question of the modification of VTS, almost all respondents declared that 
the VTS service should be upgraded or implemented in the area and no respondent has 
expressed opinion to downgrade or close the service. 
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(4) It is recognized that marine experience is essential for VTS operators to perform 
their tasks and the previous experience of shiphandling & communication is preferable. 
(5) The median is determined between 3.58 and 4.24 for various YTS services & 
activities. "VTS assistance in reduced visibility" is approved as the most vital service 
rendered by YTS, while "YTS assistance with communication problems" has the lowest 
index. YTS assistances, however, were favourably rated by the respondents. Generally 
VTS operators assessed the services with slightly more severity than other groups. 
7. Chapter 7 dealt with the estimation of YTS effectiveness(benefits). 
(1') The maximum benefit to be obtained through the introduction of VTS (Level Ill) 
in Korea is determined approximately 46 percent overall. The collision reduction rate 
was estimated to be 50 percent, 47 percent for groundings, 36 percent for rammings and 
21 percent for founderings. These figures are more or less the same to the earlier 
studies. 
(2) It is estimated that about 68 percent of causal factors which is classified into 
environmental conditions may be eliminated by the proposed YTS, 40 percent of human 
factors and 35 percent of technical factors in collision accidents. As a whole 60 percent 
of environmental factor, 41 percent of human factor and 20 percent of technical factor 
may be prevented by YTS. 
(3) Ulsan-area can benefit most from the introduction of VTS, while Tonghae-area 
is the least likely area to benefit. 
(4) Sensitivity analysis {± 10 percent) presented that the effectiveness is varied 
approximately three to seven percent by casualty type. And the value is changed roughly 
four to eight percent by different sub-areas. 
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8.2 RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
(1) Although the routeing scheme in Inchon approaches brought reduction of accident 
rate, the majority of accidents still occur in the traffic lanes. Reduced visibility by fog 
and rogue vessels are identified as the most influential single causal factor in lnchon area. 
It is known that the major benefit of TSS is the prevention of meeting encounters, and 
thereby the reduction of meeting collision. There were, however, seven meeting 
collisions after the traffic scheme. This is probably due to the exception clauses of the 
regulation such as: 
The ship proceed from Inchon-hang to Asan-man can navigate Tong-sudo and the 
ship proceed from the NW area of Tokchok-do to Inchon-hang can navigate So-
sudo. 
Ships of less than 500 tons shall navigate according to the regulations as 
practicable. 
If, however, there is any obstacles on the route and dangers to traffic, able to not 
follow the scheme. 
Six incidents out of seven were occurred under reduced visibility (less than 300 metres) 
, and seven ships violated the local regulations. Taking into account the facts described 
above, stricter enforcement of the routeing scheme is required to reduce the meeting 
encounters, and appropriate traffic surveillance and information service are potently 
recommended to cut down the incidents which is occurring under the reduced visibility 
and violating the traffic rules in the area. 
(2) The main causal factors of incidents in Ulsan area were identified as "Other ship-
Manoeuvring against rules" and "No reaction to the critical situation". The introduction 
of TSS in Kanjoi-Gap (5 miles south from Ulsan) has led a reduction of accidents, but 
three collisions out of four after the TSS occurred within the traffic lane. Therefore 
appropriate traffic observation and surveillance are necessary to eliminate the rogue 
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vessels, and thereby to reduce the accident rate further. Possibly repositioning of traffic 
lane or placing of buoy may improve the safety in the area. 
(3) The examination of collision incidents in Pusan area revealed that the location of 
incidents have spread over the whole area, especially more collisions in South outer 
harbour and Pusan approaches after the introduction of VMRS. Consequently, advanced 
traffic observation and surveillance over the area are required to increase the navigation 
safety in Pusan Hang area. 
(4) The introduction of traffic separation scheme or VMRS into three major ports 
(Inchon, Ulsan and Pusan) has led a significant reduction of accidents as recognised 
earlier. However the TSS and VMRS do not give adequate level of safety, traffic 
observation/surveillance and information exchange service are fundamental to reduce 
accident further. Accordingly it is necessary to extend advanced VTS (Level Ill or IV) 
to all parts of Korea. 
Although there is no probabilistic basis, the following order of priority to establish 
VTS can be recommended taking into account the ranking of risk perceived, the VTS 
effectiveness percentage, number of casualties per annum and the environmental 
conditions. 
I. Pusan-Uisan coastal belt is the ports and waterway most in need of improved 
vessel traffic services. 
2. Taean Bando to Inchon area is the most hazardous waterway in Korea and is 
a strong candidate for vessel traffic services. 
3. Yosu/Kwangyang, Mokpo and Masan sub-area are the next waters in which 
planning for improved vessel traffic services should be pursued. 
(5) Clearly the introduction of advanced VTS into coastal waters will increase the 
navigation safety. However it needs enormous amount of investment and takes several 
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years to organize the system, so that following feasible schemes are recommended to 
place as an immediate need. 
1. place more Traffic Separation Scheme in danger areas, specially in south-west 
and south coast of Korea 
2. develop recommended route for small coastal ferries and passenger vessels 
3. designate the 'navigation prohibition or pollution sensible area', and prohibit 
the passing of tankers and ships dangerous cargo boarded to minimize the 
pollution damage. 
4. put advanced weather information service into operation collaborating with 
Korean Navy. 
(6) Approximately 70 percent of VTS operators in Korea has no full" time shipboard 
experience and very few of them have shiphandling experience. However the results of 
questionnaire and other studies agreed that full-time shipboard experience is preferable 
for the VTS operators. Therefore it is recommended to recruit the operators who has 
shiphandling shipboard experience in future when they organize new systems. 
It is of common knowledge that most (probably more than 95%) VTS operators 
in Korea have radio operator's certificate. It, however, is generally recognized that the 
operators in advanced VTS system should have the knowledge of English language, 
general & special nautical knowledge, equipment handling expertise, legal knowledge and 
local geographic knowledge. Even though it seems infeasible to recruit the operator 
having all the abilities, the appropriate training and certification programme should be 
prepared before organizing the new system. 
(7) This thesis does not cover cost-benefit analysis following the introduction ofVTS. 
So further research can be focussed on the cost-benefit analysis based on the consequence 
of casualties and the unique model developed in this thesis. Further research also can 
be concentrated on developing navigational risk index based on the casualty analysis in 
this thesis and traffic survey. 
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CAUSAL FACTORS OF CASUALTIES 
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
I. EXTERNAL CONDITIONS 
211. Reduced Visibility/: 
Maneuverabi1ity 
2111 
2112 
2113 
2114 
by Fog/mist 
by Snow/hail 
Rain/drizzle 
Storm-Sea spray 
Jinsoo PARK 
Institute of Marine Studies 
University of Plymouth 
212. Reduced efficiency of equipment : 2121 
by external factor 2124 
Radar by rain/snow/sea state, 
Heavy ship motion 
241. Light condition: 2411 
2412 
2413 
Daylight 
Darkness 
Twilight 
II. WATERWAY CONDITIONS 
223. Traffic situation: 2231 
2232 
2233 
2234 
Small vessels in fairway 
Heavy surounding traffic 
Other ship passing/overtaking too close 
Other ship on collision course 
221. Waterway configuration: 2211 
2212 
2213 
Narrow channel passage 
Low water level 
Strong current/Tidal stream 
222. Navigational aids: 2221 Faults of the aids(lights, marks) 
2222 Wrong/poor marking of fairway 
III. WORKING ENVIRONMENTS 
2230. Deficiencies in charted information on chart & publications 
231. Rules and Regulations: 2311 
2313 
232. Other ship's behaviour: 2321 
2322 
2323 
Improper rules (Road, Class, etc.) 
Management pressure(ETA, etc.) 
Equipment fault or Deficiency in other ship 
Manoeuvering against rule 
No-reaction to the critical situation 
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HUMAN FACTORS 
I. HEALTH CONDITION OF WATCHKEEPER 
111. Physical/Mental Health condition: 1111 
1112 
1113 
1114 
1115 
1116 
1117 
Attack of sickness, Illness 
Physical handicap (sight) 
Tiredness 
Drunkeness 
Stress 
Sleepy 
Drug 
II. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION 
112. Organization: 1121 Improper Shipboard organization 
1122 Improper Harbour organization 
113. Training: 1131 No/Lack of seafaring experience 
1132 Lack of professional knowledge 
117. Chart/Publication factor: 1171 No small corrections on charts/pub. 
1172 Error in voyage planning 
III. WATCHKEEPING SITUATION 
114. Watchkeeping: 1141 
1142 
1143 
1144 
1145 
1148 
1149 
IV. SYSTEM INTERFACE 
No Officer on bridge 
Captain left bridge in critical situation 
Negligence of Lookout 
Not use every available aids/equipments 
in the situation 
Officer under other work 
Improper reporting/take-over 
Misunderstanding of order 
116. System interfaces: 1161 
1162 
1164 
1165 
Ship/Shore 
Ship/Ship 
Ship/Tug 
Ship/Head office 
V. SHIP CONTROL TASKS 
123. Wrong appreciation of : 1232 Misobservation of othr ship 
traffic information 1222 Misobservation of lights/marks 
125. Navigation/Manouvering 
factors 
1251 
1252 
1253 
1254 
1255 
1256 
1257 
1258 
1259 
Excessive speed under the circumstances 
Negligence in critical situation 
Sailed on wrong side of fairway 
Sailed in unmarked waters 
Miscalculation of position 
Not fix position regularly 
Improper order 
Improper decision 
No reaction to the critical situation 
126. Misuse of Equipment&: 1261 Improper maneuver - Mishandled M/E, 
Steering, etc. 
1263 Misuse/misread of Radar, Compass, etc. 
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TECHNICAL FAULT/DEFICIENCIES 
I. DESIGN, ARRANGEMENT AND SERVICEABILITY 
3110. Poor design 
3120. Poor placing of equipment 
3130. Poor quality 
3140. Poor maintenance or inspection 
3150. Lack of equipment 
II. EQUIPMENT BREAKDOWN 
321. Propulsion and Steering: 3211 
3212 
3213 
3214 
3215 
322. Navigation Equipments: 3221 
3222 
3223 
3224 
Main engine breakdown 
Aug. engine breakdown 
Steering gear breakdown 
Rudder 
Propeller 
Radar 
Compass 
Navigation lights 
Other navigation equipment 
323. CoDIIIIunication Equipments: 3231 Internal communication 
3232 External communication 
III. MANAGEMENT OF CARGO 
3310. Poor stowage/securing 
3320. Cargo shifting 
IV. ACCIDENTIAL FAILURE 
3510. Electricity blackout 
3520 .. Broken mooring wire 
3530. Fracture of ship structure 
"' Note: the four digit numbers indicate the code of each factor 
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CASUALTY CARD 
Ship Name: Jinsoo PARK 
Judgement No. : Institute of Marine studies 
University of Plymouth 
GENERAL (1-7) 
1. Serial number: 2. Casualty type: [] 
3. Year: CD 4. Month: CD 5. Date: CD 
6. Time: ·hours 7. Week: 
VESSEL PARTICULARS (10-23) 
10. Gross tonnage: I I I ton 
11. Ship's Type: CD 12. Length of Ship: m 
13. Beam: CD m 14. Ship's age: CD 
15. Ship's speed: CD. [] 16. Loading condition: [] 
17. Steering: [] (A or M) 18. Speed at casualty: CD [] 
19. Movement: [] 20. Ship's draft: CD [] m 
21. Trading Area: [] 22. Flag of Vessel: [] 
23. Radio equipment: [] 
METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS (30-35) 
3 0. Wind Force: CD 31. Sea State: CD 
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32. vi.sibHity: CD . CD mile 
34. Light Condition: [] 
33. Current: CD.[] knots 
35. Weather: [] 
HUMAN ELEMENTS (40-45) 
40. Watch system : [] 
41. Number of Officers on Bridge: [] 
42. Subordinate on the bridge: [] 43. Licence held: [] 
44. Age: CD 45. Sea career: CD years 
WATERWAY CONFIGURATION (50-56) 
50. Waterway type: [] 51. Latitude: 
52. Longitude: I I I I I I . [] E 
53. Channel width: I I I I lm 54. Channel depth: 
55. Channel bend radius: L__.l----L.---L..-ll m 
56. Unobstructed line of vision of channel: 
CONSEQUENCES OF CASUALTY (60-70) 
60. Lives lost: 61. Injuries: 
62. Cargo damages: [] 63. Engine damage: [] 
64. Hull damage: [] 65. Damage to objects: [] 
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66. Propeller damage: D 67. Rudder damage: D 
68. Total loss: c=J (Y or N) 69: Oil outflow: tons 
70. Delays by casualty: l-.J.-.J..._JI • D days 
CAUSES OF CASUALTIES (80-89) and EXTENT OF THE FACTOR (801-891) 
80. Causal factorl: 801. Extent of the factorl: D 
81. Causal factor2: 811. Extent of the factor2: D 
82. Causal factor3: 821. Extent of the factor3: D 
83. Causal factor4: 831. Extent of the factor4: D 
84. Causal factorS: 841. Extent of the factorS: D 
85. Causal factor6: 851. Extent of the factor6: D 
86. Causal factor?: 861. Extent of the factor?: D 
87. Causal factorS: 871. Extent of the factorS: D 
88. Causal factor9: 881. Extent of the factor9: D 
89. Causal factorlO: 891. Extent of the factorlO: D 
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TABLES FROM STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MARINE 
CASUALTIES (1986-1990) 
Table 1 Types of ship by Casualty type 
TYPE OF CASUALTY 
COLLISION GROUNDI NG RAMMING FOUNDERING 
Type of ship 
Count Column Count Column Count Column Count Column 
Perce nt Percent Percent Percent 
PASSENGER . . .. . . 7 2.9\ 3 3.7\ 3 13.0\ 0 . 0\ 
TANKER ......... 45 18.6\ 12 1 4.8\ 4 17.4\ 2 5.7\ 
CARGO .......... 73 30.2\ 24 29.6\ 10 43 . 5\ 6 17.1\ 
FISHING . . ...... 87 36.0\ 33 40.7\ 3 13.0\ 22 62.9\ 
OTHERS ......... 30 12.4\ 9 11.1\ 3 13.0\ 5 14.3\ 
Note: Number of cases(n) = 381 
Table 2 Wind force by Casualty type 
TYPE OF CASUALTY 
Wind 
COLLISION GROUNDING RAMMING FOUNDERING 
force 
Count Column Count Column Count Column Count Column 
Percent Percent Percent Percent 
0 ......... 0 . 0% 1 1. 3% 0 . 0% 0 .0% 
1 ......... 2 .8% 1 1. 3% 0 .0% 0 .0% 
2 .. . .. . . . . 75 31.8% 8 10.5% 4 17.4% 3 8 . 6% 
3 .. ... . . .. 82 34.7% 19 25.0% 2 8. 7% 4 11.4% 
4 ......... 38 16 . 1% 9 11.8% 4 17.4% 2 5. 7% 
5 . . . . ..... 25 10.6% 10 13.2% 0 .0% 4 11.4% 
6 .. . . . .. . . 8 3.4% 10 13.2% 4 17.4\ 4 11.4% 
7 . . . . ..... 2 .8% 5 6.6% 1 4.3% 12 34.3% 
8 ......... 2 .8% 6 7.9% 1 4.3% 6 17.1% 
9 ......... 2 . 8% 6 7.9% 4 17 . 4% 0 .0% 
10 .. . . . ... 0 . 0% 1 1.3% 1 4.3% 0 .0% 
11 ........ 0 .0% 0 . 0% 2 8. 7% 0 . 0% 
Wind force means Beaufort scale , Miss i ng cases= 11 , n= 381 
Table 3 Time of day by Casualty type 
TYPE OF CASUALTY 
Time COLLISION GROUNDING RAMMING FOUNDERING 
band Count Column Count Column Count Column Count Column 
Percent Percent Percent Percent 
00 - 04 . .. ... 59 24 . 4% 19 23.5% 4 17 . 4% 8 22.9% 
04-08 ...... 54 22.3% 14 17 . 3% 7 30.4% 13 37.1% 
08-12 . . . . .. 35 14.5% 15 18.5% 2 8. 7% 4 11.4% 
12-16 ...... 28 11.6% 13 16 . 0% 5 21.7% 0 . 0% 
16-20 . . .. . . 48 19.8% 9 11 . 1% 4 17 . 4% 7 20.0% 
20-24 . .... . 18 7.4% 11 13 . 6% 1 4.3% 3 8 . 6% 
Number of cases= 381 
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Table 4 Ship's age by Casualty type 
TYPE OF CASUALTY 
Ship's COLLISION GROUNDING RAMMING FOUNDERING 
age Count Column Count Column Count Column Count Column 
Percent Percent Percent Percent 
UPTO 5 
YEARS .. 46 24 0 7\ 1 0 14.9% 3 15.0% 2 6.3% 
6-10 0. 00 00 35 18.8% 13 19 .4% 8 40.0% 3 9.4% 
11-15 0 0 0 0 0 39 21.0\' 12 17.9% 5 25.0% 8 25 . 0% 
16-2000 00 0 30 16.1\ 16 23.9% 2 10.0% 6 18 .8\' 
21-25 .... 0 20 10.8\' 10 14.9% 2 10.0% 6 18 . 8\' 
26-3000 00 0 12 6.5% 5 7.5% 0 .0% 4 12 .5\' 
OVER 30 0 0 0 4 2.2\' 1 1. 5% 0 .0\' 3 9.4\' 
Number of cases= 381 
Table 5 Day of week by Casualty type 
TYPE OF CASUALTY 
COLLISION GROUNDING RAMMING FOUNDERING 
Day of 
week Count Column Count Column Count Column Count Column 
Percent Percent Percent Percent 
MON .... . . . . 20 8 . 3% 14 17 0 3\ 2 8 . 7% 2 5 . 7% 
TUE ... . .... 26 10 0 7% 12 14.8% 0 .0% 4 11.4% 
WED .... . . .. 41 16 . 9% 14 17. 3% 2 8 . 7% 7 20 .0% 
THU ....... . 58 24.0\' 10 12.3% 8 34.8\ 9 25 0 7% 
FRI . ... .. . . 33 13 . 6\ 11 13.6\ 6 26.1\ 2 5 0 7% 
SAT ........ 26 10 . 7\' 6 7.4% 2 8 0 7% 6 17.1\ 
SUN . .. ..... 38 15 . 7% 14 17.3\ 3 13 . 0\ 5 14.3\ 
Number of cases= 381 
Table 6 Month by Casualty type 
TYPE OF CASUALTY 
COLLISION GROUNDING RAMMING FOUNDERING 
Month 
Count Column Count Column Count Column Count Column 
Percent Percent Percent Percent 
JANUARY . . 14 5.8\ 6 7 . 4% 2 8 . 7\ 4 11.4\ 
FEBRUARY. 10 4.1\ 6 7.4% 4 17.4\ 3 8 . 6\ 
MARCH . ... 11 4.5\' 7 8.6\ 1 4.3\ 2 5 . 7% 
APRIL . ... 16 6 .6\' 6 7.4\ 2 8.7 \ 2 5.7\' 
MAY . ..... 24 9 . 9\ 4 4.9\ 3 13.0\' 4 11.4% 
JUNE ..... 36 14.9\ 7 8.6\ 2 8.7\ 3 8 . 6\ 
JULY ..... 45 18 . 6\' 11 13.6\ 1 4 0 3% 2 5. 7% 
AUGUST ... 23 9.5\ 4 4.9% 4 17.4\ 1 2 . 9\' 
SEPTEMBER 14 5.8\ 4 4.9\' 0 .0\ 0 . 0% 
OCTOBER . . 12 5 . 0\ 4 4.9% 1 4.3\' 3 8.6\ 
NOVEMBER. 15 6 . 2\ 10 12 . 3\ 2 8. 7% 3 8 . 6\' 
DECEMBER. 2 2 9 . 1\ 12 14 . 8% 1 4.3% 8 22.9\' 
Number of cases= 381 
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Table 7 Subarea by Casualty type 
TYPE OF CASUALTY 
COLLISION GROUNDING RAMMING FOONDERING 
Subarea 
Count Column Count Column Count Column Count Column 
Percent Percent Percent Percent 
Tonghae area 14 5.8\ 5 6 .2t 2 8 . 7\ 2 5.7\ 
Pohang area. 21 8. 7\ 5 6.2\ 2 8.7\ 3 8 .6t 
Ulsan area .. 12 5.0\ 4 4.9\ 1 4.3\ 0 .Ot 
Pusan area .. 47 19.4\ 7 8.6\ 6 26.H 4 11.4\ 
Masan area .. 26 10.7\ 3 3.7\ 2 8 . 7\ 1 2.9\ 
Yosu area .. . 38 15.7\ 10 12 .3\ 3 13 . 0\ 6 17.1\ 
Cheju area .. 16 6.6\ 17 21.0\ 0 . ot 9 25.7\ 
Mokpo area .. 30 12 . 4\ 13 16.0\ 1 4 . 3\ 5 14 .3\ 
Kunsan area. 11 4.5\ 9 11.1\ 2 8.7\ 0 . 0 \ 
Inchon area. 27 11.2\ 8 9.9\ 4 17.4\ 5 14.3\ 
Number of cases= 381 
Table 8 Light by Casualty type 
TYPE OF CASUALTY 
Light COLLISION GROUNDING RAMMING FOUNDERING 
condition Count Column Count Column Count Column Count Column 
Percent Percent Percent Percent 
DAYLIGHT ..... . . 115 47 .5\ 35 43.2\ 10 43.5\ 11 31.4\ 
DARKNESS ....... 99 4 0.9\ 40 49.4\ 11 47 . 8\ 21 60 .0 \ 
TWILIGHT ....... 28 11.6\ 6 7.4\ 2 8. 7\ 3 8.6\ 
Number of cases= 381 
Table 9 Weather by Casualty type 
TYPE OF CASUALTY 
COLLISION GROUNDING RAMMING FOUNDERING 
Weather 
Count Column Count Column Count Column Count Column 
Percent Percent Percent Percent 
CLEAR/FINE 55 25.8\ 14 20.3\ 3 15.0\ 9 39.1\ 
CLOUDY .... 30 14.1\ 15 21.7\ 5 25.0\ 1 4.3\ 
OVERCAST . . 28 13.H 4 5.8\ 4 20.0\ 9 39.1\ 
RAIN . . ... . 6 2.8\ 17 24 .6t 4 20 . 0\ 1 4.3\ 
SNOW . . .. . . 0 .Ot 4 5.8\ 1 5 .0\ 3 13.0\ 
FOG ....... 94 44.H 15 21.7\ 3 15 . 0\ 0 .0\ 
Number of cases =381, Missing cases= 56 
Table 1 0 Tonnage group by Ship type 
SHIP'S TYPE 
Gross 
t o nnage PASSENGER TANKER CARGO FISHING OTHERS 
group 
Count: Column Count: Column Count: Column Count: Column Count: Colu mn 
Percent: Percent: Percent: Percent: Percent: 
UNDER lOO . . . l 1 .n 0 .0\ 2 l. 8\ 115 79.3\ 25 53.2\-
100-199 .. . . . 5 38 . 5\- 3 4 . 8\ 6 5.3\ 22 15.2\ 7 l4 . 9\-
200-499 ..... l 7.7\ ll 17.5\ 21 18 . 6\ 4 2.8 \ 3 6 . 4\-
500-999 ..... 4 30.8\ 26 41 . 3\ 23 20.4\ l .7\- l 2.1\-
1000-2999 ... l 7. 7t 15 23.8\- 19 16 .8 \- 2 1.4\ 2 4.3\-
3000-4999 ... 0 .0\- 4 6.3\ 12 10.6\ l . 7t 6 12 . 8\ 
5000-9999 ... l 7.7\- 1 1.6\ 8 7.1\ 0 .o t l 2.1\-
10000 & OVER 0 .0\- 3 4 . 8\- 22 19.5\- 0 . 0\- 2 4 .3\ 
Number of cases= 381 
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Table 11 Waterway by Ship type 
SHIP' S TYPB 
Waterway 
PASSBNGBR TANKER CARGO PISHING OTHERS 
type 
Count Column Count Column Count Column Count Column Count Column 
Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent 
PORT / HARBOUR ... 5 38.5\ 17 27 . 0\ 30 26.5\ 15 10.3\ 18 38 . 3\ 
PORT APPROACHES 2 15 . 4\ ll 17.5\ 8 7 .lt 15 10. 3t 5 10 . 6t 
SOUND/PASSAGE .. 1 7. 7t 10 15.9\ 21 18.6\ 15 10 .3\ 9 19 .lt 
COASTAL WATER . . 5 38.5\ 24 38 . a 41 36. 3t 73 50 .3\ 13 27. 7t 
OPEN SEA . .... . . 0 .Ot 1 1.6\ 13 ll . St 2 7 18 . 6\ 2 4 .H 
Number of cases= 381 
Table 12 Sub - area by Ship type 
SHIP'S TYPE 
Sub-area PASSENGER TANKER CARGO FISHING OTHERS 
Count Column Count Column Count Column Count Column Count Column 
Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent 
Tonghae area 2 15.4\ 1 1. 6\ 8 7.H 9 6.2\ 3 6.4\ 
Pohang area . 1 7 . 7t 4 6 .n 8 7 .lt 15 10 . 3t 3 6.4\ 
Ulsan area .. 0 .ot 3 4 . 8\ 7 6.2\ 2 1.4\ 5 10 .6\ 
Pusan area .. 3 23 .lt 9 14.3\ 21 18. 6t 20 13 . et 11 23 . 4\ 
Masan area .. 0 . Ot 8 12 .7\ 13 ll . 5\ 9 6. 2\- 2 4.3\ 
Yosu area .. . 3 23 . lt 14 22 . 2\ 13 11.5\ 19 13 . 1\ 8 17 . 0\ 
Cheju area .. 0 .0 '1- 0 .0\ 10 8 .et 31 21.4\ 1 2 . 1\ 
Mokpo area .. 2 15 . 4t 14 22.2 \ 9 8 .0\ 17 11.7\ 7 14. 9t 
Kunsan area. 1 7. 71r 6 9.5\ 8 7 . 1\ 6 4 . 1\ 1 2.H 
Inchon area. 1 7. 7t 4 6 . 3\ 16 14 . 2\ 17 11 . 7\ 6 12 . 8\ 
Number of cases= 381 
Table 13 Visibility by Casualty type 
TYPE OF CASUALTY Total a cses 
Visibility 
COLLISION GROUNDING RAMMING FOUNDERING 
Less than 0. 03 ... 21 7.8\ 4 1. 5\ 0 .Ot 0 .0\ 25 9 . H 
0.03-0.09 mil es .. 50 18. 7t 16 6.0\ 3 l.lt 0 . 0\ 69 25 . 7\ 
0.10-0.49 miles .. 26 9. 7t 6 2 .2 \ 1 . H 0 . 0\ 33 12 .H 
0 .5 0 - 1 .0 9 miles .. 4 1. 5\ 4 1. 5\ 1 . 4\ 1 .4\ 10 3 . 7\-
1.10-2. 19 miles .. 8 3 .0\ 1 . 4\ 1 . 4\ 0 . Ot 10 3 . 7t 
2. 20-5.39 miles .. 8 3. Ot 2 . n 0 .Ot 1 . 4\ 11 4 . 1\ 
5 . 40 - 10 .99 .. . .. . . 79 29 .5\ 14 5 .2 \ 8 3. 0\ 2 .n 103 38 .4\ 
11 and Over . . .... 6 2. 2\- 1 .4\ 0 .0\ 0 .0\ 7 2.6\ 
Total acses ...... 202 75 . 4\ 48 17.9\ 14 5 . 2\ 4 1 . 5\ 268 100\ 
Number o f cases= 381, Missing cases= 113 
Table 14 Month by Visibility 
VISIBILITY 
Month Less than 0 . 03 0.03-0.09 miles 0 . 10-0 . 49 miles 0 . 50 - 1.09 miles 1.10- 2.19 miles 
JANUARY ..... 2 . 7t 1 . H 0 . Ot 0 .0\ 0 .Ot 
FEBRUARY .... 0 . 0\ 3 1.1\ 0 . 0\ 0 . Ot 0 . 0\ 
MARCH . ...... 3 l.H 0 .0 \ 1 . 4\ 0 .Ot 0 . 0\ 
APRIL ....... 0 .0\ 2 .n 3 l.lt 4 1. 5\ 0 .Ot 
MAY ......... 1 . 4\ 10 3 . 7t 3 l.lt 2 .7\ 2 .7\ 
JUNE • • • •. 000 10 3 . 7\ 9 3 . 4\ 10 3.7\ 0 .O t 4 1. 5\ 
JULY . . . . . .. . 3 1.1\ 21 7. 8 \ 11 4.1\ 2 . 7\ 2 . 7\ 
AUGUST .. . .. . 0 .0\ 9 3.4\- 4 1. 5\ 0 . Ot 1 . 4\-
SEPTEMBER ... 2 . 7t 4 1. 5\ 0 . ot 1 .4\- 0 .0\ 
OCTOBER . .... 0 . 0\ 2 . 7t 0 . Ot 0 .0\ 1 . H 
NOVEMBER .... 4 1. 5\ 6 2. 2\- 0 .ot 0 .Ot 0 .Ot 
DECEMBER .. .. 0 .O t 2 .n 1 .4\- 1 .4\- 0 . 0\ 
To tal Cases . 25 9 . 3\ 69 25. 7t 33 12. 3t 10 3. 7\ 10 3 . 7\ 
(continued ) 
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VISIBILITY Total Cases 
Mon t h 2.20-5.39 miles 5. 4 0 - 10.99 11 and Over 
JANUARY . .... 0 .0\ 11 4.H 0 .0\ 14 5.2\ 
FEBRUARY . . .. 0 . 0\ 10 3.7\ 2 . 7\- 15 5. 6\-
MARCH ....... 3 1.1\ 8 3.0\ 0 .0\ 1 5 5. 6\-
APRIL ....... 2 .7\- 10 3.7\ 0 .0\ 21 7.8\ 
MAY .. . ...... 0 .0\ 6 2.2\ 2 .7\- 26 9.7\ 
JUNE . . ...... 0 .0\ 8 3.0\ 1 .4\ 42 15.7\-
JULY . . ... . .. 3 1.1\ 6 2.2\ 0 .0\" 48 17.9\" 
AUGUST . . . .. . 0 .0\- 6 2 . 2\" 0 .0\ 20 7. 5 \" 
SEPTEMBER ... 2 .7\- 3 l.H 0 .0\ 12 4.5\ 
OCTOBER .. . .. 0 .0\ 8 3.0\ 0 .0\ 11 4 .a 
NOVEMBER .... 0 .0\ 9 3.4\ 0 .0\ 1 9 7 .lt 
DECEMBER .... 1 .H 18 6 . 7t 2 . 7t 25 9.3\-
Total Cases. 11 4 .1\ 103 38 . 4\ 7 2 . 6\" 268 100.0\ 
Table 15 Day of week by Visibility 
VISIBILITY 
Day of 
week Less than 0.03 0 . 03-0.09 miles 0. 1 0-0.49 miles 0.50-1.09 miles 1. 10-2. 1 9 miles 
MON .. . ...... 2 .7\ 4 1.5\ 1 . H 1 .4\ 2 .7\ 
TUE .. .. . . ... 4 1.5\ 4 1. 5\ 4 1. 5\ 1 .4\ 2 . 7t 
WED ......... 5 1.9\ 8 3. 0\ 3 1.1\ 0 .0\ 0 .0\ 
THU . ..... . . . 6 2. 2\ 22 8 . 2\ 5 1. 9\ 1 .4\ 4 1. 5\ 
FRI ......... 5 1.9\ 7 2.6\ 6 2.2\ 0 .0\ 2 . 7t 
SAT .. .. ... . . 1 .4\ 11 4 .lt 4 1. 5\ 0 .0\ 0 .0\ 
SUN ......... 2 .7\ 13 4.9\ 10 3. 7\- 7 2 . 6\ 0 .0\ 
Total Cases. 25 9.3\ 69 25.7\ 33 12.3\ 10 3.7\ 10 3.7\ 
VISIBILI TY Total Cases 
Day of 
week 2.20-5 . 39 miles 5 . 40 - 10.99 11 and Over 
MON ......... 0 .0\ 15 5.6\ 0 .0\ 25 9. 3\ 
TUE ......... 1 .4\ 11 4.1\ 0 .0\ 27 10.1\ 
WED . ..... . .. 5 1. 9\ 23 8.6\ 3 1.1\ 47 17.5\ 
THU ......... 2 .7\ 15 5.6\ 2 .7% 57 21. 3\ 
FRI .. ... ... . 0 .0\ 14 5.2\ 0 .0\ 34 12.7\-
SAT . . . . ..... 1 .4\ 10 3. 7\ 0 .0\ 27 10.1\ 
SUN .. . ...... 2 .7\ 15 5.6\ 2 . 7% 51 19.0\ 
Total Cases. 11 4 .lt 103 38.4\ 7 2.6\ 268 100.0\ 
Table 16 Wind force by Day of week 
DAY OF WEEK 
Wind force 
MON TUB WED THU 
0 ........... 1 .3\ 0 .0\ 0 .0\ 0 . 0\ 
1. .......... 0 .0\ 0 .0\ 0 .0\ 0 .0\ 
2 ........... 9 2.4\ 6 1. 6\ 16 4.3\ 25 6. et 
3 ........... 9 2.4\ 16 4.3\ 26 7.0\ 19 5.1\ 
4 ..... . ..... 7 1. 9\ 8 2.2\ 7 1. 9\ 11 3.0\ 
5 ........... 0 .0\ 3 .8\ 1 0 2.7\ 6 1. 6\ 
6 .. . ..• . . . .. 2 . 5\ 1 .3\ 1 .3\ 6 1. 6\ 
7 .. . . .• . .. . . 3 .8\ 2 . 5\ 1 .3\ 4 1.1\ 
8 .....•..... 4 1.1\ 2 . 5\ 1 . 3\ 3 .8\ 
9 ... • .•.. . .. 2 .5\ 4 1.1\ 0 . 0\ 6 1. 6\ 
10 •••.•..... 0 . 0\ 0 . 0\ 1 .3\ 1 .3\ 
11. .. .... . .. 0 .0\ 0 .0 \ 0 .0\ 2 .5\ 
Total Cases . 37 10.0\ 42 11 . 4\ 63 17.0\ 83 22.4\ 
DAY OF WEEK Total Cases 
Wind force 
FRI SAT SUN 
0 ........... 0 .0\ 0 .0\ 0 . 0\ 1 .3\ 
1 ........... 2 .5\" 1 .3\ 0 . 0\ 3 .8\ 
2 ........... 9 2.4\ 10 2. 7\ 15 4.1\" 90 24.3\ 
3 ...... ..... 14 3. 8\" 8 2.2\ 15 4 .lt 1 07 28.9\ 
4 ........... 6 1. 6\ 4 1.1\ 10 2. 7\ 53 14.3\ 
5 ........... 8 2.2\ 7 1.9\ 5 1.4\ 39 10.5\ 
6 . .. ..... . .. 5 1 . 4\ 5 1.4\ 6 1. 6\ 26 7.0\ 
7 .... .. ... .. 5 1.4\ 2 .5\ 3 . 8\ 20 5 . 4\ 
8 ........... 2 .5\ 3 .8\ 0 . 0\ 15 4 . 1\ 
9 ......... .. 0 . 0\ 0 .0\ 0 .0\ 12 3 .2\ 
10 ......... . 0 .0\ 0 .0\ 0 . 0\ 2 .5\ 
11. .. . ...... 0 .0\ 0 .0\ 0 . 0\ 2 .5\ 
Total Cases. 51 13.8\ 40 10.8\ 54 14. 6\" 370 100.0\ 
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Table 17 Sea state by Day of week 
DAY OF WEEK 
Sea state 
MON TUE WED THU 
1 . . ......... 2 .5\ 1 .3\ 0 .0\ 2 .5\ 
2 ........... 10 2 . 7\ 17 4.6\ 28 7.6\ 32 8.7\ 
3 ........... 10 2.7\ 11 3.0\ 20 5 . 4\ 22 6. 0\ 
4 ........... 3 .8\ 5 1.4\ 8 2 .n 8 2.2\ 
5 ...... ..... 3 . 8 \ 2 . 5 \ 2 . 5\ 1 0 2.7\ 
6 . .... . ..... 8 2 .2\ 5 1.4\ 2 . 5 \ 5 1.4\ 
7 ........... 1 . 3\ 1 . 3 \ 1 .3\ 4 1.1\ 
Total Cases. 37 10.1\ 42 11.4\ 61 16.6\ 83 22 . 6\ 
DAY OF WEEK Total Cases 
Sea state 
FRI SAT SUN 
1 .... .. ... . . 2 .5\ 1 .3\ 5 1.4\ 13 3.5\ 
2 ........... 17 4.6\ 12 3.3\ 17 4 . 6\ 133 36.2\ 
3 . . ...... ... 11 3 . 0\ 7 1.9\ 17 4.6\ 98 26. 7t 
4 ........... 8 2.2\ 14 3.8\ 10 2 . 7\ 56 15.3\ 
5 . . . . . . .. . .. 12 3.3\ 5 1. 4\ 3 . 8\ 3 7 10 .1\ 
6 .......... . 0 . 0 \ 1 .3\ 2 . 5\ 23 6 .3\ 
7 ••... • ...• • 0 . 0 \ 0 . 0 \ 0 .0\ 7 1.9\ 
Total Cases. so 13.6\ 40 10.9\ 54 14.7\ 367 100.0\ 
Tabl e 1 8 Wind f o r ce by Tonnage group 
GROSS TONNAGE 
Wind force 
UNDER 100 100-199 200-499 500-999 1 000-2999 
0 ..... .. .... 0 .0\ 1 .3\ 0 .0\ 0 .0\ 0 . Ot 
1 ........ ... 1 . 3\ 0 . 0\ 1 .3\ 0 .Ot 1 . 3\ 
2 ...... . ... . 21 5. 7t 8 2 .n 15 4.1\ 16 4.3\ 13 3.5\ 
3 .... . ...... 41 11 . 1\ 8 2.2\ 8 2.2\ 19 5 . 1\ 10 2 .7\ 
4 ..... . . . ... 25 6.8\ 11 3 . 0\ 4 1.1\ 6 1. 6\ 2 . 5\ 
5 ........... 13 3.5\ 5 1.4\ 3 . 8\ 4 1.1\ 7 1. 9\ 
6 .. ... .... .. 14 3.8\ 3 .8\ 1 . 3\ 2 .5\ 4 1.1\ 
7 ..... . ..... 12 3.2\ 0 .0\ 3 .8\ 2 .5\ 0 .0\ 
8 .... ....... 7 1. 9\ 5 1 . 4\ 1 .3\ 1 .3\ 0 .0\ 
9 ........... 3 .8\ 0 . 0\ 2 .5\ 3 .8\ 1 .3\ 
10 .......... 0 .0\ 0 .0\ 0 .0\ 0 .0\ 0 .O t 
11 .......... 0 .0\ 1 .3\ 0 .0\ 1 .3\ 0 .0\ 
Total Cases. 137 37.0\ 42 11.4\ 38 10 . 3\ 54 14.6\ 38 10.3\ 
GROSS TONNAGE Total Cases 
Wind force 
3000-4999 5000-9999 10000 & OVER 
0 ..... ... . .. 0 .0\ 0 .0\ 0 .Ot 1 . 3\ 
1 .. ..... .... 0 . Ot 0 .0\ 0 . 0\ 3 . 8\ 
2 ..... ..... . 8 2.2\ 1 . 3\ 8 2 .n 90 24.3\ 
3 .... ....... 6 1.6\ 7 1. 9\ 8 2.2\ 107 28.9\ 
4 ... .. .... . . 3 . 8\ 2 .5\ 0 . 0\ 53 14 . 3\ 
5 ....... . . .. 3 .8\ 0 .Ot 4 1.1\ 39 10 . 5\ 
6 .......... . 0 .0\ 1 . 3\ 1 . 3\ 26 7.0\ 
7 ... . . .. .... 1 .3\ 0 .0\ 2 .5\ 20 5.4\ 
8 ... . . . . .. . . 0 .0\ 0 .0\ 1 .3\ 15 4.1\ 
9 ....... .... 1 .3\ 0 .0\ 2 . 5\ 12 3.2\ 
10 ....... .. . 1 .3\ 0 .0\ 1 .3\ 2 .5\ 
11 ....... . .. 0 .0\ 0 .0\ 0 .0\ 2 .St 
Total Cases . 23 6.2\ 11 3.0\ 27 7.3\ 370 100 .0\ 
237 
Table 19 Tonnage group by Visibility 
VISIBILITY 
Tonnage group Less than 0.03 0.03-0 . 09 miles 0. 10-0 .49 miles 0.50-1.09 
UNDER 100 ...... 11 4.1\ 16 6. 0 t 9 3 .4t 3 
100-199 ....... . 2 .7\ 11 4.1\ 2 .7t 1 
200-499 ........ 4 1.5\ 8 3 .0\ 6 2 . 2 \ 2 
500-999 ......•. 1 . 4\ 18 6. 7\ 5 l. 9\ 1 
1000-2999 ...... 3 l.U 9 3.4\ 3 l.lt 0 
3000-4999 ...... 2 .7\ 6 2.2\ 1 . 4\ 0 
5000-9999 ...... 0 .0\ 0 .Ot 2 .7t 1 
10000 & OVER ... 2 . 7\ 1 . 4\ 5 l. 9t 2 
Total Cases .... 25 9.3\ 69 25. 7t 33 12.3\ 10 
VISIBILITY 
Tonnage group 
1.10-2.19 miles 2.20-5.39 miles 5.40-10.99 miles 
UNDER 100 ...... 5 l. 9\ 3 l.U 43 16.0\ 
100-199 ........ 2 . 7t 2 . 7t 9 3.4\ 
200-499 ........ 1 . 4\ 1 . 4\ 7 2.6\-
500-999 ........ 1 .4\ 3 l.H 12 4 . 5\-
1000-2999 ...... 1 .4\ 1 . 4\ 14 5 . 2\-
3000-4 999 ...... 0 . Ot 0 .0\ 4 l. 5t 
5000-9999 .. .... 0 .Ot 0 .Ot 5 l. 9t 
10000 & OVER ... 0 .Ot 1 . 4\ 9 3.4\ 
Total Cases .... 10 3. 7t 11 4 .1\ 103 38 . 4\ 
Note: 
(1) Source of information: Author compiled the tables based on 
the statistical analysis of 3 81 
ship-casualties 
(2) Number of cases: 38 1 cases unless otherwise stated 
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miles 
l.lt 
.4\ 
• 7\-
.4\ 
.0\ 
.0\ 
. 4\ 
. 7\ 
3. 7\-
11 and Over Total cases 
5 1. 9t 95 35.4\ 
1 .4\ 30 11.2\ 
0 .Ot 29 10.8\-
0 . Ot 41 15 .3\ 
0 .Ot 31 11 . 6\ 
0 .O t 13 4 .9\ 
1 .4\ 9 3.4\ 
0 .0 \ 20 7.5\ 
7 2.6\ 268 l OO.Ot 
Annex D 
LIST OF TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS 
1. INCHON INBOUND/OUTBOUND ROUTES 
PERIOD A 
1976 
Date Time NiJITie Type GRT Lat. Long. Flag Hain causal factor 
GRD Jul 14 1021 Empire Cargo 1599 37087 126210 Panama Inaccurate position 
Inaccurate speed calculation 
1977 
Date Time NiJITie Type GRT Lat. Long. Flag Hain causal factor 
COL May 3 0741 Bum 11 Tanker 6333 37122 126243 Korea Violation of rules in fog 
1978 
Date Time NiJITie Type GRT Lat. Long. Flag Hain causal factor 
COL May 21 I443 No. 2 Lucky Tanker 3561 37041 126159 Korea Missed time to avert danger Operia Cargo 16938 37041 126159 Liberia Excessive speed 
1979 
Date Time NiJITie Type GRT Lat. Long. Flag. Hain causal factor 
COL Jul 4 1235 L i 1 ac Cargo 3381 37101 126223 Korea V'tion of rules in narrow eh. 
Red Sky Cargo 18723 37101 126223 Liberia Neg. of l'out & Ex. spd in fog 
1980 
Date Time NiJITie Type GRT Lilt. Long. Flag Hain causal factor 
COL Feb 12 2105 Sewoon Cargo 11998 37172 126251 Korea 
Strait Oalia Tanker 44263 37172 126251 Panama V'tion of rules in narrow eh. 
N'gence to avert danger 
GRD Feb 24 0600 Korean Peace Cargo 16897 37136 126246 Korea Error in tidal range.cal 'tion 
COL May 14 2120 No,25 Shin-A Cargo 1993 37172 126256 Korea No fog signal & ex. speed 
No.1 Oae Jin Fish 716 37172 126256 Korea 
GRD Sep 7 0003 Hanwoo Cargo 14822 37088 126209 Korea Mishandled steering & 
strong current 
PERIOD 8 
1981 
Date Time NiJITie Type GRT Lat. Long. Flag Main causal factor 
COL Aug 28 2008 5 Kinsei Maru LPG 615 37071 126191 Japan Neg of 1 'out in narrow eh. 
1982 
Date Time NiJITie Type GRT Lat. Long. Flag Main causal factor 
COL Jul 3 0555 So-Yang Cargo 1596 37232 126320 Korea V'tion of rules in fog 
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1983 
Date Time Name Type GRT Lat. Long. Flag Main causal factor 
GRD Mar 25 2119 Hae Keum Cargo 19276 37135 126252 Korea Missed time to A/Co. 
COL Aug 6 0824 Hae Gui Cargo 1578 37224 126327 Korea V'tion of ship safety rules 
GRD Sep 15 0405 No.9 Kun-Shin Fish 37095 126225 Korea 
1984 
Date Time Name Type GRT Lat. Long. Flag Main causal factor 
COL Dec 27 2045 YoungChemicary Tanker 3267 37046 126155 Korea 
Se Kwang No. I ? ? 37046 126155 Korea 
1985 
Date Time Name Type GRT Lat. Long. Flag Main causal factor 
COL Jun 22 1721 AtlasCounceller Cargo 12771 37184 126262 Korea (Reduced visibility) 
Oi nos I Cargo 14241 37184 126262 Greece 
1986 
Date Time NiJITie Type GRT Lat. Long. Flag Main causal factor 
GRD Jan 10 2227 Negros Cargo 4634 37137 126246 Panama M'ring error of pilot 
PERIOD C 
COL Jun 17 1209 Pacific Express 20664 37190 126269 Korea 
17 Sung Un 649 <Tong Sudo) V'tion of local rule 
1987 
Date Time Name Type GRT Lat. Long. Flag Main causal factor 
COL Jun 4 0010 A·Yong Tanker 3859 37070 126193 (Budo SW 2.2·) Asleep & v'tion of s'ling rule 
COL Aug 13 1724 918 Ham Naval 3020 37198 126234 Ex spd & v'tion of s'ling rule 
1988 
Date Time NiJITie Type GRT Lat. Long. Flag Main causal factor 
COL Jun 8 1258 Korean L i fter Cargo 1599 37210 126314 Not fix ~osition 
Fighter Cargo 16423 <S of Palmidol Cyprus Sail to eft of Sudo 
COL Jun 18 2105 S. Venus Cargo 22331 37111 126116 (Ent. of So-Sudo) Ex spd & alter to port 
1989 
Date Time NiJITie Type GRT Lat. Long. Flag Main causal factor 
COL May 28 1006 Kyungki Ham Naval 3000 37214 126319 Ex spd & sailed on wrong side 
Vietnam Namtu Cargo 5710 (Palmi dol Vietnam 
1990 
Date Time NiJITie Type GRT Lat. Long. Flag Hain causal factor 
COL Jan 8 1955 S'pore Glory Cargo 7343 37052 126175 Panama No NUC light 
COL Apr 1840 Asean Victory Cargo 11519 37109 126116 Panama 
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2. KANJOL-GAP WATERWAY 
PERIOD A 
1978 
Date Time Name Type GRT Lat. Long. Flag Hain causal factor 
COL Jan 7 0720 Asian Energy Tanker 104902 35180 129230 Liberia Negligence of lookout 
COL Jan 30 1915 Jin Hwa Tanker 475 35215 129237 Korea 
2 Kyung Jin Cargo 384 35215 129237 Korea Negligence of lookout 
lack of cooperation 
COL Feb 4 0030 7 Kwang 11 Fish 351 35153 129197 Korea Negligence of lookout 
GRD Jun 4 1548 Kara Cargo 1911 35215 129232 Korea Lack of experience & 
unskilled navigation 
1980 
Date Time Name Type GRT Lat. Long. Flag Main causal factor 
GRD Nov 6 2010 11 Shin Cargo 508 35225 129220 Korea Reduced visibility 
8"down of radar 
1981 
Date Time Name Type GRT Lat. Long. Flag Main causal factor 
COL Jul 6 2200 Shin·A Tanker 1505 35190 129245 Korea L"out & spd 
So Rim Cargo 995 35190 129245 Korea E"sive spd in fog 
COL Aug 21 1348 Ocean Ace Cargo 14309 35210 129278 Korea Spd in fog. avert danger 
Challix Cargo 6732 35210 129278 ? Spd. fog signal. 1 ·out 
1982 
Date Time Name Type GRT Lat. Long. Flag Main causal factor 
COL Aug 10 0537 No. 1 8ukpyung Cargo 497 35223 129288 Korea Rule in reduced vis. 
PERIOD 8 
1984 
Date Time Name Type GRT Lat. Long. Flag Main causa I factor 
COL Jul 15 1855 I Hae Kyung Tanker 500 35210 129250 Korea 
1985 
Date Time Name Type GRT Lat. Long. Flag Hain causal factor 
COL NJr 8 1310 Tae Yang Tanker 434 35193 129250 Korea 
Dae Hyung Tanker 433 35193 129250 Korea (New name: Taeyang) 
COL Jul 17 2050 Geum Sung Cargo 693 35174 129236 Korea 
Kaenary Cargo 4285 35174 129236 Korea A/Co to port in fog(TSSl 
1986 
Date Time Name Type GRT Lat. Long. Flag Main causal factor 
COL Oct 30 0350 Eastern Dragon Cargo 3010 35238 129281 Korea 
Hwa Rang Fish 488 35238 129281 Korea 
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3. GADEOG-SUDO AND JINHAE-MAN AREA 
PERIOD A 
1978 
Date Time Name Type GRT Lat. Long, Flag 
COL Oct 21 1027 101 Odae-Yang Tanker 706 35020 128453 Korea 
GRD Dec 27 0238 17 Shin-Young Cargo 446 35017 128443 Korea 
1980 
Date Time Name Type GRT Lat. Long. Flag 
COL Jun 24 0813 Angel Pass 58 35028 128400 Korea 
Angel N0.2 Pass 56 35028 128400 Korea 
1981 
Date Time Name Type GRT Lat. Long. Flag 
GRD Jun 13 1725 Seven Star Cargo 730 34593 128501 Korea 
COL Jun 16 1726 Angel N0.5 Pass 105 35017 128469 Korea 
Angel No.6 Pass 107 35017 128469 Korea 
1982 
Date Time Name Type GRT Lat. Long. Flag 
GRD Feb 28 1820 Sewon Cargo 397 35028 128368 Korea 
PERIOD 8 
Date Time Name Type GRT Lat. Long. Flag 
COL Jul 25 0915 I Hae Yoon Fish 337 35023 128395 Korea 
Keum Gang Tug 236 35023 128395 Korea 
GRD Jul 29 0500 17 Pyung Kwang Tug 34579 128434 Korea 
COL Aug 1055 7 Sunil Cargo 1933 35040 128384 Korea 
Dong Myung ? 35040 128384 Korea 
1983 
Date Time Name Type GRT Lat. Long. Flag 
COL Sep 16 0600 7 Hyun Sung Cargo 177 35061 128373 Korea 
1984 
Date Time Name Type GRT Lat. Long. Flag 
GRD Jun 4 2205 Jean Jin Cargo 995 35056 128427 Korea 
COL Sep 14 0200 1 Sung Kwang Tug ? 35005 128481 .Korea 
KalimantanEmpat Cargo 2984 35005 128481 ? 
1985 
Date Time Name Type GRT Lat. Long. Flag 
GRD Sep 22 1030 11 Keum San Cargo 87 35022 128368 ·Korea 
1986 
Date Time Name Type GRT Lat. Long. Flag 
COL Nov 22 0935 Heung Koog TanKer 500 35061 128370 Korea 
22 Sein ? 35061 128370 Korea 
COL Dec 31 0450 9 Hwa Pyung Cargo 730 35020 128467 Korea 
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4. PUSAN HANG AREA 
PERIOD A 
1974 
Date Time Name 
11 1630 RAM Borneo 
2 16 0945 RAM Global Pioneer 
4 1254 RAM Beatris 
4 4 0300 COL Bal-san 
Nosan Star 
4 12 2340 COL Mount Atos 
4 21 0230 RAM New Samshin 
5 14 0935 RAM Lilac 
5 24 2345 COL Koryo 
Fun Cl ift 
11 11 1823 COL 9 Heung-A 
12 4 2330 GRD Daiho Maru 
12 12 0530 RAM 3 Shin-A 
Date Time Name 
2 13 0500 GRD Sea Wings 
3 9 1740 RAM I Lucky 
3 25 0915 RAM Mok-Ryun 
Type 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
GRT Lat _ Long. /'lain causal factor 
3920 35066 129029 Excessive speed 
1566 35067 129030 Unexpected gale (No,3 pier) 
3908 35062 ·129027 Strong wind (No.2 pier) 
8432 35061 129053 Improper m'ring in gale 
2765 35061 129053 
Cargo 14133 35043 129067 Negligence of lookout 
Cargo 501 35063 129054 Negligence to danger 
Cargo 3381 35065 129039 Negligence. to gale 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Tanker 
Type 
Cargo 
Tanker 
Cargo 
6819 35055 129050 
8785 35055 129050 Cross other ships course 
556 35001 128582 
999 35064 129042 Unexpected gale 
902 35059 129034 Mishandled M/engine 
GRT Lat. Long. /'lain causal factor 
820 35060 129027 Negligence to ship operation (No. I pier) 
3561 35068 129044 Negligence to bad weather 
3806 35061 129040 Negligence to danger 
Liberia 
Panama 
Norway 
4 2 1013 RAM Global Exporter Cargo 
4 21 1400 RAM 3 Lucky Tanker 
1569 35067 129031 Unskilled & careless manoeuvring 
3350 35068 129044 Improper manning on bridge 
8 9 1800 GRD Tongwoon 1206 
10 2 1518 RAM New Hanjin 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Tanker 
Cargo 
91 35063 129042 Negligence to danger 
550 35062 129028 Negligence to danger (No.2 pier) Too close to pier 
885 35045 129065 Negligence of lookout 
820 35060 129027 E'sive speed 
10 14 2035 RAM 15 Shin-A 
10 27 0750 RAM Sea Wings 
10 30 2200 GRD 13 Bum yang Fishcarry 90 35061 129049 Negligence of lookout 
11 19 1805 COL 7 Keum Shin Cargo 
Pacific Conbay Cargo 
502 35066 129035 Cross other ships course 
472 35066 129035 Negligence to danger 
11 23 1242 COL Manwa 
Hanbada 
Cargo 9159 35046 129052 Not obey the order 
Training 3491 35046 129052 
12 5 1815 COL Dolphin 
Date Time Name 
3 23 0815 COL 1 Do-shin 
Arecos 
4 17 1747 COL Aroho 
Yushio Maru 
Ferry 
Type 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
4 20 1555 COL 11 Hakuyo Maru Tug 
Yushio Maru Cargo 
4 23 0230 GRD Lord Cargo 
5 0835 COL 15 Shin-A 
3 Nitsho Maru 
Tanker 
Cargo 
59 35059 129030 Excessive speed 
GRT Lat. Long. /'lain causal factor 
999 35065 129029 Didn't find other ship 
10309 (Centre pier) 
4967 35065 129040 
1995 35065 129040 Anchored close to other 
80 35066 129040 
1995 35066 129040 Negligence of lookout 
4673 35061 129049 Old chart 
885 35062 129042 
188 35062 129042 No knowledge of regulation 
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Liberia 
Japan 
Japan 
Japan 
Japan 
Panama 
Date Time Name 
6 8 0230 COL Venus 
Mok Hwa 
6 9' 0656 RAM Mi- yang 
7 21 0915 COL Han Yong 
5 Jung,Geum 
12 2 1140 COL Hae-hyun 
Silver Pagoda 
12 20 0900 RAM Chun-Ri 
Date Time Name 
13 0830 COL 1 Hyoam 
Hae 11 
3 13 1930 RAM Queen Dragon 
4 6 1400 RAM Shin-A 
4 0725 RAM 5 Yoo Nam 
4 13 0839 GRD Ruby Star 
4 19 1310 COL Odae ho 
Narcissus 
5 2200 RAM Dae-an 
Type 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Type 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
GRT Lat_ Long. Hilin causal factor 
1998 35069 129040. 
3653 35069 129040 Negligence to storm/gale 
3787 35069 129032 B'down of shore bitt 
(No.4 pier) 
3924 35062 129040 Improper manoeuvre 
941 35062 129040 Not proper signal 
4009 35058 129055 
13370 35058 129055 Improper anchoring 
501 35062 129026 Mishandled M/engine 
GRT Lat. Long. Hilin causal factor 
508 35061 129042 Violation of rules 
110 35061 129042 
997 35064 129055 Negligence to bad weather 
1505 35063 129054 Negligence to bad weather 
3949 35055 129055 Dragging anchor 
3963 35048 129050 No small correction 
8991 35056 129057 Negligence of ship 
operation 
4000 35056 129057 
999 35063 129053 N'gence to storm 
5 23 0647 COL Marine Star 
World amber 
Cargo 3009 35051 129051 
Tanker 28488 35051 129051 Main engine failure 
6 2340 COL 5 Yea Nam 
Silver Fun 
6 2 0010 COL 5 Min Woo 
72 Chil Sung 
3 1614 COL 2 In Wang 
Tokerau 
8 1433 COL 15 Shin-A 
8 3 1205 GRD Nambang 
12 8 1740 COL Doraji 
Chun Yang 
12 15 0745 RAM Merry Star 
12 18 1200 COL 8 Heung-A 
12 29 1200 RAM Korean Lifter 
Date Time Name 
2 13 1131 RAM Myung Sung 
3 9 0159 COL Sung Ryong 
Grand Opal 
3 10 2013 COL 2 Donam 
Mok Geun 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Tanker 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Tanker 
Cargo 
Ferry 
Tug 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Type 
Tanker 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
4 5 1720 COL Daeduk Cargo 
2 Yamaume Maru Cargo 
4 28 1817 GRD 1 Hansung Cargo 
6 2020 RAM Pegasus Plenty Cargo 
6 25 0926 COL I Mano 
6 1843 COL Dong Sung 
2 Sam.Bu 
Cargo 
Tanker 
Tanker 
3949 35063 129058 Storm 
5000 35063 129058 Negligence of lookout 
673 35062 129055 
476 35062 129055 Negligence of refuge 
4237 35052 129052 Dence fog. excessive speed 
9328 35052 129052 
885 35060 129034 Violation of col. rules 
1974 35059 129037 Improper manning on .bridge 
890 35061 129033 Violation of rules 
23 35061 129033 No reaction to col. danger 
1999 35062 129026 Improper manoeuvre 
558 35057 129045 Improper manoeuvre 
1598 35063 129057 Didn't use anchor in docking 
GRT Lat. Long. Hain causal factor 
998 35068 129044 Negligence of manoeuvring 
599 35051 129050 
12000 35051 129050 Storm & improper manoe'g 
1998 35066 129041 Negligence of duty 
3767 35066 129041 Lack of knowledge on ship 
manv·g & improper decision 
1190 35068 129038 
1874 35068 129038 Improper manoeuvring (anchor) 
993 35045 129051 No new chart 
4520 35068 129038 Anchored too close to Hanyong 
1995 35061 129033 B'down of steering(ex. sp'd 
467 35050 129070 No fog signal 
523 35050 129070 Excessive speed in fog 
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Panama 
Liberia 
Panama 
Liberia 
Date Time Name 
7 13 2010 RAM Queen dragon 
22 0356 COL 20 Chemicarry 
Dong Yang 
PERIOD 8 
Date Time Name 
12 21 1809 GRD 5 Min Woo 
12 31 1817 GRD Sam Jung 
Date Time Name 
Type 
Cargo 
LPG 
Cargo 
Type 
Tanker 
Cargo 
Type 
4 2028 COL Myung Sung Tanker 
15 1418 GRD 5 Yoo Nam Cargo 
4 14 0825 RAM Aurora Cargo 
4 19 2020 RAM 101 0-dae-yang Tanker 
4 21 0200 GRD 2 Han Sung Cargo 
4 23 1030 RAM Eun sung Cargo 
4 24 0705 GRD Yulsan Poseidon Cargo 
4 24 0914 GRD Trident 
5 1810 GRD Tahang 
Cargo 
Cargo 
GRT Lat. Long. Hain causal factor 
997 35062 129026 lack of docking ability 
635 35045 129060 No reporting 
1599 35045 129060 Negligence of lookout 
GRT Lat. Long. Ha in causal factor 
673 35060 129037 Unskilled manoeuvring 
998 35061 129049 Not fix posision 
Negligence of lookout 
GRT Lat. Long. Hain causal factor 
998 35006 129015 No warning signal.viol ·n rule 
3949 35060 129036 poor inspection of M/E 
4252 35071 129038 Unski·lled manoeuvring 
706 35060 129037 Other ship crossed ahead 
991 35054 129045 Error in voyage planning 
702 35063 129054 Reckless sailing 
13193 35058 129065 Negligence to bad weather 
15533 35053 129059 Negligence to bad weather 
1785 35019 129057 Improper manoeuvring 
6 26 0756 COL Kyung Yang 
Cho Yang 
Factory 5377 35055 129069 Improper anchoring 
7 14 1345 COL 17 Dong-A 
Hakori Fur 
Cargo 3668 35055 129069 Negligence. of routine 
Tug 27 35043 129060 No fog signal. excessive 
Fishcarry 328 35043 129060 speed. negligence to danger 
7 19 1219 RAM Sealand Leader Cargo 17376 35047 129066 Misobservation of 
8 1913 RAM Queendom Venture Cargo 
8 17 1732 COL Chestnut Heroine Cargo 
Kwang Fung Cargo 
10 21 1710 GRD Hanla Pride 
12 31 1735 COL Sea Bear 
8i8i 
Date Time Name 
11 OB20 RAM Nam Kyung 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Type 
Cargo 
Cargo 
(No.2 buoy) surroundings 
30000 35071 129037 E"sive speed to berth 
29411 35055 129060 Typhoon (Erbing) 
4300 35055 129060 
9953 35055 129056 Lack of experience 
1978 35059 129030 Improper anchoring 
16000 35059 129030 
GRT Lat. Long. Hain causal factor 
502 35069 129033 Excessive speed 
Failure of telegraph 
3003 35058 129045 Storm 3 4 1114 GRD Namyang Ace 
3 5 1700 GRD New Songdo 
3 21 2300 RAM Seed Reef 
4 5 1540 GRD In Wang 
Cargo 11760 35053 129059 Negligence of lookout 
4 5 1650 COL Queen Dragon 
Bowoon 5 
4 5 !BOO GRD 2 In Wang 
4 8 1630 GRD Young· Dong 
4 19 1430 RAM Glory Ocean 
4 19 1740 GRD Kordes 
5 16 0218 GRD 5 Yoo Sung 
improper manoeuvring 
Fishcarry 1391 35057 129043 Dragging anchor 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Tanker 
Cargo 
Tanker 
Cargo 
Tanker 
Tanker 
3451 35057 129061 Negligence to storm 
993 35057 129043 Negligence to storm 
1938 35057 129043 Dragging anchor 
4237 35053 129059 Dragging anchor 
431 35061 129049 Not fix position. 
unskilled manoeuvring 
2593 35060 129026 Gust during docking 
483 35063 129042 Negligence to bad weather 
11I4 35027 129009 Error in voyage planning 
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Korea 
Liberia 
Panama 
Date Time NiJ/De 
6 9 0900 COL Kwang Yang 
7 19 0755 COL Chun Kyung 
7 Hwa Pyung 
22 1733 RAM Salix 
6 31 1600 RAM Global Moon 
Type 
Tanker 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
10 14 0810 RAM Global Venture Cargo 
GRT Lat. Long. Hain causal factor 
64 35069 129032 Unskilled manoeuvring 
1241 35050 129057 No plotting, misread radar. 
530 35050 129057 negligence. to danger 
6732 35072 129041 Failure of M/engine & 
negligence to bad weather 
14200 35066 129026 Poor placing of fender (Centre pier) at pier 
1567 35066 129030 Improper manoeuvre 
12 3 1610 COL 6uk Neung 
12 12 1950 GRO 7 Shin-A 
12 26 1630 COL Oong Nam 
Factory 6506 350!9 129013 ~ailure of main engine 
Date Time Name 
3 
2 1720 COL American Mark 
16 Heung-A 
3 2010 COL Moon Star 
36 Hee Young 
Tanker 
Cargo 
Type 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Tug 
3 27 1730 RAM Hwapyung Jinju Cargo 
6 8 0753 GRO 5 Yu Sung 
6 16 1503 COL 5 Hwa Pyung 
Constadoula 
6acolista 
9 0742 COL I Chang Sung 
Sunny Rose 
7 15 2215 COL I Do Nam 
Silver Star 
Tanker 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
337 35021 129056 No fog signal 
3003 35049 129060 Cross other's course. 
GRT Lat. Long. Ha in causal factor 
1574 35057 129043 No voyage planning 
999 35057 129043 
1640 35060 129026 
29 35060 129026 
Negligence of cooperation 
Negligence of lookout. 
violation of rules. 
improper manning(no certil 
1595 35060 129027 Mishandled M/engine 
1114 35059 129036 Error in position of anchor 
365 35051 129062 Negligence in dence fog 
7 35051 129062 
460 35040 129061 Excessive speed in dence 
3453 35040 129061 fog. negligence to danger 
1996 35009 129072 Excessive sp'd in fog 
3000 35009 129072 
16 0746 COL American Merchant Cargo 21687 35048 129062 Other ship's rule v'tion 
6 26 0600 COL Sea Kwang Tug 
9 0030 RAM Pacific Dragon 2 Cargo 
9 3 0455 COL One-west 9 
Kota Sejati Cargo Cargo 
10 19 0746 RAM Korean Wonisone Cargo 
11 22 0743 RAM 9 Heung'A 
12 29 1852 RAM lnchon 
Date Time Name 
0930 GRO Sam Han 
2 26 1000 RAM Hae Gui 
3 9 0718 COL New Dolphin 
Ooraji 
3 15 0850 RAM 18 Chemicarry 
3 31 1125 COL Coral Star 
7 22 0850 COL Se Hwa 
8 24 0115 COL 6 Heung-A 
Shogo Maru 
12 9 1755 RAM New Dolphin 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Type 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Pass 
Pass 
Tanker 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Pass 
19 35045 129025 
35063 129056 Typhoon (Agnesl 
? 35060 129031 
9719 35060 129031 
23930 35047 129066 Ramming to buoy 
556 35060 129027 (No.1 pier) 
3818 35032 128582 Fish farming net 
GRT Lat. Long. Hain causal factor 
390 35061 129049 Too close to rock 
1578 35072 129042 Ramming to pier 
73 35059 129025 
890 35059 129025 
1586 35063 129056 Ramming to pier 
4100 35035 129034 
7 35036 129077 
558 35051 129063 
48775 35051 129063 
73 35059 129025 (Ferry dolpinl 
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Panama 
Japan 
S'pore 
1983 
Date Time Name Type GRT Lat. Long. Hain causal factor 
5 0723 RAM Arirang Pass 915 35058 129025 (ferry pier) 
3 16 1630 COL 2 Sun 11 Cargo 3336 35059 129038 
Naeoi 9 7 35059 129038 
3 26 1245 RAM 6. Don am Cargo 3839 35060 129026 Storm. unskilled m"ing 
5 5 0808 COL Brother Star Cargo 13078 35034 129073 Violation of rules(fogl 
Crimson Concord Cargo 3425 35034 129073 Neg. of cooperation 
5 6 0905 RAM Bochurn Cargo 3049 35059 129030 
0730 COL Merry Star Cargo 1999 35067 129033 
5 Samsam ? ? 35067 129033 
8 23 1210 RAM Oae Myung Tanker 433 35055 129043 (New name: Taeyangl 
9 11 1355 COL 7 Oonam Cargo 3840 35060 129028 
5 Oongho Tug 34 35060 129028 
9 28 0400 RAM Dol Jin Cargo 1969 35071 129049 
PERIOD c 
Date Time Name Type GRT Lat. Long. Hain causal factor 
11 0554 COL Phoenix Pass 77 35023 129010 
Hae Ouk ? 
11 9 1824 COL Kuk Hwa Tug 185 35067 129035 
2 11 Jin Tanker 130 (front of No.4 pier) 
1984 
Date Time Name Type GRT Lat. Long. Hain causal factor 
4 0313 COL New Man 7 7 35030 129035 
Sun Wave 7 ? (S outer Hr) 
2 6 1030 COL 103 Nam Sung F.Carry 299 35036 129017 
9 Yoo Sung Tug 29 (S outer Hrl 
3 14 1140 GRO 9 Shin-Ah Tanker 840 35063 129057 (New name: Woo Ryongl (Tongmyung pier) 
4 18 1620 COL Saebada F.Factory 2275 35028 129028 
Three Ocean 7 ? (S outer Hr) 
6 20 0528 COL Hwapyung Songdo Cargo 1000 35048 129058 
Lady Josephine ? 
8 21 1000 RAM Hae Gui Cargo 1578 35071 129042 (No 7 pier) (New name:Haesung 7) 
10 23 1510 RAM Hae Sung Cargo 1984 35071 129042 (No 7 pier) 
11 21 2340 GRO 5 Oae Yang Tanker 596 35060 129036 
1985 
Date Time Name Type GRT Lat. Long. Hain causal factor 
28 2330 COL Ocean Blue Tanker 2697 35036 129024 (New name: Moogal l 
Seed Reef F. Carry 1391 (S outer Hrl 
2 19 0630 RAM !1 shin Cargo 3600 35055 129043 (Cheonghakdong pier) 
3 23 0505 COL 1 Hyo Oong Tug 58 35051 129074 
Pheonix Passenger 77 (Q. anchorage) 
3 25 1100 GRO Haeyoung S i1 ver Cargo 15000 35033 129044 (S outer Hr l 
5 8 2145 RAM Hangang Glory Cargo 4996 35067 129030 RAM to other ship (No.3 Pier) 
6 11 1720 COL Pegasus Peace Cargo 2161 35042 129023 (New name: Grace Liberty Ill 
Jin Yong Tanker 1429 (S outer Hrl 
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Date Time Name Type GRT Lat. Long. Hain causal factor 
6 19 0900 RAM Sunny Ocean Cargo 3373 35067 129030 (New name: Oooyang Garnet) (No.3 pier) RAM to other ship 
6 19 1051 RAM 71 Chil Sung Cargo 853 35063 129054 (New name: Nam Kwang I) (Shell pier) RAM to other ship 
8 10 1940 GRO Haeyoung Light Cargo 15000 35033 129045 (S outer Hr) 
8 29 2050 GRO 6 Hi Yang Tanker 884 35059 129067 (Honam Pier) New Name:Oae Woong 
9 1610 COL Samba Expert 
Korean Chance 
Cargo? ? 35026 129026 
Cargo 37277 (S outer Hr) (New name: Choyang Chancel 
10 5 0827 COL Ferry Pukwan Ferry 6138 35058 129026 
Korea Carferry I Ferry 2904 (New name: Car Ferry Queen) 
10 5 1330 RAM· 5 Reefer 
10 13 0055 RAM Hwang Yong 
12 13 0745 GRO Chun Yang T~! 
12 18 0353 RAM Aurora 
12 28 0600 COL Tae Kwang 
Date Time Name 
4 23 0838 COL Royal Star 
Botany Triton 
6 12 1530 RAM Yong Bi 
31 0755 GRO 105 Sang Hae 
8 28 1405 GRD Haebaraki 
Date Time Name 
2 19 0505 COL Pal Pal 
11 Young 8u 
4 21 1048 GRD Global Star 
16 0345 GRD Probo Hawk 
8 17 1937 COL 77 Dong Bang 
Olympic 
9 25 0614 COL 6 Jang Young 
9 28 2055 COL Hyundai 14 
Namgang Glory 
11 1010 COL 67 Jin Young 
11 29 0100 RAM Sun Hanjin 
Date Time Name 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Tug 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Type 
Cargo 
Tanker 
Tug 
Cargo 
Type 
? 
Cargo 
Cargo 
3009 35053 129062 RAM to anchored ship (A-2 anchorage) 
22953 35063 129035 (New name:Global Fame) ([·4 anchorage) RAM to anchored ship 
111 35063 129041 
4253 35053 129063 RAM to anchored ship (A-2 Anchorage) 
2544 35022 129011 Crossing (S of Dudol V'tion of give way rule 
GRT Lat. Long. Ha in causal factor 
3131 35043 129068 (New name: Cargobay) 
3B90 
56 35072 129039 (No.6 pier) 
35061 129049 
35060 129068 
GRT Lat. Long. Hain causal factor 
35011 129010 (1.7' S of Dudol 
15545 35053 129059 (Near No.4 Buoy) 
31276 35044 129016 (S outer Hr) 
F.Carry 1527 35025 129010 
Passenger 199 (S of Dudol V'tion of give way rule 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Cargo 
Tug 
Cargo 
Type 
523 35054 129071 
14433 35049 129062 
4406 (Fairway) (New name: Trade Resources) 
50 35061 129041 (near Breakwater) 
1981 35061 129049 (Ko-Aml 
GRT Lat. Long. Hain causal factor 
23 0330 COL 51 Dong Sam Tug 90 35046 129019 Anchored - no proper Lt 
228 (S outer Hr) Lack of Lookout 702 Hi Haeng F.Carry 
4 0007 COL 7 Bo Kyung 
Dutch Senator 
4 10 1800 COL 3 Chang Sin 
7 2 1740 COL Probo Bani 
F.Carry 239 35001 129065 Crossing 
Cargo 16430 (S of Saengdo) V'tion of give way rule 
Tug 
Cargo 
30 35027 129058 Lack of Lookout (near Taejongdae) Meeting 
31276 35033 129027 (S outer Hr) 
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AnnexE 
No. VARIABLES 
CODING SCHEME FOR QUESTIONNAIRE 
VARIABL!E l:ABEL VALUE LABELS 
Jin-Soo PARK 
Institute of Marine Studies 
University of Plymouth 
BASIC INFORMA HON { 1-5 J 
1 SERIAL 
2 EXPERIE 
3 LASTRANK 
4 BGROUND 
5 SHIPSIZE 
FAMILIAR AREAS 
6 FAREAl 
7 FAREA2 
8 FAREA3 
9 FAREA4 
10 FAREA5 
11 FAREA6 
12 FAR EA? 
13 FAREA8 
14 FAREA9 
15 FAREA10 
Serial number 
Shipboard experience Number of years 
Last rank on board 1= Master/mate of merchant vessel 
2= Master/mate of ferry 
3= Master/mate of tug 
4= Master/mate of fishing vessel 
5= Master/mate of military. government vessel 
6= Master/mate of other vessel 
7= Radio operator 
8= Pi.lot 
9= Marine engineer 
10= Others 
Marine background 1= Shipping company 
2= Port/harbour official 
3= Education or research institute 
4= Government employee 
5= Coast guard 
6= Marine union or association 
7= Classi,fication or survey 
8= Others · 
9= VTS Operators 
Average size of vessel 1= Less than 100 gross ton 
{ 6-15 ) 
Tonghae area 
Pohang area 
Ulsan area 
Pusan area 
Masan/Jinhae area 
Yosu/Kwangyang area 
2= 100 500 ton 
3= 500 1.000 ton 
4= 1.000 - 5.000 ton 
5= 5.000 - 10.000 ton 
6= 10.000 - 30.000 ton 
7= 30.000 ton and over 
1= Yes 
1= Yes 
1= Yes 
1= Yes 
1= Yes 
1= Yes 
Cheju haehyop/Jangjug sudo area 1= Yes 
Maemul sudo/Mokpo area 1= Yes 
Kunsan/Janghang area 1= Yes 
Taean bando/Inchon area 1= Yes 
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2= No 
2= No 
2= No 
2= No 
2= No 
2= No 
2= No 
2= No 
2= No 
2= No 
RISK FACTORS ( 16-27 J 
16 VISIBIL Reduced visibility 0= No opinion/don't know 
1= Very seldom increases .risk 
17 STORM Stormy weather 2= Seldom increases ·risk 
3= Sometimes increases risk 
18 CURRENT Strong current/tidal stream 4= Often increases risk 
5= Very often increases risk 
19 FISHBOAT More fishing boats in shipping 1 a ne 
20 PLEABOAT More pleasure boats in shipping lane 
21 NARROWCH More narrow channel/passage 
22 TRAFFIC Higher density of traffic (merchant) 
23 FAIRWAY Poor design of fairway 
24 NAVAJOS Poor navigational aids 
25 HUMAN Human factor in manoeuvring 
26 RULEVIO Rule v.iolation 
27 OF ACTOR Other factors to increase marine risk 
OVERALL RISK BY AREA ( 28-37 J 
28 TONGHAE Tonghae area 0= No opinion/don't know 
1= Very low risk 
29 POHANG Pohang area 2= Low risk 
3= Moderate risk 
30 ULSAN Ulsan area 4= High risk 
5= Very high risk 
31 PUS AN Pusan area 
32 M AS AN Masan/Jinhae area 
33 YOSU Yosu/Kwangyang area 
34 CHEJU Cheju haehyop/Jangjug sudo area 
35 MOKPO Maemul sudo/Mokpo area 
36 KUNSAN Kunsan/Janghang area 
37 INCHON Taean bando to Inchon area 
ALTERNATIVES FOR RISK REDUCTION ( 38-48 ) 
38 WEATHER 
39 SPDLIMIT 
40 SAFEREG 
41 DREDGING 
42 UPNAVAID 
43 ADDTSS 
44 ADDCO 
45 ADDVTS 
46 IMTRAIN 
47 PROFISH 
48 OTHERALT 
Improved weather information 
Institution of speed l~mits in more.areas 
Stricter enforcement of ship safety regulations 
additional dredging 
Upgraded floating/fixed navigational aids 
Additional traffic separation schemes 
Additional recommended courses on charts 
Add it i ana 1 VTS 
Improved education and training for mariners 
0= No opinion 
1= Very little 
2= Little 
3= Moderate 
4= Significant 
5= Very significant 
Stricter enforcement of prohibition of fishing/excursion on fairway 
Other alternatives 
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HODIFICATION TO VTS ( .49-54 J 
49 PORTNAME Name of your port or area 
50 VTS GRAD Up/downgrade existing VTS 
51 VTS IMP In case of no VTS service 
52 VTS LEVL What level of VTS is adequate ? 
53 VTS TYPE What kind of VTS is adequate ? 
54 VTS AUTH Formal authority of VTS 
1= Tonghae 
2= Rohang1 
3= Ul san' 
4= Rusan 
5= Masan/Jinhae 
6= Yosu/Kwangyang 
7= Cheju 
8= Mokpo 
9= .Kunsan 
10= Inchon 
1= Downgrade or close 
2= Maintain at present level 
3= Improve or upgrade 
4= ,No opinion 
1= Implement 
2= Do not implement 
3= No opinion 
1= Level 1 
2= Level 2 
3= Level 3 
4= Level 4 
1= Port VTS 
2= ,Port and its approaches 
3= Coastal VTS 
4= Other type of VTS 
1= Harbour authority 
2= Coast Guard 
3= Pilot association 
4= Other · · 
VTS OPERATOR ( 55-57 ) 
55 OPR MAR 
56 OPR EXP 
57 OPR_QUA 
Marine experience is essential ? 1= Essential 
2= Not necessary 
3= No 
4= No idea 
What kind of previous experience? 1= Ship handling 
2= Communication 
3= Other experience 
What level of qualification? 1= Pilot 
2= Master's experience 
3= Master's certificate 
4= Chief mate's certificate 
5= Second mate's certificate 
6= Radio operator's certificate 
EFFECTIVENESS OF VTS ( 58-68 J 
58 EF VISIB 
59 EF METED 
60 EF TRAFF 
61 EF FISHG 
62 EF RESTR 
63 EF ROGUE 
64 EF EMERG 
65 EF LANGU 
66 EF EOMMU 
67 EF NOTJC 
Assistance in reduced v.isibility conditions o= ,No opinion 
1= Very unimportant 
Assistance in adverse meteorological conditions 2= Unimportant 
3= Average 
Assistance in dense traffic areas 4= Important 
Assistance in areas with fishing/pleasure boats 
Assistance in restricted waters 
Assistance in areas with rogue vessels 
Assistance to vessels in emergency 
Assistance with language/experience/knowledge 
Assistance with communication problems 
Provision of notices to shipping 
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5= Very important 
Annex F 
QUESTIONNAIREON MARINE SAFEl'Y 
AND VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICES 
IN KOREAN COASTAL WATERS 
Dear Colleague, 
We are presently undertaking a research programme on marine safety and Vessel Traffic 
Services (VTS) in Korean coastal waters. As part of this research, we are now seeking the 
opinions of marine experts of these systems so that their attitudes toward the existing service and 
their perception of marine risk may be analysed. 
A large sample of mariners across Korea is being surveyed. We are requesting you, as 
a marine experts, to complete the enclosed questionnaire stating your opinions. Although it may 
seem long, the questionnaire is easy to answer. 
The success of the survey depends on you. Your views will be incorporated into our 
study. We have taken care to ensure each respondent's anonymity. After your answers have 
been coded for analysis, the questionnaires will be destroyed. 
We would be grateful if you could complete and return this questionnaire by August 31st 
1993. Please return it in the self-addressed envelope which is addressed to Korea Maritime 
University for your convenience. Extra copies of the questionnaire can be obtained from the 
following address: 
Department of Maritime Transport & Science 
Korea Maritime University 
1 Dongsam-dong 
Yeongdo-ku 
Pusan 606-791 
Thank you for your cooperation and input to this study. 
Navigation Group 
Institute of Marine Studies 
University of Plymouth 
Drake Circus 
Plymouth, Devon 
PL4 8AA U.K. 
Jin-Soo PARK 
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QUESTIONNAIRE ON MARINE SAFETY 
AND VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICES 
IN KOREAN COASTAL WATERS 
A. BASIC INFORMATION 
Al. FULLTIME SHIP-BOARD EXPERIENCE? 
Please indicate your number of years of fulltime shipboard experience: ..................... years 
If your answer is 0, please go .to question A3 
A2. THE LAST RANK YOU HAVE POSSESSED ON BOARD ? 
Please indicate your occupation during your most recent year of fulltime shipboard experience. 
If you are currently engaged fulltime onboard ship, indicate your present occupation. 
Circle the appropriate number. 
(I) Master/Mate of a merchant vessel 
(2) Master/Mate of a ferry/passenger vessel 
(3) Master/Mate of a tug 
(4) Master/Mate of a fishing vessel 
(5) Master/Mate of a military or other government vessel 
(6) Master/Mate of other vessel, please specify ............................................. . 
(7) Radio operator 
(8) Pilot 
(9) Marine engineer 
(10) Other, please specify .................................................................... . 
A3. OTHER MARINE BACKGROUND 
If you are not currently engaged fulltime onboard ship, please indicate your present link 
with the marine community by circling the appropriate number(s). 
(I) Shipping company, Agent 
(2) Port/Harbour official, please specify ...................................................... . 
(3) Seafarer's education and research institute 
(4) Government employee, please specify ...................................................... .. 
(5) Coast Guard 
(6) Official of mariner's/marine industry/commercial organization 
(7) Classification surveyor 
(8) Other, please specify, ....................................................... , .... , ........ . 
A4. THE AVERAGE SIZE (Gross Ton) OF VESSEL YOU HAVE SERVED ? 
Please circle appropriate number. 
(I) less than 100 
(5) 5,000-10,000 
(2) 100-500 (3) 500-1,000 (4) 1,000-5,000 
(6) 10,000-30,000 (7) over 30,000 grt 
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A5. FAMILIAR AREAS 
B. 
Please indicate the geographical areas with which you are currently familiar by circling 
respectively. (More than one·number may be circled) 
( 1) Tonghae and its approaches 
(2) Pohang and its approaches 
(3) Ulsan and its.approaches 
(4) Pusan and its approaches 
(5) Masan/Chinhae, Kadok sudo and Koje-do area 
(6) Yosu/Kwangyang, Yosu Haeman and its approaches 
(7) Cheju Haehyop(North of Chejudo, Geomundo, Chuja.Gundo, Wando) 
and Jangjug Sudo area 
(8) Maemul Sudo, Maenggol Sudo, Heugsan Jedo, Mokpo and its approaches 
(9) Kunsan/Changhang and its approaches 
( 10) Taean Bando to Inch on area 
RISK PERCEPTION 
81. RISK FACTORS 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
ll 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Various factors contribute to accidents or to situations where the chance of an accident increase. 
Based on your total experience, please indicate how often, in your opinion, the factors below would 
increase marine risk in Korean coastal waters. Circle the appropriate number on each line. 
No opinion Very seldom Seldom Sometimes Often Very ofren 
don't know increases increase increases increase increase 
risk risk risk risk risk 
Reduced visibility 0 I 2 3 4 5 16 
(fog, snow. rain) 
Slonny weather 0 I 2 3 4 5 17 
Srrong currem 0 I 2 3 4 5 18 
or tidal sueam 
More fishing boars 0 I 2 3 4 5 19 
in shipping lanes 
More pleasure boars 0 I 2 3 4 5 20 
in shipping· lanes 
' 
More narrow channel 0 I 2 3 4 5 21 
and passage 
Higher density of rraffic 0 I 2 3 4 5 22 
(mercham ships) 
Poor design of fairway 0 I 2 3 4 5 23 
(sharp bend, shallow warer) 
Poor navigational!aids 0 I 2 3 4 5 24 
(fixed and lloaring) 
Human,faclor in ship handling 0 I 2 3 4 5 25 
Violation of rules and~regulation 0 I 2 3 4 5 26 
Olher. please specify 0 I 2 3 4 5 27 
··········································································· 
254 
Office 
Use Only 
I 
B2. OVERALL RISK BY AREA 
For each area with which you are familiar, and for the generally prevailing conditions, please 
indicate its overall risk as you see it by circling the appropriate number. 
No opinion Very low Low Moderate High Very high 
don't know risk risk risk risk risk 
Tonghae area 0 2 3 4 s 
Pohang area 0 2 3 4 s 
Ulsao area 0 2 3 4 s 
Pusan area 0 2 3 4 s 
Masan/Chinhae/Kadok Sudo/ 0 2 3 4 s 
Koje-<lo area 
Yosu/KwangyangNosu Haeman area 0 2 3 4 s 
Cheju Haehyop/Geomun-<lo/Chuja 0 2 3 4 s 
Gundo/Wando/Jangjug Sudo area 
Maemul Sudo/Maenggol Sudo/ 0 2 3 4 5 
Heugsan Jedo/Mokpo area 
Kunsan!Changhang area 0 2 3 4 s 
Taean'Bando 10 lnchon area 0 2 3 4 s 
c. ALTERNATIVES FOR RISK REDUCTION 
Cl. ALTERNATIVES 
There are different ways of improving marine safety, Please indicate the contribution of the 
following methods in improving marine safety. Circle the appropriate number on each line. 
IMPROVEMENT IN MARINE SAFETY 
No Very bnle Moderate Significant Very 
Opinion liule significanl 
Improved weather information 0 2 3 4 s 
Institution of speed 
limilS in more areas 0 2 3 4 5 
Stricter. enforcement· of 
ship safety regulations 0 2 3 4 s 
Additional dredging 0 2 3 4 5 
Upgraded fixed and floating 
navigational aids 0 2 3 4 5 
Additional traffic 
separation schemes 0 2 3 4 s 
Additional recommended 
courses on charts 0 2 3 4 s 
Additional VTS 0 2 3 4 s 
Improved education and 
training for mariners 0 2 3 4 s 
Stricter enforcement of, prohibition 
of fishing/excursion on fairway 0 2 3 4 5 
Other, please specify ....................... 0 2 3 4 5 
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C2. MODIFICATION TO VTS (* these questions are answered by the persons who work in 
specific port or area *) 
!MO Guidelines define VTS as: 
"A VTS is any service implemented by a competent authority, designed to improve safety and 
efficiency of traffic and the protection of.the envirorurient. lt.may mnge from the provision of 
simple information messages to extensive management of tmffic within a port or waterway" 
For your area, please indicate how in your opinion VTS services should be modified by circling 
the appropriate number. 
C2.l. The name of your port or area ? (. ................................................ ) 
C2.2. If your area has VTS service now 
(I') Downgrade or close (2) Maintain at present level (3) Improve or upgrade (4) No opinion 
C2.3. If your area has no VTS service 
(I) Implement (2) Do not implement (3) No opinion 
C2.4. U "Improve or upgrade" or "Implement", what level of VTS is adequate in your area? 
(I) Level 1: VMRS (A vessel movement reporting system consisting of VHF Communication 
and various vessel reporting) 
(2) Level 11: Basic Radar Surveillance (The VMRS of Level I coupled with basic radar 
surveillance. The radar is assumed to be a standard shipboard radar 
without advanced features) 
(3) Level Ill: Advanced Radar Surveillance (This system includes complete communication plus 
an advanced state-of-art VTS radar surveillance system including; 
automatic vessel track analysis, track and collision alarms,advanced 
rain and sea clutter control, high resolution, overlaid port chart system, 
provisions for vessel identifiers and particulars) 
(4) Level IV: Automatic Dependent Surveillance (based on the use of differential GPS 
retransmissions. This system consists of an automated transponder 
installed on the participating vessel that determines the vessel's 
position via differential GPS, and transmits this information 
automatically, along with vessel identification and ship 
particulars to the VTS control centre) 
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C2.5. What kind of YTS is adequate in your area ? 
(l) Port YTS 
(2) Port and its approaches 
(3) Coastal YTS 
(4) Other(. ................................................... ) 
C2.6. Where the formal authority of YTS should be vested ? 
(I) Harbour Authority (2) Coast Guard (3) Pilot Association (4) Other (. ................... ) 
D. The YTS Operator 
IMO Guidelines.defines the YTS Operator as: 
"A YTS operator is the appropriately qualified person who perfonns the functions of the VTS. 
VTS operator further means a person who provides, if duly authorised, instructions and 
infonnation to vessels and decides what action should be·taken In response to data received. 
This person may be directly responsible for communications within a defined area, or may relay 
such infonnation and decisions through an intennediary" 
Please indicate your answer by circling to appropriate number. 
D I. Do you think that marine experience is essential for YTS operators to perform their tasks 
and duties? 
(I) Essential (2) Not necessarily (3) No (4) No opinion 
D2. If "Essential", what kind of previous experience? 
(I) Ship handling (2) Communication (3) Ship handling and Communication 
(4) Other ( ............................... ) 
D3. What level of qualification is necessary to perform· the functions? 
(lo) Pilot (2) Master's experience (3) Master's certificate (4) Chief Mate's certificate 
(5) Second Mate's certificate (6) Radio Operator's certificate 
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E. EFFECTIVENESS OF VESSEL TRAFF1C SERVICES 
Each of following questions are ·based· on the analysis of marine casualties in Korean coastal 
waters that are the most incidental causal factors of accident. 
Please read· the following questions and' indicate your answer by circling to appropriate number. 
El. ASSISTANCE IN REDUCED VISilliLITY CONDITIONS 
YTS provides assistance to vessels in reduced visibility conditions by fog, rain and/or snow 
such as: monitoring the position; providing .advice on request or when determined necessary; 
providing information on objects and floats, etc. 
How important are these services to marine safety ? 
No opinion Very unimportant Unimportant Average Important Very important 
0 I 2 3 4 5 
E2. ASSISTANCE IN ADVERSE METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS 
YTS provides assistance to vessels in adverse meteorological conditions( stormy weather, 
strong current or low water, etc) by services such as: providing information on tides and 
currents; monitoring the position and providing advice on request or when determined 
necessary, etc. 
How important are these services to marine safety ? 
No opinion Very unimportant Unimportant Average Important Very important 
0 I 2 3 4 5 
E3. ASSISTANCE IN DENSE TRAFFIC AREAS 
YTS provides assistance to merchant vessels in dense traffic areas by service such as: 
providing advance traffic information; establishing/maintaining radio contact among vessels; 
warning other traffic of vessel acting contrary to regulations or in an unexpected manner; 
monitoring vessel's movements; providing advice on the timing of various manoeuvres to 
assist traffic and/or to avoid a potentially hazardous situation, etc. 
How important are these services to marine safety ? 
No opinion Very unimportant Unimportant Average Important Very important 
0 t 2 3 4 5 
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E4. ASSISTANCE IN AREAS CONGES"[:ED WITH.FISHING VESSELS OR PLEASURE CRAFTS 
In areas congested with fishing vessels or pleasure crafts, VTS provides assistance by services 
such as: provide advance information to large vessels on the presence of the group of 
small vessels; providing advance information to fishing vessels on the approach of larger 
vessels; advising larger vessels of courses that will avoid concentrations of small vessels, 
etc. 
How important are these services to marine safety ? 
No opinion Very unimponant Unimportant Average Important Very important 
0 I 2 3 4 5 
E5. ASSISTANCE IN RESTRICTED WATERS 
E6. 
E7. 
VTS provides assistance to vessels in restricted waters (e.g. near blind bends, narrow 
passage, rocks, shoals, shallow water, structure on seabed, tunnels, bridges, caissons, 
narrow channels, or floating objects) by services such as: providing advance notice of the 
hazard where necessary (to foreign vessels, or where the hazard is new); providing traffic 
information in the area of the hazard; monitoring vessel's movements so as to regulate the 
flow of traffic and reduce risk, etc. 
How important are these services to marine safety ? 
No opinion Very unimportant Unimportant Average Important Very important 
0 I 2 3 4 5 
ASSISTANCE IN AREAS WITH VESSELS ACTING CONTRARY TO RULES 
VTS provides assistance to vessels acting contrary to rules & regulations such as 
excessive speed under the·condition, sail in wrong side or unmarked waters, and etc. 
by services such as: providing information to other traffic on the presence of rogue vessels; 
warning all traffic of a vessel acting contrary to regulations or in an unusual manner, etc. 
How important are these services to marine safety ? 
No opinion Very unimportant Unimportant Average Important Very important 
0 t 2 3 4 5 
ASSISTANCE RENDERED TO VESSELS IN EMERGENCY 
VTS assists vessels experiencing engine failure, fire on board, loss of control, radar failure, 
radio failure and other emergency situation by services such as: identifying the vessel in 
distress; routeing other vessels away from the scene of accident; closely monitoring the 
situation; providing any other required assistance. 
How important are these services to marine safety ? 
No opinion Very unimportant Unimportant Average Important Very important 
0 t 2 3 4 5 
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E8. ASSISTANCE WITH FOREIGN LANGUAGES ·PROBLEMS, 
LACK OF EXPERIENCE OR KNOWLEDGE PROBLEMS 
VTS provides assistance to vessels having such problems by services such as: the early 
identification of vessels whose crews are experiencing language difficulties in .their 
communications; warning other traffic of ,the presence of such vessels; ·helping to 
communicate each other; providing assistance on request, etc. 
How important are these services to marine safety ? 
No opinion Very unimponant Unimponant Average lmponant Very imponant 
0 I 2 3 4 5 
E9. ASSISTANCE WITH COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS 
VTS centre monitor the communications between vessels, ship. and shore, ship and tug. 
VTS provides assistance to vessels having communication difficulties, on request or when 
detennined necessary. 
How important are these services to marine safety ? 
No opinion Very unimponant Unimponant Average lmponant Very imponant 
0 I 2 3 4 5 
E!O. PROVISION OF NOTICES TO SHIPPING 
When VTS personnel are made aware of a new hazard to navigation, a Notice to Shipping 
is passed to the vesseL 
How important are these services to marine safety ? 
No opinion Very unimportant 
0 I 
Unimponant Average lmponant Very imponant 
2 3 4 5 
Thank you for your cooperation 
and input to this study !! 
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264 
Office 
Use Only 
(I) '/'tl VIS (2) 8/'ftlj. .J. ':l~~*li ~~li:: VIS (3) 'ti'U'i>~~~~ ~~li:: VIS 
(4) 7]E~ ( ......... ., .................................... ) 
(I) '-t ~loteit'/'tl~ (2) ti•J':o.fiJ: '-t ~~.:r~ (3) '-t 8/'tlel .5:.~.1.~~!1 
(4) 7]E~ ( ................................................ ) 
~111tP~7]-f,(ll«.l)~.lo{ 1\1" tt~.l!:t!(VIS Operator)!] 1el11- of-ei11"Jt ~.:;J.t~.l.joj Ofi\1 
-1!:-'/(4.1 - 4.3l!l WN 't!.t.~ O.i.tl ?"J"Ii.. 
"t!-~.2.-t!(VIS Operator)oj~ VIS!] ~ 7]JN 'i>'Jtli::tt ~m! *1t 7~~ "~'lt-1- a,h!q. 3:\1" 
?tt~~-1!-Ei '1:1-H- .Y.Oo!'l!'~ :>J~ f-8/-::!'!1'~:>1 ~1"111- 1.1!.0nstructlons 8lld lnfol'l8tlon)f ~-i' 
t~7].S:. t~ll] ~~7]7~ <;>~J\!' Dataf oj'f~ *-lt~.:;J., .J. Data~ oj'f;af ~%V ~'tl~li 7J~tli:: .l.~'lto]7].S:. 
t~.:;J., ~f7]7f -e4'-tli:: ~~~~l>fi.lof!l .5'.~ .J.{!(OOIIIunlcatlons)~ ~t( 'l1':1~'tl 1~'l:lol ~.:;J. ll.IJI-Ei ':1~ 
1.1!.lf 'J"J.-If'/t tt'I!.Y..J.f~ i'7itli:: 1~'i:lo] ~i: ~~ojq." 
4.1. ;J1j. Y~ '11.1? '!I 7]-\--i -t-'l••i: ~llf.ll.-t!IVJS ~tcr)of;af •l"l~'IIIBI'lne elpel'ieme)ol ifl4''!!.!!.!. 
.11. .:r:t~ q. .il. .., '-tt1114 ~ ? 
(I l 8/tl '!! -::! '!l'.!.i' (ship bandllf1) (2) f"J (couunlcatlonl (3) '/ti, -::! 'll'.!.i' '!! t-'J 
(4) 7]E~ (. ........................ ) 
265 
Office 
Use Only 
~. VIS i~ (Effectiveress of Vessel Traffic ~rvlces) 
of*-1 7.1' {ttJ'~ t~'litl-of)oj~ tl\:1'-'f.:;r.f ~~ :>Jlj., 7f"r 'l.!'titf:1 'lt1tii= -'f.2-ti0Jfq,JI..jt:f, 
7.j' tj'!! ~ 'li'!!?~of Level Ill (Advanced Radar !Wwlllanoei 'lt~ 3.2.4 {tt{ "".if.)~ VJSf 
11~1tf'll.t:f.:;r. 7f'liV ltJ, ~I .12}~ 1!~ o~ H~ tltfo.J ~W 'll..t.of O.lf.tfo.j -MI-'1.!1.. 
'!!11, w1 :!1:.-l:': .r2£ 'l!tfo.J -'l'llol ~mt! ~~~)oj. ~Efof)oj.f: ~I!J'~ oiHt-i i!folt:f£.1!-~J~~ 
tf.:;r. ~2.£.-¥-E-I .11.~01 11t 111, ~~"J'tjol of.IJ'l!l !t1 ~ li!.!!.tft:f.:;r. 'l!'lll!l llfoti': ~I!J'.J.M~'ll!!., 
~l!.f .:!1:.-l:': ~tolfOf 1!~ 'll!!. n -'f~of 'lfi\oj* .!jlj. ~~ )ojwl~i ~-i'V ?7f 11-l::~. ole-j~ 
~YI~el ;!fjol ~I!J'el '!!~t{tJ ~ .lf.:;r.of'tof ~.!::'li.X. .12}1f 11t ~2.£. !!.-'li':"l.!!. 1 
el::! ~-3- ~"l t .!!.tf"l ~q. t.!!.*l ~q. !!.folt:f t.!l.tft:f- of-j> 't.!l.tft:f 
0 I 2 3 4 s 
7I"/"J'tl7f f"l~~ 'H(~. ~.VI .:!1:.-l:': '/.if.i!- f), vrs-:gtfof~i': .:f.~oll..f .if.i!-of tl~ '11!!.21 
"d-i·. ofoltf-i -t~ ~~~~~ 1t*J ~ ~~. ~2.£.-\'-ti .!l.'lfol11t lif .:!1:.-l:': li!.!!.tft:f-.:;r.lftl(!-ljjit8 
~~~ tW "I'~ %2} ~~ ~wl~i :!f-i'V '*-'f 11-l::~. ole.J~ ~w~~~ ~-i'OI ~I!J'el '!!~VtJ ~ 
.Af.:;Lof'tot ~,!::"J£ t.!l.tftf.:;L !!..11-f:)ll.!!. 1 
21::! ~~ ~e.j t .!l.tf"l ~q. t.!!.*l ~q. !!.l-0 I q. t.!l.tft:f- of-j> 't.!l.tft:f-
0 I 2 3 4 s 
-"l.l-01 f~J~ "l'!jofJ.j, ~tf~~i': ft{~I!J'~ tit! -'f~-ttl'll!!.el :>!1-i. ~I!J'l}!! i'{!.J.~ *"I• 
t{'llt ~tl1fo.j tjtJtf.:;r. 11-l:: ~I!J'of 1!~ ~ll'll!!.!!.l llfj, ~I!J'-ttiof tl~ i!~J ~ ~-'1. *" ~I!J' 
ft{lj. i!~t! 'll!!.!!.l llfj %2} ~~ ~YI~i llfj~ '*-'f 11-l::t«, ole-j~ ~Y~~~ i!fjoJ ~I!J'!!.I 
'!!~t{tJlj. .lf.:;Lofotof ~='ll.x. t.!l.tft:f.:;r. !!.-'1-f:lll.!!. 1 
el::! ~-3- ~e.j t .!l.tflll ~q. t.!l.tfll! ~q. !!,fO ltf t.!l.tft:f- of-j> t.!l.tft:f 
0 I 2 3 4 5 
266 
Office 
Use Only 
oH! ·~.e -R-~1! %21- ~~ .:t•J{!'ItoJ '!l~Jijoj il~ llj'!joJ).j~ vrs-:!t~of"''-1= *""' .:t•J{! aJ~J 11"~ 
tW .tf~ ~~'I tt•J1!of ilfi-tf1JLf, t1~1!~l 'd.r.tf11t .:t•J1Jof .t~~ot 'll~* 1J, ~-~= .:t•J{!-H-
.t.*l2£ Jjt(:Q' '}il-l= ll~f tt~J{!of 'll~* %~1 ).jwJ~i llliV '}7f il-l=~. oJ~ti ).jwj~~~ 
lltioJ {!lit~! ~~tjtJ2j. .t~~of'tof oi=~!r. t.l!.tfrj-~ ~.tJ:f:;!J.l!.1 
*.! tl-3- ~tl t.l!.*l firj- t.l!.t~"' fit!- ~fojrj- t.l!.t~rj- oK- t.l!.tfrj-
0 I 2 3 4 5 
tJ'}~. 'd'}llj'!j, tl-.if-11-• .;FJ', ~-1= HftoJ il-l= "l'!lof"''. vrs-:gt~"''-1= oJ~~ ~1:111-tot rm 
~~~~ .t~~~~~i. ~1;l'}'!j0il).j21 £t~~ llli. {! 'lt~l ojt-'J"f t~-~.t 'ill!! VI oJeiti ~1:1'i fol7l 
~tfo,J {!'lt.ii.H .!.~tf~ tllltli: %~ ).jYJ~t ilfiV '}7f il-l:;~. oJeW ).jYJ~~I i!fioJ {!'IJ"~l 
~~·i•J 'J,l .tf~ot'tof oi=~x. .t.2j-7f ilt ~~ ~.tj{:;llj.l!. 1 
~I 'tl tl-3- ~ tl t .l!.*l fit!- t .!!.$fill fit!- ~toltl- t.l!.t~rj- oK- t.l!.t~rj-
0 I 2 3 4 5 
>Jtl~ ·.t~i 'J!oil.l'i'ltf~ il-l= 7Jf, it~~ .!t£i \M •.t•Jt~~ il-l= :>df, ~t~~ \'"'IJ(IIJ'!l\'"'J 
1f11J, ~111l'i'll %lt ~'1]-tfo,J •i•Jt~~ il-l:; 7Jf ~{:; Oll'tl~-1= q.j~of tit( of-1!-~ .!.~I£ ~6~111 fi-E 
-:-:! ~~to! il-l= :>Ji!-011 ~tfof"''-E "itH! 'ltof t.!ti q.J 'IJ".tf-'J~l "i'lj 'il i:!.;J..if ~~t •.t•At'i! ~ 'ltof 
ctt~o,j{:; q.j'l]--:-:j'lj"ej ~~!%of t!-ti ~~ilfi %~1 ).jYJ~f ilfiV '}7f il.f:~. oJi!-Jti ).jYJ~~ "i-i-01 
~*' ~~·.t·J 'J,l ,tf~of'tot oi=~x. .t.2j-7f ilt ~~ ~.tj.f:lll.l!. 1 
~I 'tl tl-3- ~tl t.l!.*l firj- t.l!.*l firj- ~toJrj- t.l!.t~q. oK- t.l!.t~rj-
0 I 2 3 4 5 
~Efojj).j{:; 7Jt!-~~J", !J-11!, tf7J~'i. ~~7J~'i. Pjojrj-~'i. f-'J'iYJ~~.t 'J,l 7Jt~ -H-'itiof il.f: 
-:-:!'lt~l ~'I! 'il "i-lL "i'41i f\'"tli: {!'lj"of tltl"'i-1= ojejti ~'i{!'IJ"t Yj;!j:Q' '}il£-it :rB~i "'itli: 
%~1 ).jYJ~i llfiV '}7~ il-l:;~, oJ~ti ).jYj~~ i!f-i-01 {!'IJ"~l ~~·.t•J 'J,l .t~2of'tof oi=:r;i£ .t.2j-7f 
ilt ~~ ~.tj{:;llj.l!. 1 
~!?..! tl-3- ~tl t .l!.tflll firj- t.l!.tflll fit!- ~fojrj- t.l!.t~rj- oK- t.l!.t~rj-
0 I 2 3 4 5 
267 
Office 
Use Only 
5.8. !l?tol!. '!I•• .il•t11t~ otl!t. '!t!l!4 .!f.~ J!Y;ll)~ !!\~ oti!Jt.;. ~,!!. 'll~ o\'l!toft tl!t YIS ll);! Office 
VIS1!E~~.Ioji; 't71!1 oH!·£. 'l..!t~~ ojl.of-tof ~·1~-i: ~lit-& ~7Jot ~'lit~ -&-~~~* t!•Jt~,i!. ~~ Use Only 
tjtJfO.! eH!- ~'I!'~ t(t~O;ji; ojej\}' ~'IJ'oj ~H 'lfl.of?ul, ~~-¥-Ei!l.li."JO! ~V Ill ojf *~ 
*'~ * -f-!l .lojuj~f ~i\1" *7~ ~i;t4, oiei\t .lojuj~!l 11!-iol ~'IJ'!l oJ~tjtJ '!I -'~2ot'V"ol 
oj~"cc.S:. .:!21-7~ ~t 1~ .'i!.-'li::!l.ll. 1 
!I::!. tl-3- ~"' i' .ll.t~:~l 'litl- i'.ll.*l 'litl- .'i!.f0 ltl- i'.ll.t~q. 0~ t.ll.t~q. 
0 I 2 3 4 5 
5. 9. J-o\'I.;HI !.lt ~!I I f .•• ll);! 
VTS-l!E~~.Ioli: 1!'1J':zi-1!'1J', 1!'1J':z!. ~~. 1!llt:z!. ~~ ~ 1!'1J':z!. .s:.~~ :tt.el .J.1!1..1H ".!~\!" *7~ 1li:t4. 
0 lf ftro'l .J.1!'t!l oJ~-&-ol 'l.]:~lli ttli; olf i'~ ~i; ~'ll\1" *7~ ~,!!., .J.1!t..IH -!P-!tl{l: H~ ~~oj 
Oll::l.li tt(ofi; ol~ t(\t .J."cc ~ ~,i!.f t~ -f-!!1 .lo!HI~i "ii\1" *7~ ~i;t4, o!ei\t .lojuj~!l ~:101 
1!'1!'!1 'tl~tjtJ ~ )~,i!.ofl'l/'~ oJ~'ll.s:. .:!:zl-7~ 1lt 12£ .'i!.-'li::~l.ll. 1 
!1::!. tlt ~to! i'.ll.*l 'lit!- t ,ll.t~:~l 'litl- .'i!.f0 ltl- t.ll.t~q. 0~ t.ll.t~tl-
0 I 2 3 4 5 
VJ'S-l!t~.loji; t!"i.ll.~('rnl Operator)oj '1.]:~1\J' 'l'l"/!l -'I!.~ ~~WJ ('/ll:~l!l ,i!.>J'oll1 oj-f- -f-, 
t(.s:.~.-~ *£."'1:~1"/!l ~:'~-'~'/, Ht. Hlot tW 'll.'l!.i ?'li!!l f'l1illtot'l •Jl>f* -f-!!1 .lojul~i 
111-i\t *7f 1li;r4, oj~i\}' .lojul~!l J4iol 1!'1!'!1 '\!~'1'8 ~ -'f,i!.o4'1/'ofl oJ~'ll.s:. .:t:zl-7~ 1lv 
12£ .'l!,J.ji;:~l.ll. 1 
!I::J. tlt ~to! t .ll.t~:~l 'litl-
0 I 
( '!!-t ~.±) 6 0 6 - 7 9 I 
-¥-"J"I "J.S:.iL -i"'Jf I 
\t ~ tl •J ~ tt 
t( .... ~ * t tt :z!. >J' 
t.ll.*l 'litl- .'J!.fOirf f,ll.t~q. 0~ t.ll.t~t:f 
2 3 4 5 
268 
Reference 
REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 
ALDWINCKLE D.S., POMEROY R.V.(l983). Reliability and Safety Assessment 
Methods for Ships and Other Installations. No.82. Lloyd's Register of Shipping. 
2 ARINC Research Corporation (1964). William H. Von Alven (Eds). 
Reliability Engineering. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc. 
3 BARBER P., HUGHES T.( 1992). Training and Qualifications for VTS 
Operators. Proceedings of 7th International Symposium on VTS. 
Vancouver, Canada. June 1992. 
4 BELL P.(l992). The Mariner's Requirements for VTS. Proceedings of 
7th International Symposium on YTS. Vancouver, Canada. June 1992. 
5 BLOCKLEY 0.(1992). Engineering Safety. McGraw-Hill Book Company. 
6 BOLE A.G. et a! (1992) The Navigation Control Manual 2nd ed. Newnes. 
7 BOWDIDGE I. D.( 1977). Collisions and Strandings in the Dover Strait Area 
1960-1976. National Maritime Institute. NMI R 12. Feltharn. 
8 BROWN D.B.( 1976). Systems Analysis & Design for Safety. Prentice-Hall Inc. 
9 BUJAR A.B.(1988). Vessel Traffic Services in Ports and their Approaches. MSc 
Thesis of University of Wales College of Cardiff. 
10 BURGESS C.R., FRAMPTON R.M. & UTTRIDGE P.A. (1988). Meteorology 
for Seafarers. Glasgow: Brown, Son & Ferguson Ltd. 
11 CANADIAN COAST GUARD (1984). Study: Vessel Traffic Services. 
Final Report. Ottawa. 
12 CANADIAN COAST GUARD (1988). Vessel Traffic Services Benefit/Cost 
Update Study. February 1988. Ottawa. 
13 CANADIAN COAST GUARD (1991). 1991 Vessel Traffic Services CVTS) 
Update Study. December 1991. Ottawa. 
14 Central Marine Accidents Inquiry Agency. Written Verdicts (] 986) (] 987) (1988) 
(1989) (1990) (1991). Seoul. 
15 COCK CROFT A.N .( 1978) Journal of Navigation Vol.31 No.2. Statistics of 
Ship Collisions. London. 
16 COCKCROFT A.N. (1982). The Effectiveness of Ship Routeing offNorth 
West Europe. Proc. A Seminar on Aspects of Navigational Safety. London 
December 1982. The Nautical Institute 
269 
Reference 
17 COLDWELL T.G. (1982). A Marine Traffic Study in the Humber Seaway. Hull 
College of Higher Education. 
18 COMPtJTING SERVICE (1986). Prime System Handbook, Volume 4: 
Statistical Analysis. Chapter 2: Survey Analysis. Polytechnic South West, 
Plymouth, 
19 CORBET A. G. (1987). The Legal .and Technological Aspects of Marine Traffic 
Control. PhD Thesis. University of Wales, Cardiff. 
20 DARE S.C. & LEWISON G.R.G.(1980) The Recent Casualty Record in the 
Dover Strait. National Maritime Institute. NMI R 68. Feltham. 
21 DEGRE T. and et al (1987). Existing Vessel Traffic Services: Inventory, 
Functions and Effectiveness. COST 301 Final Report, Annex to Main Report: 
Volume 4. Commission of European Communities. 
22 Department of Energy (1988). A Survey of Operational Vessel Traffic 
Service in Offshore Locations. report prepared by Technica Consulting 
Scientists and Engineers, HMSO: London. 
23 DRAGER K.H, VERLO G, THACKWELL J.A & KARLSEN J.A.(1978) 
Study of Relationships between different Causes of Collisions and Groundings. 
Proceedings of Third Marine Traffic Services Symposium, Liverpool. 
24 DRAG ER K.H.(l981) The Needs for National and IMCO Ship Casualty Statistics. 
DnV Report No. 103. 
25 DRAG ER K.H. (1981 ). Cause Relationships of Collision and Stranding. 
Final Report. DnV Report No. 81-0097. Oslo. 
26 ECKER W.J.(l978). Casualty Analysis of Selected Waterways. SMEATON 
G.P. (Eds). Proceedings of the Third International Symposium on Marine 
Traffic Service; Supplement. Liverpool. April 1978. 
27 ELMS D.G.(l992) Engineering Safety. David Blockley (Eds) Chapter 2 
McGraw-Hill Book Company. 
28 ERIKSSON T. (1986). Fishing Activities. COST 301 Final report on Task force 
2.1'5. Commission of European Communities. 
29 Fairplay Information Systems ( 1988). Commercial Shipping Fleets. Surrey. 
30 Fairplay Information Systems. Faimlay World Shipping Directory 1993-94. 
Surrey, UK. 
3·1 FUJII Y & YAMANOUCHI H (1973). The Distribution of Collision in Japan and 
Methods of Estimating Collision Damage. Journal of Navigation Vol 26, No. I. 
270 
Reference 
32 FUJII Y.(l977) Development marine traffic engineering in Japan. Journal of 
Navigation, Vol. 30 No l. p 36. 
33 FUJII Y. & KAKU S. (1981). Time Trend of Traffic Accidents in Japan before 
and after the Maritime Traffic Safety Law. In Zade G.(Eds). Proc. Fourth 
International Symposium on Vessel Traffic Services. Bremen. 
34 FUJII Y., YAMANOUCHI H. & MATSUI T.(l984). Survey on Vessel 
Traffic Management Systems and Brief Introduction to Marine Traffic Studies. 
Electronic Navigation Research Institute Papers, vol.45. 1984. Tokyo. 
35 FUJII, YAMANOUCHI & WAKAO T.(l988). The Results of the Third 
Survey on VTS in the World. Proceedings of the Sixth International 
Symposium on VTS. Gothenburg, Sweden. May 1988. 
36 GARDINIER J.S.(1976) Toward a Science of Marine Safety. In Glansdorf 
C.C.(Ed) Marine Traffic Systems. Delft University Press. 
37 GLANSDORP C.C. et a/ (1987). The Maritime Environment, Traffic and 
Casualties. COST 301 Final Report-Annex to Main Report: Volume 2. 
Commission of European Communities. 
38 GOODMAN R.A. Lloyd's Register's Approach to Ship Safety. No.84. Lloyd's 
Register of Shipping. 
39 GOODWIN E.M.(l975) A Statistical Study of Ship Domains. PhD Thesis, 
CNAA. 
40 GOSS R.O. & I-IALLIDAY J.E.(I986) Cost 301, Costs and Benefits of Coastal 
Vessel Traffic Services in European Waters: Report on Task 2.43. Commission 
of European Communities. 
41 GRIMES C.(l972) Journal ofNavigation Vol.25 No.4. A Survey ofMarine 
Accident with particular reference to Tankers. London. 
42 HAMMER W.(l972). Handbook of System and Product Safety. Prentice-Hall Inc. 
43 I-IARA K.(l988). Progress of VTS and its Studies in Japan. Proceedings 
of Sixth International Symposium on VTS. Gothenburg, Sweden. 17-19 May. 
44 SELECT COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, HOUSE OF 
LORD. Safety Aspects of Ship Design and Technology. HL Paper 30-11. HMSO. 
45 HAWKINS F.(l987). Human Factors in Flight. Gower Technical Press: England. 
46 The Hydrographer of Navy (1983).Pilot No. 43. South and East Coast of Korea, 
East Coast of Siberia and Sea of Okhotsk Pilot. Somerset, England. 
4 7 The Hydrographer of the Navy ( 1982). Coast Pilot No. 32. China Sea Pilot 
Volume Ill. Somerset, England. 
271 
Reference 
48 The Hydrographer of the Navy. B.A. Chart No. 3642. 1065, 898, 1259, 3666. 
49 The Institute of London Underwriters (1992). 1991 Annual Report p.5. 
London. 
50 IMO (1985). Resolution A.578(14) - Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Services. 
51 IMO ( 1990). Guidelines on the Recruitment. Qualifications and Training of 
YTS Operators. NA V 36/20, 6 June 1990. 
52 IMO (1993). Report on the 37th Session of IMO. Sub-Committee on Safety 
of Navigation. Annex I - Draft MSC Circular 'Guidelines on the 
Recruitment, Qualifications and Training of YTS Operators'. 
53 IRVIN G.(I978). Modern Cost-Benefit Methods. London: The Macmillan 
Press Ltd. p 52. 
54 JOHNSON D.R.( 1978) Recent Trends in Navigational Safety in the Dover Strait. 
In Smeaton G.P.(Ed). Marine Traffic Service-Supplement. Liverpool Polytechnic 
Press . 
55 JURDZINSKI M. and STA:ROSCIAK 1.(1981) Navigation problems on Southern 
Baltic. In Zade G.(Eds). Proc. Fourth International Symposium on Vessel Traffic 
Services, Bremen. 1981. 
56 KARLSEN J.E. & KRISTIANSEN S.(l980). Statistical Survey of Collisions and 
Groundings for Norwegian Ships for the period 1970-78. Oslo: Det Norske 
Veritas. 
57 KEMP J.F., GOODWIN E. M.( 1979) Marine Statistics. p.l40. London: 
Stanford Maritime London. 
58 KEMP J.F., GOODWIN E.M. & PICK K.(l984) Quantification of risk in 
European sea areas. Safety in European Waters. Proc. A seminar on safety of 
shipping in European Waters, Dec. 1984. London. 
59 KEMP J. et a/ (1985). COST 301: Hydro-Meteorological Factor. Report on Task 
2.JI. Commission of European Communities. 
60 KEMP J.F., GOODWIN E.M. & PICK K.(l986) COST 301, Risk Assessment: 
Problem Area Identifier: Report on Task 2.46. Commission of European 
Communities. 
61 Korea Maritime and Port Administration. Statistical Yearbook of Shipping and 
Ports (1973) - (1991). Seoul, Korea. 
62 Korea Maritime and Port Administration (1993). Interim Report on the National 
YTS Project (Korean). July 1993. Seoul. 
63 Korean Maritime Research Institute. Shipping Directory Korea (1991). Seoul. 
272 
Reference 
64 Korea Maritime University (1983). Vessel Traffic Management System on the 
Area of the frequency of marine accidents (Korean). The Basic Maritime Science 
Institute, Korea Maritime University. Pusan, Korea. 
65 Korea Maritime University (1987). A Comprehensive Developing Plan of 
Navigational Aids (Korean). The Basic Maritime Science Institute, Korea 
Maritime University. Pusan, Korea. 
66 Korean Shipowners Association ( 1985). Marine Casualty DiaryC1962 - 1983), 
Seoul. 
67 Korea Shipping Association. The Status quo of Partners (1989). Seoul. 
68 KOSTILAINEN V. et a! (1985). Cost Benefit Analysis of the Vessel Traffic 
Services. COST 301 Final Report on Task 2.47. Commission of European 
Communities. 
69 KURODA K., KIT A H.(l990). Safety Assessment of Waterway Network m 
Topkyo Bay Area. Proc. of the 27th International Navigation Congress, 
Osaka - May 1990. 
70 LANGLEY R.(l970). Practical Statistics. Dover Publications: New York. 
71 LIGTHART V.H.M.( 1978) Maritime Risk Analysis for the importation of 
LNG into the Netherlands. In Smeaton G.P. (Eds). Marine Traffic Service 
-Supplement. Liverpool Polytechnic Press. 
72 LITTLE I.M.D., MIRRLESS J.A.( 1976). Project Appraisal and Planning for 
Developing Countries. Heinemann Education Books: London. 
73 Lloyd's of London Press. Lloyds' Maritime Directory 1993. Essex. 
74 Lloyd's Register of Shipping. Register of Ships 1992-93. London, 
75 Lloyd's Register of Shipping. List of Ship Owners 1992-93. London. 
76 Marine Accident Inquiry Agency. Written Verdicts (Korean) (1973 - 1988), Seoul. 
77 MARINE DIRECTORATE, Department of Transport (1991). The Human 
Element in Shipping Casualties pp.2-3. London: HMSO. 
78 MclNTOSH D.H. (1972). Meteorological Glossary. London: Her Majesty's 
Stationery Office. 
79 Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. Statistical Yearbook of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (1990)(1984). Seoul, Korea. 
80 Ministry of Defence(NAVY) (1987). Admiralty Manual of Navigation. HMSO: 
London. 
273 
Reference 
81 Ministry of Transport. Statistical Yearbook of Transportation (1990). Seoul, Korea 
82 MOON J.R. & HIGGINS 1.(1977) Mathematical Aspects of Marine Traffic 
Casualty Statistics. In Hollingdale S.H.(Eds.). Mathematical Aspects. of Marine 
Traffic. London: Academic Press. 
83 MOTTE R. (1972). Weather Routeing of Ship's. pp. 36-38. London: The 
Maritime Press Ltd. 
84 NAGATSUKA S.(l993). Analysis of World/Japan's Shipping Casualties and 
Future Prospects thereof. Tokyo: Japan Maritime Research Institute. 
85 NORUSIS M.J.(l988) SPSS/PC+ V2.0 Base Manual. Chicago: SPSS Inc. 
NORUSIS M.J.( 1988) SPSS/PC+ Data Entry I I. Chicago: SPSS Inc. 
NORUSIS MJ.(l990) SPSS/PC+ Tables. Chicago: SPSS Inc. 
NORUSIS M.J.(1990) SPSS/PC+ Trends. Chicago: SPSS Inc. 
NORUSIS M.J.(l990). The SPSS Guide to Data Analysis. SPSS Inc. 
86 O'CONNOR P.D.T.(l985). Practical Reliability Engineering. John Wiley & Sons, 
87 Office of Hydrographic Affairs, Republic of Korea. Notice to Mariners No.31 
(748) 1982. 
88 Office of Hydrographic Affairs, Republic of Korea. Notice to Mariners No.21 
( 494) 1982. 
89 Office of I-lydrographic Affairs, Republic of Korea (1988). Sailing Direction for 
the South Coast of Korea. 
90 Office of Hydrographic Affairs, Republic of Korea (1989). Sailing Direction for 
the West Coast of Korea. 
91 Office of Hydrographic Affairs, Republic of Korea. Korean Chart No. 306. 323, 
202, F-229. 
92 OPPENHEIM A.N.(l992). Questionnaire Design. Interviewing and Attitude 
Measurement. Pinter Publishers Ltd. London. 
93 PARK J.S.( 1994). Maritime Korea, February 1994. Analysis of Inter-relationships 
between different Causes of Marine Casualties in Korea (Korean). Seoul: Korea 
Maritime Research Institute. 
94 PARK J.S.(l994). Maritime Korea, March-April 1994. A Survey on the 
Navigation Environment and VTS in Korean waters (Korean). Seoul: Korea 
Maritime Research Institute. 
95 PARK J.S. & et a! (1988). A Questionnaire Survey on the Shipboard Life of 
Graduates from KMU in 5 Years (Korean). Thesis Collection of KMU. Vol. 23. 
Pusan, Korea. 
274 
Reference 
96 PARK J.S.( 1989). MSc Thesis - A Study on the Inventory Management of Sea-
borne Containers (Korean). Dong,A University. Pusan, Korea. 
97 PARK J.S., PARK Y.S.(l990). Study Report: A Study on the Reasonable 
Objectiveness of Trading Area of the Korea Ship Safety Act (Korean). Pusan, 
Korea. 
98 PARK J.S. & et a/ ( 1990). A Questionnaire Survey on the Status of Apprentice 
Officer on Merchant Ships (Korean). Journal of Korea Merchant Marine Research 
Institute. Pusan, Korea. 
99 PARK Y S (1988). Marine Traffic Laws (Korean) pp 882-887. Korea Merchant 
Marine Research Institute, .Pusan, Korea. 
I 00 Planning Board, Treasury Board Secretariat of Canada. Benefit-Cost Analysis 
Guide. March 1976. p 36. 
101 QUINN P.T. & SCOTT S.M. (1982) The Human Element in Shipping Casualties: 
Analysis of Situational and Human Factors. London: The Tavistock Institute of 
Human Relations. 
I 02 RAHMAN N.A.(l968). A Course in the Theoretical Statistic. 
London: Griffin. pp 215-217. 
I 03 RASH AD R.M.( 1982). A Study of Marine Traffic Management with Special 
Reference to the Egyptian Waterways. PhD Thesis. University of Wales, Institute 
of Science and Technology Cardiff. 
I 04 READ J.F.(1981) Shipping Casualties around The British Isles 1970-7-1979. 
National Maritime Institute. Feltham. 
I 05 RED FERN A. ( 1988). Effective Search and Rescue. PhD Thesis. Polytechnic 
South West. Plymouth. 
I 06 Republic of Korea. Marine Accidents Inquiry Act, Article I. 
107 ROBERTS C.W. & FRANKCOM C.E.N. (1985). Maritime Meteorology: A 
Guide for Deck Officers. pp. 211-212. London: Thomas Reed Publications Ltd. 
I 08 SIL VERLEAF A. (1973) Marine traffic engineering: an introduction. Marine 
Traffic Engineering. p.3. London: The Royal Institute ofNavigation. 
I 09 SPIRO E. M.(l992). Economic Appraisal and Marine Safety. Department of 
Transport. 
110 SWIFT A.J.( 1993). Bridge Team Management. The Nautical Institute: London. 
Ill TAHA H.A.(1982). Operations Research (3rd Ed.). New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Company. p 7. 
275 
Reference 
112 TANAKA K. & FUJII Y.(1971). Traffic Capacity. Journal ofNavigation, Vol. 24. 
pp 543"552. 
112 TERRY G.J.(1991) Engineering System Safety. Mechanical Engineering 
Publications Ltd., London. p 14. 
113 THOMSON J.R.(l987) Engineering Safety Assessment. 
Essex: Longman Scientific & Technical. 
114 TOYODA S. & FUJII Y.(l97I) Marine traffic engmeenng. The Journal of 
Navigation, Vol. 24 No I. 
115 TRESFON R.(I985). COST 301 Marine Traffic Casualties in the COST 301 
area I 978- I 982. p 19. Final report on Task 2.23. Commission of European 
Communities. 
116 TUOVINEN P., KOSTJLAINEN V. & HAMALii.INEN A.(I983) Studies on Ship 
Casualties in the Baltic Sea. Helsinki University of Technology, Ship 
Hydrodynamic Laboratory, Report No. 24. 
117 TUOVINEN P., HAMALAINEN A. & KOSTILAINEN (1985). COST 301. Cost-
Benefit Analysis of the Vessel Traffic Services in the Baltic Sea. July 
Commission of European Communities. 
118 UNITED STATES COAST GUARD (1973). Vessel Traffic Systems: Analysis of 
Port Needs, Final Report. August 1973. Washington DC. 
119 UNITED STATES COAST GUARD (1991). Port Needs Study (Vessel 
Traffic Services Benefits). Washington DC. 
120 W ALPOLE R.E. & MYERS R.H.( 1990) Probability and Statistics for 
Engineers and Scientists. New York: MacMillan Publishing Co. 
121 WEEKS F.F.(I991) Vessel Traffic Services. BIMCO Bulletin 1/91. 
122 WENNINK C.J.( 1992) Collision and Grounding Risk Analysis for ships 
Navigating in confined waters. The Journal of Navigation, Vol.45 No. I. 
123 WHITEMAN H.H & FALVEY T.J. (1988) The U.S. and Canadian View 
on VTS. Proceedings of Sixth International Symposium on VTS. 
Gothenburg, Sweden. 17-19 May. 
124 WINER B.J.(I971). Statistical Principles in Experimental Design. New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Co. pp 37-48, 185-201 and 205-220. 
276 
